The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

Arnold admitted. “However, this was done by an orderly process under public control and the question of whether this legislation was wise or unwise is a subject for public debate and not for the deliberations of private conspiracies” (Arnold 1940, p. 195).

47. Brinkley (1993, p. 566). One of Arnold’s favorite examples was the union restriction that paint brushes could be no wider than 41⁄2 inches.

48. Edwards (1943, p. 346).

49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

50. Crane (2007, p. 97).

51. As we saw, price fixing had been illegal per se since the Trans-Missouri Freight decision of

1897. But the Appalachian Coals decision (Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 US 344 [1933]) had introduced some elements of a rule-of-reason doctrine. On this see Kimmel (2011), who disputes the conventional reading of these cases.

52. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

53. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

54. Waller (2005, pp. 91–92).

55. Hamilton (1941); Hart (1998, pp. 91–92). On this distinction see also Hovenkamp

(2008).

56. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F.

Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943). In the Hartford-Empire case, the district court ordered royalty-free licensing, but the Supreme Court altered the verdict to licensing at “reasonable” rates.

Notes to Chapter 7 619

57. Gressley (1977, p. 50).

58. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).

59. Skidelsky (1994, p. 14).

60. Keynes (1920, p. 251).

61. See for example Jonathan Kirshner, “The Man Who Predicted Nazi Germany,” New York

Times, December 7, 2019.

62. Harrison (2016, p. 154).

63. Tooze (2007, p. 17).

64. Doerr et al. (2019).

65. Galofré-Villà et al. (2019).

66. Tooze (2007, p. 47). In the event, it turned out to be more efficient to transport war

materiel across Germany by rail rather than by road. The Autobahnen were highly successful as propaganda, however, as they provided a powerful symbol of the end of austerity and of political instability, thus helping to entrench the new regime (Voigtländer and Voth 2014).

67. Burns (1956, p. 263).

68. Kennedy (1999, p. 387).

69. Koistinen (1998, chapter 14); Wiltz (1961). The chair was a Republican despite the fact

that the Democratic Party was in majority in the Senate.

70. Much has been made of Hiss’s role on the committee, even though he was actually a rela-

tively minor figure. The chief counsel was Stephen Raushenbush, the son of Walter Rauschen- busch, a famous theologian and founder of the Social Gospel Movement.

71. Burns (1956, p. 318).

72. Ickes (1953, p. 302); McBride (2000, chapter 7).

73. Koistinen (1998, p. 265). The Vinson-Trammell Act itself had limited the profits of private

shipyards to 10 percent, a level none would actually approach, and followed a long-standing policy of requiring half of all building to take place in government-owned shipyards.

74. Bernstein (1971, chapter 11). Dies for the all-metal Chevrolet were at the Fisher plant in Cleveland, which was also struck. GM headquarters had centralized final assembly in those two plants, but had left labor policies to the divisions, where, to the displeasure of labor, Fisher re- mained a stronghold of piece-rates. Alfred Sloan responded to the strike by centralizing GM labor policies (Freeland 2001, p. 99).

75. Nevins and Hill (1962, p. 235). 76. McBride (2000, pp. 177–78). 77. Levine (1988, pp. 438–68). 78. Kennedy (1999, p. 401).

79. The British and French feared the “utter destruction of European civilization,” which would then be replaced by Soviet domination (Tooze 2007, p. 322).

80. Reynolds (2002, pp. 44–46).

81. Kennedy (1999, p. 429).

82. Although the legislation creating the WPA had forbidden military activities, the agency

routinely constructed airports and other facilities that had deliberate strategic objectives (Sher- wood 1948, pp. 75–76).

83. Black (2003, p. 482); Kennedy (1999, p. 421). 84. Black (2003, p. 502); Wilson (2016, p. 49).

620 Notes to Chapter 7

85. Kennedy (1999, p. 429); Koistinen (1998, p. 197). 86. Craven and Cate (1955, p. 173).

87. Holley (1964, p. 131); Koistinen (1998, p. 184). 88. Craven and Cate (1955, p. xii).

89. Koistinen (1998, pp. 305–16). 90. Ickes (1954, p. 629).

91. Koistinen (2004, pp. 17–18). 92. Beasley (1947, p. 235).

93. Lacey (2019, p. 79).

94. Higgs (1993, pp. 173–74).

95. Sloan (1941b, p. 240). “We haven’t got enough ‘economic royalists’ among us to do this job

for national defense,” Sloan said even more sarcastically in a radio interview (Baime 2014, p. 87). 96. I. F. Stone, “Labor’s Plan: 500 Planes a Day,” The Nation, December 21, 1940, pp. 624–25. 97. Sloan (1941b, p. 242).

98. Higgs (1993); Wilson (2016).

99. Rockoff (2012, p. 167).

100. Higgs (1993, p. 186); Rose et al. (1946, pp. 27–32).

101. Koistinen (2004, p. 86); US Civilian Production Administration (1947, p. 101).

102. US Civilian Production Administration (1947).

103. Janeway (1951, pp. 156–57); Kennedy (1999, pp. 478–79).

104. Koistinen (2004, p. 127).