The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

105. Koistinen (2004, p. 97).

106. Nelson (1946, p. 67).

107. Nelson (1946, p. 85).

108. Nelson (1946, p. 125).

109. Koistinen (2004, pp. 132–36).

110. Nelson (1946, p. 122).

111. Dunn (2018); Kennedy (1999, p. 479).

112. Koistinen (2004, p. 177).

113. Using prices to allocate resources in this kind of setting is not as absurd as it may sound.

In 1942, Abba Lerner wrote an article, never published in his lifetime but widely circulated, argu- ing that prices should in fact be used to allocate materials in war mobilization. “Perhaps the greatest single contribution to the unprecedented growth of productive efficiency in modern times,” Lerner wrote, “was the establishment of the price calculus . . . as a governor of the mode of production. Yet now, when efficiency in production is more urgent than it has ever been before, we can observe a kind of sabotaging of the price mechanism as an instrument of social cooperation and its replacement over larger and larger sections of our economy by demonstra- bly less efficient devices such as rationing, priorities and allocations, not the least of whose disadvantages is their need for bureaucratic hordes who inevitably tie up the whole economy, including themselves, in ever more complex confusions of red tape” (Lerner 2013). Lerner was known as a proponent of “market socialism,” the idea that a socialist economy could be operated by a central planning agency if that agency used prices to allocate resources. On Lerner and his role in the so-called socialist calculation debate, see Lavoie (1985).

114. Nelson (1946, p. 142).

Notes to Chapter 7 621

115. Koistinen (2004, pp. 182–83).

116. “Knudsen was a member of the Supply Priorities Allocation Board and in that capacity superior to Nelson whose job was to implement the Board’s decisions; but Nelson as executive director of the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board then gave orders to the Office of Produc- tion Management, making him, in that capacity, superior to Knudsen!” (Rockoff 2012, p. 185).

117. Goodwin (1994, p. 315).

118. Rockoff (2012, p. 185).

119. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 105–6).

120. Novick et al. (1949, p. 109).

121. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 129–35).

122. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 163–204).

123. Kennedy (1999, p. 629).

124. Janeway (1951, p. 242).

125. Rockoff (2012, pp. 188–91).

126. Edelstein (2001, p. 64).

127. Lacey (2011, p. 115).

128. Rockoff (2012, p. 188).

129. Novick et al. (1949, pp. 130–49).

130. Cuff (1990, p. 110). Cuff argues that Nelson had chosen the original “horizontal” ap-

proach to avoid a structure of industry associations that might look to Americans too much like the cartels of Germany or the zaibatsu of Japan.

131. Rose et al. (1946, pp. 27, 32, 37); US Civilian Production Administration (1947, p. 146). 132. Day (1956, p. 23).

133. Holley (1964, p. 319).

134. Wilson (2016, pp. 114–20).

135. Heath (1972).

136. Rockoff (1984, p. 86–98; 2012, pp. 175–79).

137. Deep in the bowels of the OPA, in the division that rationed tires, a young lawyer from

California would form the opposite opinion. Yet his distaste for what was going on at the OPA would not stop him from one day setting up his own regime of price controls. His name was Richard M. Nixon (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002, p. 42).

138. Koistinen (2004, p. 428).

139. Goodwin (1994, p. 384).

140. Koistinen (2004, p. 422).

141. Kennedy (1999, pp. 629–30); Koistinen (2004, pp. 336–41). 142. Rockoff (2012, p. 192–94).

143. Wendt (1947).

144. Solo (1954); Tuttle (1981).

145. Wells (2002, pp. 73–80).

146. Already by December 19, 1941, Standard had come to a cross-licensing and patent-

sharing agreement with the RRC and the tire makers. The March consent decree postponed determination of any royalties until six months after the end of hostilities (Koistinen 2004, p. 154).

147. Hart (1998, p. 93).

622 Notes to Chapter 7

148. Polenberg (1980, p. 78).

149. Goodwin (1994, pp. 355–59).

150. Doris Kearns Goodwin crows that the drive netted seven pounds of rubber for every

man, woman, and child in the country. That sounds like a lot, but it constituted on the order of one-tenth of one percent of the existing stockpile.

151. After having failed to reach a patent agreement with IG Farben in the early 1930s, both B. F. Goodrich and Goodyear had independently set up pilot plants in an effort to produce synthetic rubber in a way that wouldn’t infringe existing patents (Morris 1989, pp. 8–9).

152. Solo (1954); Tuttle (1981).

153. Solo (1953, p. 33).

154. Solo (1954, p. 67); Williamson et al. (1963, p. 791).

155. Wendt (1947, pp. 213–14).

156. Solo (1953).

157. Hart (1998, pp. 135–36).

158. J. K. Smith (1988, p. 312).

159. Enos (1962). Initially, IG Farben was also part of the group, but after the war broke out,

the German concern became, in Enos’s phrase, ausgeschlossen. 160. Enos (1962, p. 188).

161. Zachary (1997).

162. Stewart (1948, p. 7).

163. Bush (1949, p. 6).

164. Owens (1994, p. 525).

165. Stewart (1948, pp. 10–12).

166. Owens (1994, p. 526).