The Translator’s Invisibility

The “merit” of the foreign text, and the “excellencies and defects” of attempts to reproduce it in translation, are accessible to all, because, in so far as reason and good sense afford a criterion, the opinion of all {69} intelligent readers will probably be uniform. But, as it is not to be denied, that in many of the examples adduced in this Essay, the appeal lies not so much to any settled canons of criticism, as to individual taste; it will not be surprising, if in such instances, a diversity of opinion should take place: and the Author having exercised with great freedom his own judgment in such points, it would ill become him to blame others for using the same freedom in dissenting from his opinions. The chief benefit to be derived from all such discussions in matters of taste, does not so much arise from any certainty we can obtain of the rectitude of our critical decisions, as from the pleasing and useful exercise which they give to the finest powers of the mind, and those which most distinguish us from the inferior animals. (ibid.:vii–viii) For Tytler, it is possible both to translate successfully and to evaluate translations because he assumes that linguistic and cultural differences do not exist at a fundamental level, invoking a universal “reason and good sense” that distinguishes a public sphere of cultural consensus (“readers”) but extends to the species, “intelligent” human beings.[10] Yet he subsequently narrows this sphere, first excluding consensus (“settled canons of criticism”) and then appealing to the “freedom” of “individual taste.” Tytler’s “common sense” approach to translation rests on a liberal humanism that is stated with a fugitive democratic gesture (a public sphere of cultural debate), but lapses ultimately into an individualist aesthetics with skeptical consequences: “in matters where the ultimate appeal is to Taste, it is almost impossible to be secure of the solidity of our opinions, when the criterion of their truth is so very uncertain” (ibid.:11).

The strain of individualism in Tytler’s treatise is so powerful, however “uncertain” the contours of subjectivity may seem, that he never shows the slightest skepticism about aesthetic judgment and in fact constructs a concept of “correct taste” based on “exquisite feeling.” The translator’s every choice should be governed by it— even to the point of violating the “laws” for good translation. These include, first, “That the Translation should give a complete transcript of the ideas of the original work,” and, second, “That the style and manner of writing should be of the same character with that of the original” (Tytler 1978:16). The “man of exquisite feeling,” however, is invested with the “liberty” of “adding to or retrenching {70} the ideas of the original,” as well as the “privilege” of “correcting what appears to him a careless or inaccurate expression of the original, where that inaccuracy seems materially to affect the sense” (ibid.:54). Of course, what is “correct” is always a domestic value, including the discursive effect that dominates English culture at that moment, transparency. Hence, Tytler’s third and final “law” is “That the Translation should have all the ease of original composition” (ibid.:15).