Tapping Hitler's Generals

HEIM: I received the following information from an extremely reliable source, from a General Staff Officer in the General Army Branch in fact. He said the last attack had come about as follows: the FÜHRER had ordered that the ‘Divisionen’ which were recently being formed at home and of which the date for completion of formation had been laid down as the beginning of September, were immediately to be sent into action in the East, regardless of their condition, and were to occupy the switch(?) lines on the German frontier. Then OLBRICHT and FROMM and all these people said that it was a decision born of sheer despair and would rob us of the very last troops we could throw into the balance at all, because it had long been shown by experience that all formations of that kind are lost if they are put into a switch-line. So those Generals opposed that strongly, but without success(?). So they decided that it was high time to act. It was a case of the man having no power of judgement, and a thing like that could not be done. Actually the FÜHRER withdrew this order after the attempt on his life, but it was then immediately issued again, because the issue in the West had collapsed in the meantime. The position is that we lack any proper professional military leadership, either administrative or strategical. That’s the tragedy of the whole affair.[464]

Document 161

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 213

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 18–19 Oct. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]

CHOLTITZ: Would you kill HITLER, too?

SCHLIEBEN: It’s very difficult to say whether he should be killed or not; it might turn him into a martyr. I should hand him over to the Russians, to work in some Siberian mine or other; that would settle the matter.

CHOLTITZ: As long as the man lives, German Youth will believe in his return and think only of resistance. He mustn’t be surrounded by a Napoleonic halo of glory either–that is to any, exiled.

SCHLIEBEN: Would you kill him, then?

CHOLTITZ: Certainly. Death is no martyrdom. He should be killed and the whole world should be told about it; he should be photographed pleading for his life, and should be shown in a really bad light, just as they did with Feldmarschall von WITZLEBEN. He should be made to wear just a pullover, and to stand there as a criminal, with his hair cropped and so on.

Document 162

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 220

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 7–10 Nov. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]

BASSENGE: What would you say to the following question supposing a man like RUNDSTEDT, for example–knowing perfectly well that there’s only one way to avoid chaos this winter or next spring–were to pack up the Army, do away with the Nazi system and finally open the gates to the enemy, what percentage of the armed forces would help him, and what percentage would not? Providing it was made known in a suitable manner and the lines of communication worked. Just the psychological question of what percentage of the Army and the population would cooperate under present conditions, and how many would fight against it, that is, apart from SS ‘Divisionen’–

DASER: One hundred.

BASSENGE: One hundred per cent would cooperate? You’re convinced? Not the young officers and young people–

THOMA: They, too, have lost much of their enthusiasm I believe.[465]

Document 163

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 238

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 23–6 Dec. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]

EBERBACH: I should have had great difficulties with my ‘Divisionen’, if that 20 July business had spread any further. That 1st SS Division would certainly have fired. The indignation and anger among the chaps in those ‘Divisionen’ about the ‘Putsch’ was so profound that even I was amazed–not only among the SS ‘Divisionen’ but also among some of the infantry ‘Divisionen’.

BASSENGE: Yes, I can well believe that, with the propaganda there was. When things go wrong they always blame whoever started them.

EBERBACH: Therefore it is very significant that the responsibility for that business on the Western Front was borne by the home forces only; the home forces had only enquired whether they ‘Feldmarschälle’ would participate or what attitude they would take.

BASSENGE: Is that actually so? What did the front-line troops say to that?

EBERBACH: I got it from ROMMEL himself who discussed the matter quite frankly with me; he said he agreed and would take part. Even ROMMEL said at the time: ‘We can’t start it, we can’t start a revolution against HITLER at the front as that would cause our front to collapse. You must first pull off something at home and then we’ll declare ourselves on your side.’ Obviously, all except those who turned it down categorically, like MANSTEIN, took that view, including RUNDSTEDT.

Document 164

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 263

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 21–3 Feb. 45 [TNA, WO 208/4177]

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