Tapping Hitler's Generals

EBERBACH: Of those who took part in it, I know STAUFFENBERG and OLBRICHT best, and all I can say is that I am firmly convinced that STAUFFENBERG and OLBRICHT really acted out of idealism, in the belief that they were thereby doing the best thing for the REICH. Apart from that, the way they did it was undoubtedly childish and stupid.

GUTKNECHT: Yes, of course it was. It was something like the KAPP ‘Putsch’.[447] There were no preparations at all, so that right from the start it was doomed to failure.

EBERBACH: One would really never expect such intelligent people as those two to be as naïve as all that.

GUTKNECHT: I wondered afterwards what would have happened, supposing the attempt had been successful. What would have happened then? I believe absolutely no preparations of any kind were made at all.

EBERBACH: They were so stupid that they didn’t even take over the telephone exchanges, so that while it was actually going on, officers could ring up the FÜHRER’s HQ from BERLIN. They had no business to tackle it so idiotically.[448]

Document 157

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 195

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 16–17 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

CHOLTITZ: STAUFFENBERG put the question to me: ‘Is it necessary for the FÜHRER to be killed or not?’ I replied: ‘The thing’s impossible without getting rid of the root of the trouble.’

EBERBACH: ROMMEL also convinced me of that, he said:[449] ‘The FÜHRER must be killed. There’s nothing else for it, the man really has been the driving force in everything.’

CHOLTITZ: I was at POSEN, and saw HITLER there. He was quite mad. From that moment on I knew complete physical destruction was the only answer. But I shouldn’t have thought that ROMMEL would have reach the same conclusion.

EBERBACH: Yes, ROMMEL was very emphatically of that opinion. He said: ‘Heaven knows, I’ve experienced it personally in TUNIS and TRIPOLI. The man must go!’ He was most emphatic. GAUSE, who was my Chief of Staff, and who was formerly ROMMEL’s Chief of Staff,[450] confirmed and amplified… in every detail.

Document 158

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 196

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 18–19 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

[…]

CHOLTITZ: When STAUFFENBERG said to me: ‘I am ready; it can start for all we care,’ I said to him: ‘STAUFFENBERG, that sounds so flippant. Are things really prepared? Can such matters ever be fully prepared?’ Incidentally there were four officers in the room whilst we were speaking.

EBERBACH: Well, except for one, who with a collection of twelve armed clerks, arrested them all, a thing which shouldn’t have happened–

CHOLTITZ: Who was that? The ‘Major’?

EBERBACH: An ‘Oberstleutnant’, who had only just been promoted.[451] I knew it from my people, who sent an officer out to me to give me all the information.

CHOLTITZ: That is sure to have been the man who always reported the situation and who was with FROMM.

EBERBACH: No. The man who did it belonged to STAUFFENBERG’s staff; he was from the AHA(?). He arrived with twelve clerks, armed with rifles and hand grenades and took them all into custody.

CHOLTITZ: That ‘Major’ must have shot STAUFFENBERG on the spot. STAUFFENBERG was the first to be shot.

EBERBACH: No, they apparently didn’t shoot them on the spot but put them into a room first. FROMM was set free and he ordered that STAUFFENBERG, MERZ and OLBRICHT should be shot immediately and that BECK should be handed a revolver. FROMM seems to have been liquidated in the meantime as well. I believe it is in one of the English newspapers. I am sorry because FROMM behaved very decently in this affair. He must have known that it would end tragically for him. In having those people shot on the spot and sending BECK a pistol he saved them a lot of suffering; he behaved like an officer and a gentleman. I never cared much for FROMM but that action of his pleased me.

CHOLTITZ: STAUFFENBERG was the ideal of the coming German generation. Sensible, very simple, he had a charming family circle; he was a good, honest, Christian and courageous man. He was the type of young German manhood who… ought to be at the head of things.

EBERBACH: That was always my opinion of him too. The first time I heard him speak about that matter–GEYR and I visited him–he opened his heart to us straight away.[452] He didn’t know my views. If I had still been a fervent Nazi at that time, I should have had to… him straight away, without more ado.

CHOLTITZ: I’ll admit he was incredibly indiscreet.

EBERBACH: Unfortunately that was probably part of his honesty.

CHOLTITZ: Why unfortunately?

EBERBACH: It was unfortunate for the cause! Do you know the reason why we officers kept out of the thing and why we didn’t let fly ages ago? It is because we are far too decent to undertake the things such a ‘Putsch’ entails.

Document 159

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 197

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 20–1 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]