Читаем Tapping Hitler's Generals полностью

[Conversation between General HEINZ EBERBACH and his son Oblt. z.S. HEINZ EUGEN EBERBACH]

[…]

SON: You’ve no idea how adversely this STAUFFENBERG business affected the Officers’ Corps. The fact that the individual soldier at the front was being killed, and that the officers at home were breaking their oath, infuriated the people. The fact that LINDEMANN, for example, through his own swinishness, let about 100,000 soldiers on the Eastern Front go to the devil–he let his whole front go to hell and went over to the other side with half his staff.[453]

FATHER: It hasn’t yet been established that LINDEMANN went over to the other side. Nothing is known about him.

SON: Then GUDERIAN wouldn’t have requested that he and his Chief of Staff and Major KUHNERT(?)[454] should be thrown out. At the time I was told by people in GERMANY, including an Oberleutnant, that THOMALE(?) told them a gap of 120 km had been made, and that the IV. ‘Armee’ was suddenly left standing there more or less leaderless, and that the ‘Divisionen’ had been told: ‘We’ve been left in the lurch, the best thing is to surrender.’ Part of the ‘Divisionen’ did so, others didn’t.

FATHER: I’ve never heard anything about that business.

SON: Well, that there really was a gap, which suddenly–

FATHER: But it was in the centre, and it was before 20 July.

SON: Yes, the LINDEMANN business happened before 20 July. He said that people did it more or less deliberately in order to get certain sections of the army under their control and to achieve something they needed a collapse.

FATHER: Propaganda within the Army was impossible, the people could only do it amongst themselves: moreover, RUNDSTEDT who is now in command again in the West, was party to it, and so was ROMMEL and–

SON: Well, what does ‘party to it’ mean?

FATHER: They knew about it and were willing and agreed to it, and RUNDSTEDT wanted to arrange an armistice with the Allies and arrange with them that his ‘Armee’ should turn back in order to hold back the Russians until such time as the Allies had occupied the territory at least as far as the ODER. I must say that from what I’ve seen I can unfortunately do nothing else but admit those people were right. Actually I know for certain–I’m not sure about MODEL, I couldn’t speak to those people privately–but KLUGE was also in favour of it.

SON: Well, all I can say is, why didn’t the fools cooperate?

FATHER: What does cooperate mean? That STAUFFENBERG business was supposed to happen first, and then the thing was so far prepared internally that no one could expect, once the FÜHRER really was dead, the thing to go smoothly and that the Army and the fronts were to hold on. The break-through near AVRANCHES hadn’t yet occurred on the 20th, and RUNDSTEDT was to make an armistice in order to turn about and hold back the Russians; that was the idea.

SON: The whole thing seems to me so criminal, at least, the way they prepared it. It would have meant civil war in GERMANY on a fantastic scale. It would have soon got around that the thing was connected with an attempt on the FÜHRER’s life and the German people wouldn’t stand for that. Not on any account! The German Navy certainly wouldn’t have joined in. SCHNIEWIND is the only naval man who was involved and he only had a very minor job. The German Navy wouldn’t have joined in.[455]

FATHER: Nearly all important people in the Army were involved, all except one, which is all the more surprising because he was very badly treated: MANSTEIN. He said, and I agree with him: ‘No, I’ll take no part in it.’ He said, and I agree, that we must see this thing through to the bitter end, because that is the only chance for our people of coming out of this more or less united.[456]

SON: Besides, the entire junior officer corps wouldn’t have cooperated from the moment they realised that it was connected with an attempt on HITLER’s life.

FATHER: But all those junior officers would have realised what things were like, because they themselves experienced the way they were being led. It must have been obvious to them that it was a matter of putting the SS into power, and the trend in the Army is opposed to letting the SS get into power.

SON: What about GUDERIAN?

FATHER: GUDERIAN said to me long ago: ‘The FÜHRER is mad!’ I shared the idea he had at the time: to get hold of the FÜHRER, let’s say imprison him, but at any rate keep him alive and to liquidate his entire entourage. I have changed my views in the meantime and realise that the FÜHRER is responsible for the whole thing.

SON: I can’t understand why GUDERIAN is on HITLER’s side in that case.

FATHER: It was like this: you could say that all the Generals were given the choice of either… or you are all involved; your wives and children will be shot and you yourselves will be hanged.

SON: Well, I don’t think that GUDERIAN would have been given the job of Chief of Staff if he hadn’t been considered very reliable.[457]

Перейти на страницу:

Похожие книги

1937. Трагедия Красной Армии
1937. Трагедия Красной Армии

После «разоблачения культа личности» одной из главных причин катастрофы 1941 года принято считать массовые репрессии против командного состава РККА, «обескровившие Красную Армию накануне войны». Однако в последние годы этот тезис все чаще подвергается сомнению – по мнению историков-сталинистов, «очищение» от врагов народа и заговорщиков пошло стране только на пользу: без этой жестокой, но необходимой меры у Красной Армии якобы не было шансов одолеть прежде непобедимый Вермахт.Есть ли в этих суждениях хотя бы доля истины? Что именно произошло с РККА в 1937–1938 гг.? Что спровоцировало вакханалию арестов и расстрелов? Подтверждается ли гипотеза о «военном заговоре»? Каковы были подлинные масштабы репрессий? И главное – насколько велик ущерб, нанесенный ими боеспособности Красной Армии накануне войны?В данной книге есть ответы на все эти вопросы. Этот фундаментальный труд ввел в научный оборот огромный массив рассекреченных документов из военных и чекистских архивов и впервые дал всесторонний исчерпывающий анализ сталинской «чистки» РККА. Это – первая в мире энциклопедия, посвященная трагедии Красной Армии в 1937–1938 гг. Особой заслугой автора стала публикация «Мартиролога», содержащего сведения о более чем 2000 репрессированных командирах – от маршала до лейтенанта.

Олег Федотович Сувениров , Олег Ф. Сувениров

Документальная литература / Военная история / История / Прочая документальная литература / Образование и наука / Документальное
100 знаменитых сражений
100 знаменитых сражений

Как правило, крупные сражения становились ярчайшими страницами мировой истории. Они воспевались писателями, поэтами, художниками и историками, прославлявшими мужество воинов и хитрость полководцев, восхищавшимися грандиозным размахом баталий… Однако есть и другая сторона. От болезней и голода умирали оставленные кормильцами семьи, мирные жители трудились в поте лица, чтобы обеспечить армию едой, одеждой и боеприпасами, правители бросали свои столицы… История знает немало сражений, которые решали дальнейшую судьбу огромных территорий и целых народов на долгое время вперед. Но было и немало таких, единственным результатом которых было множество погибших, раненых и пленных и выжженная земля. В этой книге описаны 100 сражений, которые считаются некими переломными моментами в истории, или же интересны тем, что явили миру новую военную технику или тактику, или же те, что неразрывно связаны с именами выдающихся полководцев.…А вообще-то следует признать, что истории окрашены в красный цвет, а «романтика» кажется совершенно неуместным словом, когда речь идет о массовых убийствах в сжатые сроки – о «великих сражениях».

Владислав Леонидович Карнацевич

Военная история / Военное дело: прочее