Tapping Hitler's Generals

BECK: I spoke to LATTMANN’s brother[427] who quite recently–at the beginning of July–went to the ‘Heeresgruppe Bertha’. I was astonished when he told me: ‘I am convinced that that’s my brother and that he really does talk and think like that. For I’ve heard him myself on the radio and, after all, one must admit, he only says what we all think.’ (Laughs) To which I said: ‘Sir, it is, perhaps, not quite as you say, that we all think along those lines, as I am convinced that a large section of the Officer Corps don’t think that way at all but believe, now as before, in a successful outcome, but, more than anything, I am astonished that you, Sir, should think the General LATTMANN speaks from innermost conviction because I know him as quite a different person.’ But I must admit, even a man like Sepp DIETRICH,[428] with whom I spoke at great length, was standing first on one foot, then on the other, saying: ‘How will it end?’ But the most shattering thing of all was my visit to General SPEIDEL.[429] The whole three-hour conversation was utterly pessimistic. He said: ‘Things are turning out exactly as your uncle prophesied; he always said that there would be fantastic successes during the first three years of the war, but that then there would be no more, and the thing would finally end in a catastrophe.’ It’s a remarkable thing, but when the happenings of the 20th were made known for the first time, I was very worried when I heard it in case my uncle might be involved in the affair, because I knew that he was always completely antagonistic. I discussed it with the Chief of Staff,[430] and with the GOC, saying that I was extremely worried, as I could imagine he would be involved in the affair in some way, even if he didn’t take an active part. Whereupon General KRÜGER[431] said to me: ‘BECK, I don’t believe it, and for this reason: your uncle was always an extremely careful man, who never ran any risks, I can’t imagine that he would suddenly adopt a different attitude, when such an enormous risk must have been attached to the affair.’

The only one who was still optimistic was BAYERLEIN, because he still had his men together.[432]

Document 153

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 183

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 29 Aug. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

BASSENGE: Is FROMM dead, too?

CHOLTITZ: No, he didn’t take part in it at all. I spoke about it beforehand[433] to OLBRICHT[434] and to GOERDELER.[435] Of course, they didn’t know the actual day, or they didn’t say anything to me about it, obviously in order not to incriminate me when I was going to the front. They didn’t tell me that they were going to kill him, but only they wanted to render him hors de combat, they wanted to lock him up, but unfortunately STAUFFENBERG was five years too young–that was the only fault of a man who was otherwise almost a genius. He went to the conference with his brief-case in his hand and put it between Adolf HITLER’s legs under the table and then he went out. JODL said: ‘Stay here, STAUFFENBERG!’ He said: ‘No, I haven’t had breakfast yet and I must make a telephone call, too. I shall be back again soon!’ Then STAUFFENBERG waited 300 m away, near HITLER’S ‘Bunker’. Then he maintains that there was such a terrific explosion that he thought no one could get out alive. Then he did the most incredible thing. On the strength of the explosion he went to the guard and remained there for three-quarters of an hour, because he was not allowed to go out, and then finally he rang up and they did let him out. He got into his aircraft and flew to BERLIN and said that the attempt had been successful, without checking up whether it was true! Because of that, all those people…

ELFELDT: What happened to the people who were not officially–

CHOLTITZ: They were all hanged.

SPONECK: The others, too?

CHOLTITZ: Yes.

THOMA: FELLGIEBEL,[436] too?

CHOLTITZ: Yes. All of them.

ELFELDT: What is ZEITZLER doing?

CHOLTITZ: ZEITZLER is under house-arrest.[437] When STAUFFENBERG arrived at the airfield, he told his brother that it had been successful, whereupon they started moving. GOERDELER said to me–as true as I am sitting here–: ‘Herr von CHOLTITZ, if we shut off OBERSALZBERG with one ‘Division’ and put him out of action, then the whole people will forsake him.’ Whereupon I said: ‘Herr GOERDELER, I beg of you, don’t think such a thing. It is a fundamental mistake! It isn’t so!’ But those people were so obsessed with the idea that they were going to save the Fatherland and they were so reckless, it was almost unbelievable. They actually did not collect even a hundred men. They took it so lightly!