The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

390. Among the most important services FedEx offered was the overnight delivery of letters and documents. This brought the company into contact with another manifestation of federal regulation, the Private Express Statutes. Were these overnight missives first class mail, which only the US Postal Service was permitted to deliver? Fearing legislation after FedEx and other courier companies instigated hearings in the House of Representatives in 1979, the USPS pro- mulgated a regulation (39 CFR Sec. 320.6C) that permitted the shipment of “time sensitive” documents if they were priced at more than twice the applicable first-class rate.

391. Bailey (2010, p. 193).

392. Carron (1981).

393. Hummels (2007, p. 152).

394. Besen and Crandall (1981); Hazlett (2017, pp. 102–18).

395. The broadcasters also complained that the CATV operators were violating copyright

by rebroadcasting their signals. The Supreme Court twice ruled against the broadcasters, but in 1976 Congress passed a bill mandating compulsory licensing at a low fee (Besen and Crandall 1981, p. 103).

396. Wu (2010, p. 181).

397. Hazlett (2017, pp. 106–10).

398. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (1977). 399. Wu (2010, pp. 184–85).

400. Horwitz (1989, p. 256).

401. Wu (2010, pp. 101–14, 190–91).

402. Temin with Galambos (1987, pp. 41–54).

Notes to Chapter 9 659

403. Vietor (1994, pp. 194–202).

404. Temin with Galambos (1987).

405. Temin with Galambos (1987, pp. 200–64).

406. “Baxter on AT&T,” New York Times, April 12, 1981, Section 3, p. 18.

407. Temin with Galambos (1987, p. 116).

408. Temin with Galambos (1987, p. 282).

409. United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1983).

410. Crandall (1988).

411. Gertner (2012, pp. 280–83).

412. Drucker (1984, p. 18).

413. Gertner (2012, pp. 285–97); Hazlett (2017, pp. 173–91).

414. Hazlett (2017, pp. 192–211).

415. McAfee, McMillan, and Wilkie (2010, p. 169).

416. Coase (1959).

417. Coase (1960).

418. Herzel (1998).

419. McAfee, McMillan, and Wilkie (2010).

420. Meehan and Larner (1989, pp. 182–83).

421. Kaysen and Turner (1959).

422. Shepherd (1996, p. 948).

423. Meehan and Larner (1989, p. 186).

424. Williamson (1983, p. 292). This was based on Turner’s remark that he approached a

certain kind of vertical contracting “not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospi- tably in the tradition of antitrust law.”

425. Simons (1934).

426. Stigler (1988, p. 97).

427. Stigler (1952).

428. Dewey (1979a).

429. Director and Levi (1956). Although they had absorbed the Director and Levi point

that tying is really often about price discrimination, Kaysen and Turner still maintained that “tying tends to spread market power into markets where it would not otherwise exist” (Kaysen and Turner 1959, p. 157). They called for it to be illegal per se. Although they explicitly consider only the simple punched-card case, Kaysen and Turner do mention (but do not explore) possible dynamic effects. Whether tying might have negative effects in much more complex dynamic settings is a question to which we return.

430. Posner (1979, p. 928).

431. Coase (1972, p. 67).

432. Boettke and Candela (2014), citing Becker (1976, p. 5).

433. McCloskey (1997).

434. Demsetz (1982).

435. Coase (1937).

436. Hovenkamp (2010, p. 628).

437. Areeda and Turner (1978). The first three volumes appeared in 1978. Subsequent vol-

umes appeared in 1980 and, with Areeda as sole author, in 1986.

660 Notes to Chapter 9

438. Hovenkamp (2005, p. 37).

439. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

440. Preston (1989).

441. Eisner and Meier (1990).

442. White (2000).

443. Fisher, McGowan, and Greenwood (1983, p. 344).

444. Barnaby J. Feder, “End of Action on I.B.M. Follows Erosion of its Dominant Position,”

New York Times, January 9, 1982, p. 1.

445. Schumpeter (1950, p. 127).

446. US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960 and 1980.

447. Roszak (1969, p. 34).

448. Shlaes (2019, pp. 36–40).

449. Roszak (1969, p. 13).

450. Turner (2006).

451. Roszak (1986, p. 33, emphasis original).

452. Roszak (1986, p. 15).

453. Lécuyer (2006).

454. Leslie (1993); Wright (2020).

455. Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 114).

456. Marshall ([1920] 1961, IV.x.3, p. 271).

457. Lécuyer (2006, p. 5). This does not mean, however, that it was somehow inefficient for

the Route 128 region to have organized around integrated systems firms, which possessed con- siderable advantage in the era of the minicomputer, the region’s most important high-technology product (Robertson 1995).

458. Klepper (2016).

459. In both cases, these transaction costs are often what I like to call dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 1992b).

460. Klepper (2016, pp. 112–28).

461. Lécuyer (2006, pp. 200–207).

462. Nicholas (2019, pp. 195–96).

463. Lécuyer (2006, pp. 259–60).

464. Sporck (2001, p. 139).

465. Lécuyer (2006, p. 257).

466. Klepper (2016, p. 123).

467. Noyce and Hoff (1981).

468. Hitzlik (1999, p. xxi).

469. Freiberger and Swaine (2000, pp. 36–53). This account of the early history of the mi-