The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

their monopsony power to force down prices (Helper 1991). In fact, they discovered that multiple sourcing increased prices. All the suppliers knew that they would get contracts even if they were not the low bidder (Rubenstein 1992, p. 169). It was arguably in Japan, where supplier productivity gains were passed on to the assemblers, that monopsony power was more effective.

199. Cusumano (1985, pp. 241–61).

200. Smitka (1991, p. 193).

201. Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, p. 61).

202. Cusumano and Takeishi (1991, p. 565).

203. Fujimoto (1995, pp. 186–87).

204. Takeishi and Fujimoto (2001).

205. Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 68).

206. Irwin (2017, pp. 574–77).

207. In 1983 dollars. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999).

208. Reich and Donahue (1985).

209. Ingrassia (2010, pp. 67–77).

210. Ingrassia (2010, p. 64). In another telling, the deal fell apart because Soichiro Honda

refused to sell the engines (Yates 1996, p. 24). 211. Kenney and Florida (1993).

212. Klepper (2016, p. 187).

213. Halberstam (1986, pp. 604–5).

214. Ingrassia (2010, p. 86).

215. “The K Car: Variations on a Theme Helped to Save Chrysler,” New York Times, Janu- ary 29, 1984, Section 12, Page 17.

216. Hyde (2003, pp. 249–51).

217. Hyde (2003, pp. 265–69); Yates (1996, pp. 17–35). 218. Adler (1993).

219. Rubenstein (1992, pp. 256–57).

220. Keller (1989, p. 131).

221. Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, p. 83).

222. Adler (1993, p. 121).

Notes to Chapter 9 653

223. Keller (1989, pp. 133–36).

224. Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, p. 87).

225. Pil and Rubinstein (1998); Taylor (2010, p. 81–91).

226. Ingrassia (2010, p. 128).

227. David Hanna, “How GM Destroyed Its Saturn Success,” Fortune, March 8, 2010.

228. Irwin (2017, p. 605).

229. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999).

230. “Total Vehicle Sales,” FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed

.org/series/TOTALSA (accessed February 24, 2021).

231. Train and Winston (2007), Table 2.

232. Ingrassia (2010, p. 90).

233. Keller (1989, p. 196). Michael Jensen (1993, p. 858) estimated that GM’s investments in

automation and R&D in this period were so unproductive that the company could have earned $100 billion more by putting its money in a bank account of equivalent risk.

234. Levin (1995, p. 76). Both GM and Chrysler also bought car-rental companies, which they used to dump their least-popular cars and to try out new models (Yates 1996, p. 11).

235. Ingrassia (2010, pp. 80–89).

236. Levin (1995, p. 93).

237. Yates (1996, p. 37).

238. Levin (1995, pp. 100–103).

239. Greenspan (2008, pp. 111–12).

240. Ingrassia (2010, pp. 96–97).

241. Helper and Henderson (2014, p. 65). 242. Porac et al. (2001, pp. 240–41).

243. Ingrassia (2010, pp. 114–16). Light trucks were and are subject to CAFE fuel-economy standards, but the targets are set lower than for car fleets. Light trucks were and are also subject to a 25 percent tariff, the so-called chicken tariff, imposed in 1962 in retaliation against a Euro- pean levy, long since revoked, on American poultry (Irwin 2017, pp. 525–26). As a result, Euro- pean automakers exited this market; and all Japanese light trucks for the American market are made in North America. In the early twenty-first century, the NUMMI plant was cranking out Toyota pickup trucks. Since 2010, the plant has been owned and operated by Tesla Motors.

244. Yates (1996, pp. 75–79).

245. Levin (1995, pp. 238–39).

246. Hyde (2003, p. 283).

247. Ingrassia (2010, p. 109).

248. Helper and Sako (1995).

249. Jacobides, MacDuffie, and Tae (2016, p. 1951). 250. Fine and Raff (2002, pp. 428–29).

251. Yates (1996, pp. 291–301).

252. Ingrassia (2010, p. 113).

253. Fine and Raff (2002, p. 429).

254. Ingrassia (2010, pp. 131, 168–73).

255. Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989, pp. 216–18). 256. Chandler (2001, pp. 32–34).

654 Notes to Chapter 9

257. Cowie (1999, pp. 12–40). 258. Graham (1986, pp. 74–75). 259. Shimotani (1995)

260. Fruin (1992, p. 149).

261. Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom (1992, p. 63).

262. Cohen (1987, p. 360).

263. Shimotani (1995, p. 58).

264. Matsushita (by then Panasonic) would ultimately acquire Sanyo, but not until the

twenty-first century. At the same time, the company also reacquired Matsushita Electric Works (by then Panasonic Electric Works), the electrical-equipment unit that had been spun off during the occupation.

265. Nathan (1999).

266. Tilton (1971, p. 154).

267. Nathan (1999, pp. 46–48).

268. Gregory (1986, p. 174).

269. Goldstein (1997, pp. 181–84).

270. Klepper (2016, pp. 198–99).

271. Chandler (2001, pp. 40, 68).

272. Sobel (1986, p. 212).

273. Jimmy Carter, “Proclamation 4511—Implementation of Orderly Marketing Agreement

on Certain Color Television Receivers,” June 24, 1977, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243984 (accessed August 9, 2022). Similar agreements were soon put in place for Korea and Taiwan as well (Gregory 1986, p. 174).

274. Gregory (1986, p. 14).

275. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

276. Elzinga (1989).