Hume’s biographer: Mossner (1970). for a history of skepticism, Victor Cousin’s lectures
Sextus: see Popkin (2003), Sextus, House (1980), Bayle, Huet, Annas and Barnes (1985), and Julia Anna and Barnes’s introduction in Sextus Empiricus (2000). Favier (1906) is hard to find; the only copy I located, thanks to Gur Huberman’s efforts, was rotten—it seems that it has not been consulted in the past hundred years.
Menodotus of Nicomedia and the marriage between empiricism and skepticism: according to Brochard (1887), Menodotus is responsible for the mixing of empiricism and Pyrrhonism. See also Favier (1906). See skepticism about this idea in Dye (2004), and Perilli (2004).
Function not structure; empirical tripod: there are three sources, and three only, for experience to rely upon: observation, history (i.e., recorded observation), and judgment by analogy.
Algazel: see his
Religious skeptics: there is also a medieval jewish tradition, with the arabic-speaking poet Yehuda Halevi. See Floridi (2002).
Algazel and the ultimate/proximate causation: “… their determining, from the sole observation, of the nature of the necessary relationship between the cause and the effect, as if one could not witness the effect without the attributed cause of the cause without the same effect.”
At the core of Algazel’s idea is the notion that if you drink because you are thirsty, thirst should not be seen as a
Modern discussions on causality: see reichenbach (1938), granger (1999), and Pearl (2000).
Children and natural induction: See Gelman and Coley (1990), gelman and Hirschfeld (1999), and Sloman (1993).
Natural induction: see Hespos (2006), Clark and Boyer (2006), Inagaki and Hatano (2006), Reboul (2006). See summary of earlier works in Plotkin (1998).
CHAPTERS 5-7
“Economists”: what i mean by “economists” are most members of the mainstream, neoclassical economics and finance establishment in universities—not fringe groups such as the Austrian or the Post-Keynesian schools.
Small numbers: Tversky and Kahneman (1971), Rabin (2000).
Domain specificity: Williams and connolly (2006). we can see it in the usually overinter-preted Wason Selection Test: Wason (1960, 1968). See also Shaklee and Fischhoff (1982), Barron Beaty, and Hearshly (1988). Kahneman’s “They knew better” in Gilovich et al. (2002).
Updike: the blurb is from Jaynes (1976).
Brain hemispheric specialization: Gazzaniga and ledoux (1978), gazzaniga et al. (2005). Furthermore, Wolford, Miller, and Gazzaniga (2000) show probability matching by the left brain. When you supply the right brain with, say, a lever that produces desirable goods 60% of the time, and another lever 40%, the right brain will correctly push the first lever as the optimal policy. If, on the other hand, you supply the left brain with the same options, it will push the first lever 60 percent of the time and the other one 40—it will refuse to accept randomness. Goldberg (2005) argues that. the specialty is along different lines: left-brain damage does not bear severe effects in children, unlike right-brain lesions, while this is the reverse for the elderly. I thank Elkhonon Goldberg for referring me to Snyder’s work; Snyder (2001). The experiment is from Snyder et al. (2003).
Sock selection and retrofit explanation: the experiment of the socks is presented in Carter (1999); the original paper appears to be Nisbett and Wilson (1977). See also Montier (2007).
Astebro: Astebro (2003). see “Searching for the Invisible Man,”