Bell curve: when I write
Diamonds: see Eco (2002).
Platonicity: I’m simply referring to incurring the risk of using a wrong form—not that forms don’t exist. I am not against essentialisms; I am often skeptical of our reverse engineering and identification of the right form. It is an inverse problem!
Empiricist: If I call myself an empiricist, or an empirical philosopher, it is because I am just suspicious of confirmatory generalizations and hasty theorizing. Do not confuse this with the British empiricist tradition. Also, many statisticians, as we will see with the Makridakis competition, call themselves “empirical” researchers, but are in fact just the opposite—they fit theories to the past.
Mention of Christ: see Flavius Josephus’s
Great War and prediction: Ferguson (2006b).
Hindsight bias (retrospective distortion): see Fischhoff (1982b).
Historical fractures: Braudel (1985), p.169, quotes a little known passage from Gautier. He writes, “‘This long history,’ wrote Emile-Félix Gautier, ‘lasted a dozen centuries, longer than the entire history of France. Encountering the first Arab sword, the Greek language and thought, all that heritage went up in smoke, as if it never happened’” For discussions of discontinuity, see also Gurvitch (1957), Braudel (1953), Harris (2004).
Religions spread as bestsellers: Veyne (1971). see also Veyne (2005).
Clustering in political opinions: Pinker (2002).
Categories: Rosch (1973, 1978). see also Umberto Eco’s
Ontological uncertainty: Some of the literature discusses my categorization problem as
Historiography and philosophy of history: Bloch (1953), Carr (1961), Gaddis (2002), Braudel (1969, 1990), Bourde and Martin (1989), Certeau (1975),
Information and markets: See Sshiller (1981, 1989), Delong et al. (1991), and Cutler et al. (1989). The bulk of market moves does not have a “reason,” just a contrived explanation.
Of descriptive value for crashes: See Galbraith (1997), Shiller (2000), and Kindleberger (2001).
CHAPTER 3
Movies: see de vany (2002). See also Salganik et al. (2006) for the contagion in music buying.
Religion and domains of contagion: See Boyer (2001).
Wisdom (madness) of crowds: Collectively, we can both get wiser or far more foolish. We may collectively have intuitions for Mediocristan-related matters, such as the weight of an ox (see Surowiecki, 2004), but my conjecture is that we fail in more complicated predictions (economic variables for which crowds incur pathologies—two heads are worse than one). For decision errors and groups, see Sniezek and Buckley (1993).Classic: Charles Mackay’s
Increase in the severity of events: Zajdenweber (2000).
Modern life: The nineteenth-century novelist Emile Zola welcomed the arrival of the market for culture in the late 1800s, of which he seemed to be one of the first beneficiaries. He predicted that the writers’ and artists’ ability to exploit the commercial system freed them from a dependence on patrons’ whims. Alas, this was accompanied with more severe concentration—very few people benefited from the system. Lahire (2006) shows how most writers, throughout history, have starved. Remarkably, we have ample data from France about the literary tradition.
CHAPTER 4