The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

269. Bragdon (1967, pp. 340–43).

270. Sklar (1988, p. 409). “The key to Wilsonian ideology during the war, as before, lay in his

organic, historical, evolutionary view of society and social change” (Cuff 1974, p. 143). 271. Thies and Pecquet (2010).

272. Wiebe (1967, p. 218).

273. Kolko (1963, pp. 204ff.); Sklar (1988, pp. 383ff.)

274. Mowry (1946, p. 280). “In fact the New Nationalism, in almost every instance, was the antithesis of the physiocratic, low-tariff, trust-busting doctrines of the farming West.”

576 Notes to Chapter 3

275. Link (1951).

276. In his History of the American People, Wilson had asserted that in contrast to the intel- ligent and hard-working Chinese coming to the West Coast, Southern and Eastern Europe were “disburdening themselves of the more sordid and hapless elements of their population,” sending to the East Coast people with “neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence” (Wilson 1903, pp. 212–14). As he turned to politics, Wilson distanced himself from those pas- sages and adopted a “melting pot” view (Vedder, Gallaway and Moore 2000). As president, he vetoed an immigration-restriction bill strongly supported by organized labor, largely to honor campaign promises to urban ethnics, even though he was not opposed in principle to restriction (Link 1956, pp. 275–76).

277. Mowry (1946, p. 280).

278. Wolgemuth (1959). Historians have often portrayed this maneuver as strictly a matter of political expediency to satisfy Southern constituents (Link 1951, p. 324). In fact, Wilson was “primarily inspired by the fear that blacks carried contagious diseases and secondarily moved by the feeling that blacks had become disrespectful to their white superiors” (Friedman 1970, p. 160).

279. Hofstadter (1964, p. 209); Seltzer (1977, p. 190).

280. Urofsky (2009, pp. 342–43).

281. Link (1954, p. 22).

282. For example Chernow (1993) and Lowenstein (2015). 283. Calomiris and Haber (2014); White (1983).

284. Calomiris and Haber (2014, p. 181).

285. Sylla (1969).

286. Calomiris and Haber (2014, p. 182).

287. Calomiris and Haber (2014, pp. 184–85). 288. Miron (1986).

289. Hanes and Rhode (2013).

290. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 158).

291. Neal (1971).

292. Trust companies were chartered by the state, but until 1906 in New York they were not

required to hold reserves, and after 1906 were held to less severe reserve requirements than banks (Moen and Tallman 1992, p. 614).

293. Moen and Tallman (1992, p. 612).

294. Gorton (1985).

295. Gorton (1985); Timberlake (1984).

296. Wicker (2000, pp. 88ff.); Bruner and Carr (2007, pp. 83ff.). 297. Moen and Tallman (1992, p. 621).

298. Andrew (1907); Timberlake (1993, pp. 183–95). 299. Timberlake (1993, p. 195).

300. Wicker (2000, p. 96).

301. Chernow (1990, pp. 127–28).

302. Roosevelt (1911, pp. 650–51). Frick and Gary portrayed the deal as incidental and moti- vated only by a desire to help in the Panic. In fact, U.S. Steel got a steal, and TCI&R made money for the company for decades.

Notes to Chapter 3 577

303. Wicker (2000, p. 100–102).

304. Bruner and Carr (2007, p. 135).

305. Gorton (1985, pp. 280–81).

306. Andrew (1908, p. 515).

307. Stephenson (1930, pp. 322 and 173). His grandson Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller would be

Gerald Ford’s vice president.

308. Lowenstein (2015); Stephenson (1930); White (1983, pp. 89–90).

309. Paul Warburg, “Defects and Needs of Our Banking System,” New York Times, January 6,

1907, p. 14. Chernow (1993) erroneously gives the date of this article as November 1907, confus- ing it with the date on which the Chamber of Commerce report was written up. The two were not unconnected. As early as 1904, Jacob Schiff had brought Warburg’s ideas to the attention of James J. Stillman, the president of National City and Vanderlip’s mentor. Stillman was initially dismissive, but the seeds were planted.

310. “Leading Financiers for Central Bank,” New York Times, November 12, 1907, p. 2.

311. Stephenson (1930, p. 338).

312. Stephenson (1930, p. 375). So great is the mythos surrounding the Jekyll Island meeting

that phantom attendees have appeared in the literature. Many sources think Benjamin Strong was there, others that Charles Norton, president of First National Bank of New York, was there. It is most likely that neither was.

313. In a well-thought-out treatise a few years earlier, Morawetz (1909) had advocated a na- tionwide clearinghouse association. He actually opposed the idea of a central bank, fearing that it would inevitably become politicized.

314. Calomiris and Haber (2014, chapter 9).

315. Cleveland and Huertas (1985, p. 44).

316. Cleveland and Huertas (1985, pp. 62–67).

317. Vanderlip’s real interest was in international banking, and the Federal Reserve Act of

1913, in which he had had a hand, would officially legalize foreign branching by national banks. 318. Kolko (1963, p. 186).

319. Kolko (1963, p. 189).

320. Carosso (1970, pp. 136–55); Chernow (1990, pp. 149–56).

321. Urofsky (2009, p. 321).

322. DeLong (1991).

323. Kolko (1963, p. 218); Lowenstein (2015, p. 131).