This framework, showing that Extremistan is where most of the Black Swan action is, is only a rough approximation—please do not Platonify it; don’t simplify it beyond what’s necessary.
Extremistan does not always imply Black Swans. Some events can be rare and consequential, but somewhat predictable, particularly to those who are prepared for them and have the tools to understand them (instead of listening to statisticians, economists, and charlatans of the bell-curve variety). They are near-Black Swans. They are somewhat tractable scientifically—knowing about their incidence should lower your surprise; these events are rare but expected. I call this special case of “gray” swans Mandelbrotian randomness. This category encompasses the randomness that produces phenomena commonly known by terms such as
You can still experience severe Black Swans in Mediocristan, though not easily. How? You may forget that something is random, think that it is deterministic, then have a surprise. Or you can tunnel and miss on a source of uncertainty, whether mild or wild, owing to lack of imagination—most Black Swans result from this “tunneling” disease, which I will discuss in Chapter 9.
This has been a “literary” overview of the central distinction of this book, offering a trick to distinguish between what can belong in Mediocristan and what belongs in Extremistan. I said that I will get into a more thorough examination in Part Three, so let us focus on epistemology for now and see how the distinction affects our knowledge.
Chapter Four: ONE THOUSAND AND ONE DAYS, OR HOW NOT TO BE A SUCKER
Surprise, surprise—Sophisticated methods for learning from the future—Sextus was always ahead—The main idea is not to be a sucker—Let us move to Mediocristan, if we can find it
Which brings us to the Black Swan Problem in its original form.
Imagine someone of authority and rank, operating in a place where rank matters—say, a government agency or a large corporation. He could be a verbose political commentator on Fox News stuck in front of you at the health club (impossible to avoid looking at the screen), the chairman of a company discussing the “bright future ahead,” a Platonic medical doctor who has categorically ruled out the utility of mother’s milk (because he did not see anything special in it), or a Harvard Business School professor who does not laugh at your jokes. He takes what he knows a little too seriously.
Say that a prankster surprises him one day by surreptitiously sliding a thin feather up his nose during a moment of relaxation. How would his dignified pompousness fare after the surprise? Contrast his authoritative demeanor with the shock of being hit by something totally unexpected that he does not understand. For a brief moment, before he regains his bearings, you will see disarray in his face.
I confess having developed an incorrigible taste for this kind of prank during my first sleepaway summer camp. Introduced into the nostril of a sleeping camper, a feather would induce sudden panic. I spent part of my childhood practicing variations on the prank: in place of a thin feather you can roll the corner of a tissue to make it long and narrow. I got some practice on my younger brother. An equally effective prank would be to drop an ice cube down someone’s collar when he expects it least, say during an official dinner. I had to stop these pranks as I got deeper into adulthood, of course, but I am often involuntarily hit with such an image when bored out of my wits in meetings with serious-looking businesspersons (dark suits and standardized minds) theorizing, explaining things, or talking about random events with plenty of “because” in their conversation. I zoom in on one of them and imagine the ice cube sliding down his back—it would be less fashionable, though certainly more spectacular, if you put a living mouse there, particularly if the person is ticklish and is wearing a tie, which would block the rodent’s normal route of exit.[15]