VIEBIG: The desire to terminate hostilities is, I think, not yet acute. As I saw from my own troops, even if comparisons with the spring offensive of the great battle in FRANCE (1918) were inevitable: ‘This is the final attempt,’ the troops and junior officers attacked with tremendous fervour, just because we were finally advancing again. Each man told himself that everything had been saved up for this, we, too, were told at the conference with the FÜHRER[158] that everything that we have had now been scraped together, there were so-and-so many tank ‘Korps’ there, the plan simply must succeed. It was clear to me that it had been very hurriedly arranged and in many respects badly prepared, the artillery preparation for instance. They had staked everything on one card, placing all their hopes on the element of surprise. But even I hadn’t reckoned with supplies breaking down so completely that eventually the artillery had no ammunition and the tanks no petrol.
HEIM: Did you think that if things had worked out as you expected, it would have resulted in a reversal of the war situation?
VIEBIG: No, I didn’t believe that, nor did I consider it possible that there would be a definite change in the course of the war.
EBERBACH: But perhaps you thought that as a result of it the way for political opportunities would be opened up again?
VIEBIG: Well, that under certain circumstances a compromise peace might have been arranged.
HEIM: In other words, it didn’t seem entirely without point to you.
VIEBIG: Not as far as I could foresee, no.
BASSENGE: When you say a compromise peace had you reckoned on the enemy negotiating with the Nazi regime at all? That is one question which was quite clear to us here: there never was a basis for negotiating. Unconditional surrender was the only basis for negotiation.
VIEBIG: Our government would
HEIM: You mean, therefore, that up to December there was hardly a person who said that we really ought voluntarily to make peace, rather here in the West than in the East.
ROTHKIRCH: Perhaps I should remark here that just as the attack started I was with the ‘Heeresgruppe’, with Generaloberst REINHARDT, who, as High Priest of the ‘Heeresgruppe’ was bound to be in the know. He had learnt about the attack twenty-four hours before, through conversation with the OKH, and was of the same opinion as VIEBIG, in the sense that it was believed that it could bring about a decisive turning point in the war; that if the attack succeeded in reaching the objective they had in mind it would be possible to win a basis for concluding a bearable peace.[159]
HEIM: And REINHARDT is without doubt one of the most sober and sensible men that we have.
VIEBIG: Things became very different after the end of January/February of course. After that every ‘Divisionsführer’ and ‘Regimentskommandeur’ told himself that it was madness what we were being forced to do.
Document 76
CSDIC (UK) GG-REPORT, SRGG 1171 (C)
CS/1952–Generalmajor BRUNS (Heeres-Waffenmeisterschule 1, Berlin)–Captured 8 Apr. 45 in Göttingen–and other Senior Officers (PW), whose voices could not be identified.
Information received: 28 Apr. 45
FRANZ: I had just crossed the RHINE and reached SPEYER and then I telephoned the C of S of the ‘Armee’.[160] He asked: ‘How many men have you left?’ ‘Only a few officers,’ and with them I was to form a ‘Kampfgruppe FRANZ’. We went on to KARLSDORF(?) and collected about forty men from the surrounding villages. At half-past nine the telephone rang: ‘OBERMEYER(?) speaking: I belong to the FÜHRER’s court martial. General HÜBNER[161] is in the village here and has orders to see you tonight.’ I knew there was something of the sort and also what it meant for me. Well, I lit a good Havana cigar, sat down on the sofa and waited for him. Suddenly there was a knock and General HÜBNER entered and said to me: ‘I am the FÜHRER’s flying court martial.’ (