Tapping Hitler's Generals

KÖHN: As much was required of us. Who bothered whether we would be killed when we went to the front, or even went to visit our own troops, for it was often worse for a ‘Kommandeur’ going to join his troops than for the men in the front line. After all, I was at GLACERIE[61] the last day, when the enemy was already in the wood right in front of the ‘Bataillon’s’ battle HQ. It was irresponsible, what they… there.

HENNECKE: Yes, and on the other hand, those people should have had sufficient courage as citizens to tell the FÜHRER: ‘Things can’t go on.’

KÖHN: He wouldn’t see it. However, people like BRAUCHITSCH and BOCK[62] etc. will have told him so. Whereupon he just dismissed them.

HENNECKE: The others should have done the same, until he’d dismissed them all. Then things would have been put right.

KÖHN: But then there were ambitious fellows among them who still–

HENNECKE: Yes, like KEITEL, who’s a yes man.

KÖHN: KEITEL, JODL, ZEITZLER etc.–all that crowd are apparently extremely ambitious.

HENNECKE: They are the guilty men!

KÖHN: This is how ROHRBACH (PW) imagines the course of the war: first there is to be a ‘General’ in GERMANY who will take over the government. Secondly, he will immediately enter into negotiations with ENGLAND with the following result: the war in the West will cease immediately, the German troops will be transferred to the East at once and will take up the battle against the Bolshevists.

HENNECKE: These ideas are all prompted by THOMA (PW).

KÖHN: Yes. Thirdly, the French and English troops etc. will follow on the heels of the German troops and occupy GERMANY, so that they will remain secure in the rear at least. I said to him: ‘First, there is no “General” who can suddenly take over the government. Secondly, do you really believe that the German people, with all this fighting behind them and having made some sort of peace on one front, would then start fighting again in the East? It’s completely impossible.’

Document 26

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 162

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 23–4 July 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

SCHLIEBEN: I should just like to know what the outcome will be. It will result in–

SATTLER: A collapse. There’s no way of stopping it.

SCHLIEBEN: I consider it to be absolutely impossible for it to be averted. Poor GERMANY! They’re a pack of swine.

SATTLER: I should like to know under what conditions the Allies will make peace with us.

SCHLIEBEN: Unconditional surrender.

SATTLER: Yes, and they will get it, too. Poor GERMANY. We used to be Colonels and Generals, after the war we shall be boot-blacks and porters. We shan’t get any pension.[63]

Document 27

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 164

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 23–4 July 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

[…]

HENNECKE: That is just what those fellows saw so clearly; they were furious about it and found themselves more and more in opposition to the attitude of the Party, but they never opened their mouths when it was necessary. The only one who possibly did it was FRITSCH and as a result he was got rid of.[64] The other said nothing. That was the great mistake.

KRUG: BRAUCHITSCH ought to have said: ‘I beg to resign.’

HENNECKE: They were all with HITLER previously and they all cooperated. Each one of those in command at that time is equally to blame.

KRUG: I was an insignificant ‘Major’.

KÖHN: Yes, we could do nothing. Moreover, I must tell you frankly that I had no idea of what was going on. I regarded National Socialism idealistically and in my opinion it offered the only possibility for the German people at that time; I also saw its successes. In my opinion nobody will deny the successes it achieved. It got rid of the unemployed for us. That was the greatest problem and were it to be condemned by world history, history would have to grant it this one achievement, that it solved the problem of unemployment.

KRUG: That is a historic fact, and we can’t get away from it, that in the autumn of 1938 we ought to have lain low for twenty years and for twenty years–

KÖHN: And ruin POLAND and RUSSIA economically so that the people came to us of their own accord; that would have been the right thing. They were already economically ruined.

KRUG: The clique surrounding him is to blame for that. They ought to have said to him: ‘My FÜHRER, now–’

KÖHN: Perhaps he wouldn’t tolerate other opinions.

KRUG: Then they ought to have cleared out.

KÖHN: Well, a man like RUNDSTEDT could surely say to him: ‘Don’t take offence; you are younger, you are more adaptable, you may bring it off, but I can’t take part in it. I am inwardly convinced that this is the situation and I consider it my duty to warn you, which I have done, and if you don’t wish to pay attention to my warning, them I am compelled to act accordingly.’ Surely he can quite easily say that. If one after the other had said that, well, I should like to see whether he wouldn’t after all have begun to wonder. […]

Document 28

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 172