Читаем Tapping Hitler's Generals полностью

It can be summarised that while the ‘Thoma group’ considered the war lost, condemned the atrocities in the East and spoke detrimentally about Hitler and Nazism, the ‘Crüwell people’, though critical of the war situation, considered it by no means hopeless,[128] attempted to justify war crimes either by minimising their scale or doubting whether they had ever happened at all, and additionally defended Nazism. The groups were not organisations but rather a loose association of independent characters whose views on many matters coincided. Only a few shared Thoma’s radical outlook. Few spoke as openly as Thoma did. Some changed their opinions in time and others drifted between the groups, or eventually preferred to spend the time in other activities such as painting.[129] Graf Sponeck made such a good copy of Rembrandt’s ‘Man in a Golden Helmet’ that it was hung in the dining room.[130] Whereas the differences in opinion did not have the same significance as they did for Thoma and Crüwell, from the beginning they impregnated decisively the climate at Trent Park.

Crüwell urged Generaloberst von Arnim as Senior German Officer into action against the ‘evil spirit’ of von Thoma in order to stop ‘defeatism’.[131] On 9 July 1943 Arnim urged the prisoners to discontinue all ‘conversations which are in any way harmful to colleagues’. Looking on the dark side would not help bear captivity. Additionally it was one’s duty to the homeland to exude confidence and so help the people at home (Document 12). Arnim was therefore working to preserve fortitude in the camp and bolster the ‘rather shaky’ morale.[132] His talk did not have the desired effect and deepened the divisions.[133]

After Arnim’s intervention, literature critical of National Socialism such as Otto Braun’s Von Weimar zu Hitler was no longer read only secretly.[134] Many inmates enjoyed the free access to books, periodicals and radio broadcasts. Only Crüwell, Hülsen and Lt Hubbuch continued to read the Völkischer Beobachter,[135] and were anxious to prevent other prisoners listening to the BBC German Service news bulletins. Crüwell, Franz and also Arnim were infuriated that Thoma, Broich and others tuned in to this propaganda, but Arnim did not have the personal authority to forbid it.[136]

In another call to reason to the Thoma group, Arnim addressed the inmates again on 15 and 16 August 1943, demanding that they refrain from ‘defeatist talk’: in the propaganda war, the British should not be given ‘the means and the weapons’. He was unaware of course that recordings of conversations had given the British a richer fund of propaganda material than ever he could have dreamed. Besides, Arnim said, he wanted to ‘safeguard’ officers in the event of the German victory, he would not want to see officers being court-martialled for their behaviour in captivity.[137] Probably aware that Arnim’s words were directed primarily at him, Thoma responded, ‘To think it right that we should accept your laborious assessment of the situation as gospel–No! […] It has been our misfortune at home that full-grown generals, enchanted by Hitler, let themselves be told off like snotty-nosed schoolboys. It doesn’t change me, absolutely not.’[138]

Undoubtedly too much was asked of von Arnim in his role as Senior German Officer (SGO). Even as he arrived at Trent Park, most generals did not think of him too highly. Some held him responsible for the disaster in Tunisia and considered him no better than a good divisional commander. He lacked the charisma to arbitrate on differences and strengthen the cohesion. Even the group around Crüwell was estranged from Arnim, for whom as SGO he never succeeded in banning the BBC German Service. Finally, at a loss, he would take charge of the wireless and re-tune it to a German station, thus making himself look completely ridiculous. From then on he was an outcast, so unloved that nobody would accompany him when he wanted to take a ramble, and finally Crüwell saw himself obliged to order somebody to walk with him.[139] Arnim spent most of his time alone in his room staring at nothing for hours, making appearances ever more rarely in the officers’ mess.[140]

Arnim’s political opinions were not without their ambiguities. General Cramer soon came to the conclusion that although Arnim thought he was obliged to defend the National Socialist regime outwardly, his personal opinion about it was different.[141] The protocols confirm this picture. He made adverse references to the war situation, the National Socialist system[142] and German war crimes (Document 96). He often conversed freely with Lord Aberfeldy, thus ignoring his maxim that one should always remain silent in the presence of the British.[143]

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