So I waited, and what happened was this. As the cards went through, sometimes the machine made a mistake, or they put a wrong number in. What we used to have to do when that happened was to go back and do it over again. But they noticed that a mistake made at some point in one cycle only affects the nearby numbers, the next cycle affects the nearby numbers, and so on. It works its way through the pack of cards. If you have fifty cards and you make a mistake at card number thirty-nine, it affects thirty-seven, thirty-eight, and thirty-nine. The next, card thirty-six, thirty-seven, thirty-eight, thirty-nine, and forty. The next time it spreads like a disease.
So they found an error back a way, and they got an idea. They would only compute a small deck of ten cards around the error. And because ten cards could he put through the machine faster than the deck of fifty cards, they would go rapidly through with this other deck while they continued with the fifty cards with the disease spreading. But the other thing was computing faster, and they would seal it all up and correct it. Very clever.
That was the way those guys worked to get speed. There was no other way. If they had to stop to try to fix it, we’d have lost time. We couldn’t have got it. That was what they were doing.
Of course, you know what happened while they were doing that. They found an error in the blue deck. And so they had a yellow deck with a little fewer cards; it was going around faster than the blue deck. Just when they are going crazy—because after they get this straightened out, they have to fix the white deck—the
“Leave us alone,” they say. I left them alone and everything came out. We solved the problem in time and that’s the way it was.
I was an underling at the beginning. Later I became a group leader. And I met some very great men. It is one of the great experiences of my life to have met all these wonderful physicists.
There was, of course, Enrico Fermi. He came down once from Chicago, to consult a little bit, to help us if we had some problems. We had a meeting with him, and I had been doing some calculations and gotten some results. The calculations were so elaborate it was very difficult. Now, usually I was the expert at this; I could always tell you what the answer was going to look like, or when I got it I could explain why. But this thing was so complicated I couldn’t explain why it was like that.
So I told Fermi I was doing this problem, and I started to describe the results. He said, “Wait, before you tell me the result, let me think. It’s going to come out like this (he was right), and it’s going to come out like this because of so and so. And there’s a perfectly obvious explanation for this—”
He was doing what I was supposed to be good at, ten times better. That was quite a lesson to me.
Then there was John von Neumann, the great mathematician. We used to go for walks on Sunday. We’d walk in the canyons, often with Bethe and Bob Bacher. It was a great pleasure. And von Neumann gave me an interesting idea: that you don’t have to be responsible for the world that you’re in. So I have developed a very powerful sense of social irresponsibility as a result of von Neumann’s advice. It’s made me a very happy man ever since. But it was von Neumann who put the seed in that grew into my
I also met Niels Bohr. His name was Nicholas Baker in those days, and he came to Los Alamos with Jim Baker, his son, whose name is really Aage Bohr. They came from Denmark, and they were
We were at a meeting once, the first time he came, and everybody wanted to see the great Bohr. So there were a lot of people there, and we were discussing the problems of the bomb. I was back in a corner somewhere. He came and went, and all I could see of him was from between people’s heads.
In the morning of the day he’s due to come next time, I get a telephone call.
“Hello—Feynman?”
“Yes.”
“This is Jim Baker.” It’s his son. “My father and I would like to speak to you.”
“Me? I’m Feynman, I’m just a—”
“That’s right. Is eight o’clock OK?”
So, at eight o’clock in the morning, before anybody’s awake, I go down to the place. We go into an office in the technical area and he says, “We have been thinking how we could make the bomb more efficient and we think of the following idea.”
I say, “No, it’s not going to work. It’s not efficient… Blab, blab, blah.”
So he says, “How about so and so?”
I said, “That sounds a little bit better, but it’s got this damn fool idea in it.”
This went on for about two hours, going back and forth over lots of ideas, back and forth, arguing. The great Niels kept lighting his pipe; it always went out. And he talked in a way that was un-understandable—mumble, mumble, hard to understand. His son I could understand better.