Another kind of problem I worked on was this. We had to do lots of calculations, and we did them on Marchant calculating machines. By the way, just to give you an idea of what Los Alamos was like: We had these Marchant computers—hand calculators with numbers. You push them, and they multiply divide, add, and so on, but not easy like they do now. They were mechanical gadgets, failing often, and they had to be sent back to the factory to be repaired. Pretty soon you were running out of machines. A few of us started to take the covers off. (We weren’t supposed to. The rules read: “You take the covers off, we cannot be responsible …”) So we took the covers off and we got a nice series of lessons on how to fix them, and we got better and better at it as we got more and more elaborate repairs. When we got something too complicated, we sent it back to the factory but we’d do the easy ones and kept the things going. I ended up doing all the computers and there was a guy in the machine shop who took care of typewriters.
Anyway we decided that the big problem—which was to figure out exactly what happened during the bomb’s implosion, so you can figure out exactly how much energy was released and so on—required much more calculating than we were capable of. A clever fellow by the name of Stanley Frankel realized that it could possibly he done on IBM machines. The IBM company had machines for business purposes, adding machines called tabulators for listing sums, and a multiplier that you put cards in and it would take two numbers from a card and multiply them. There were also collators and sorters and so on.
So Frankel figured out a nice program. If we got enough of these machines in a room, we could take the cards and put them through a cycle. Everybody who does numerical calculations now knows exactly what I’m talking about, but this was kind of a new thing then—mass production with machines. We had done things like this on adding machines. Usually you go one step across, doing everything yourself. But this was different—where you go first to the adder, then to the multiplier, then to the adder, and so on. So Frankel designed this system and ordered the machines from the IBM company because we realized it was a good way of solving our problems.
We needed a man to repair the machines, to keep them going and everything. And the army was always going to send this fellow they had, but he was always delayed. Now, we
We went through our cycle this way until we got all the bugs out. It turned out that the speed at which we were able to do it was a hell of a lot faster than the other way where every single person did all the steps. We got speed with this system that was the predicted speed for the IBM machine. The only difference is that the IBM machines didn’t get tired and could work three shifts. But the girls got tired after a while.
Anyway we got the bugs out during this process, and finally the machines arrived, but not the repairman. These were some of the most complicated machines of the technology of those days, big things that came partially disassembled, with lots of wires and blueprints of what to do. We went down and we put them together, Stan Frankel and I and another fellow, and we had our troubles. Most of the trouble was the big shots coming in all the time and saying, “You’re going to break something!”
We put them together, and sometimes they would work, and sometimes they were put together wrong and they didn’t work. Finally I was working on some multiplier and I saw a bent part inside, but I was afraid to straighten it because it might snap off—and they were always telling us we were going to bust something irreversibly. When the repairman finally got there, he fixed the machines we hadn’t got ready and everything was going. But he had trouble with the one that I had had trouble with. After three days he was still working on that
I went down. I said, “Oh, I noticed that was bent.”
He said, “Oh, of course. That’s all there is to it!”