In Search of the Miraculous

First of all he completely rejected "conscious" actions because, as it appeared from what he said, there was nothing that was conscious. The term "subconscious" which plays such a big part in the theories of some authors became quite useless and even

misleading, because phenomena of quite different categories were classified under the

category of "subconscious."

The division of actions according to the centers controlling them did away with all

uncertainty and all possible doubts as to the correctness of these divisions.

What was particularly important in G.'s system was the indication that the same

actions could originate in different centers. An example is the recruit and the old

soldier at rifle drill. One has to perform the drill with his thinking center, the other

does it with the moving center, which does it much better.

But G. did not call actions governed by the moving center "automatic." He used the name "automatic" only for the actions which a man performs imperceptibly for himself. If the same actions are observed by a man, they cannot be called "automatic."

He allotted a big place to automatism, but regarded the moving functions as distinct

from the automatic functions, and, what is most important, he found automatic actions

in all centers; he spoke, for instance, of "automatic thoughts" and of "automatic feelings." When I asked him about reflexes he called them "instinctive actions." And as I understood from what followed, among external movements he considered only

reflexes to be instinctive actions.

I was very interested in the interrelation of moving and instinctive functions in his

description and I often returned to this subject in my talks with him.

First of all G. drew attention to the constant misuse of the words "instinct" and

"instinctive." It transpired from what he said that these words could be applied, by rights, only to the inner functions of the organism. The beating of the heart, breathing, the circulation of blood, digestion—these were instinctive functions. The only external functions that belong to this category are reflexes. The difference between instinctive and moving functions was as follows: the moving functions of man, as well as of

animals, of a bird, of a dog, must be learned; but instinctive functions are inborn. A man has very few inborn external movements;

an animal has more, though they vary, some have more, others have less;

but that which is usually explained as "instinct" is very often a series of complex moving functions which young animals learn from older ones. One of the chief

properties of the moving center is its ability to imitate. The moving center imitates

what it sees without reasoning. This is the origin of the legends that exist about the

wonderful "intelligence" of animals or the "instinct" that takes the place of intelligence and makes them perform a whole series of very complex and expedient

actions.

The idea of an independent moving center, which, on the one hand, does not

depend upon the mind, does not require the mind, and which is a mind in itself, and

which, on the other hand, does not depend upon instinct and has first of all to learn,

placed very many problems on entirely new ground. The existence of a moving center

working by means of imitation explained the preservation of the "existing order" in beehives, termitaries, and ant-hills. Directed by imitation, one generation has had to

shape itself absolutely upon the model of another. There could be no changes, no

departure whatever from the model. But "imitation" did

not explain how such an order was arrived at in the first place. I often wanted very

much to speak to G. about this as well as about many other things connected with it.

But G. eluded such conversations by leading them up to man and to real problems of

self-study.

Then a great deal was elucidated for me by the idea that each center was not only a

motive force but also a "receiving apparatus," working as receiver for different and sometimes very distant influences. When I thought of what had been said about wars,

revolutions, migrations of peoples, and so on; when I pictured how masses of

humanity could move under the control of planetary influences, I began to understand

our fundamental mistake in determining the actions of an individual. We regard the

actions of an individual as originating in himself. We do not imagine that the

"masses" may consist of automatons obeying external stimuli and may move, not

under the influence of the will, consciousness, or inclination of individuals, but under

the influence of external stimuli coming possibly from very far away.

"Can the instinctive and the moving functions be controlled by two distinct

centers?" I asked G. once.

'They can," said G., "and to them must be added the sex center. These are the three centers of the lower story. The sex center is the neutralizing center in relation to the