Command and Control

“Highly dispersed nuclear weapons”: McNamara’s Athens speech is an important document in the history of the Cold War. The speech was also given my favorite level of classification: COSMIC TOP SECRET. The quote is from “Defense Policy: Statement Made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens,” North Atlantic Council, May 5, 1962 (COSMIC TOP SECRET/NATO RESTRICTED/declassified), NSA, p. 9.

“Our best hope lies in conducting”: Ibid., p. 6.

McNamara’s remarks were partly aimed at the French: By maintaining a nuclear force independent of NATO control, France gained an influence disproportionate to its size and power. No matter how hard the United States might try to fight a limited war and restrict its attacks to Soviet military forces, a French decision to use nuclear weapons against Soviet cities would inexorably lead to an all-out war. The French strategy was known as “Deterrence of the Strong by the Weak.” “They have understood that we now have the finger on the trigger,” Charles de Gaulle, the president of France, once said. “We are becoming as redoubtable as a man walking in an ammunitions depot with a lighter…. Of course, if he lights up, he’ll be the first to blow. But he will also blow all those around.” The quote comes from Bruno Tertrais, “Destruction Assurée: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1981,” in Getting Mad, pp. 73–74.

“lead to the destruction of our hostages”: “Statement at Athens,” p. 7.

“the catastrophe which we most urgently wish to avoid”: Ibid.

“Not targeting cities — how aggressive!”: Quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 442.

“To get the population used to the idea”: Ibid.

If Khrushchev’s scheme worked: Dozens of books have been written about the Cuban missile crisis. I found these to be the most interesting and compelling: Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999); Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002); Max Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cold War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Knopf, 2008). Fursenko and Naftali skillfully include material from the Soviet archives. Frankel covered the crisis for the New York Times and brings a firsthand feel to the drama. Allison and Zelikow use the crisis as a means of understanding larger questions of leadership and government behavior. The Kennedy Tapes, although based on edited transcripts, allows many of the principal actors to speak for themselves. And Dobbs conveys the simple fact that this is an incredible story, with stakes that couldn’t possibly be higher.

twenty-four medium-range ballistic missiles, sixteen intermediate-range ballistic missiles: Cited in Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. 188.

forty-two bombers… and about 50,000 personnel: Ibid.

triple the number of Soviet land-based missiles that could hit the United States: The Soviet Union had about twenty long-range missiles in 1962. Cited in Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 92.

“We have no bases in Cuba”: “Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy,” April 22, 1961, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 12.

“Our nuclear weapons are so powerful”: “Text of Soviet Statement Saying That Any U.S. Attack on Cuba Would Mean War,” New York Times, September 12, 1962.

their strategic purpose seemed to be a decapitation attack: Regardless of Khrushchev’s actual motive for deploying the missiles, they had the capability to destroy American command-and-control centers with little warning. And that made their presence in Cuba all the more unacceptable for the Kennedy administration. See May, et al., “History of the Strategic Arms Competition,” Part 2, pp. 663–68.

“It doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up”: “Off the Record Meeting on Cuba,” October 16, 1962, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 61.

“If we attack Cuba… in any way”: May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p. 111.

“We’ve got the Berlin problem staring us in the face”: Ibid., p. 113.

“almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich”: Ibid.

“LeMay: I think that a blockade”: Ibid., p. 117.

“I just agree with you”: Ibid., p. 122.

“eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat”: “Text of Kennedy’s Address on Moves to Meet the Soviet BuildUp in Cuba,” New York Times, October 23, 1962.