Command and Control

the proportion of SAC bombers on ground alert… on airborne alert: Policies that Eisenhower had strongly resisted became routine early in the Kennedy administration. During the presidential campaign, Kennedy had promised that SAC would have a round-the-clock airborne alert. For the details of SAC’s new alert policies, see “History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1961,” SAC Historical Study No. 89, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, January 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, pp. 58–65. For Kennedy’s campaign promise, see Ball, Politics and Force Levels, p. 18.

“one defense policy, not three”: Quoted in Jack Raymond, “M’Namara Scores Defense Discord,” New York Times, April 21, 1963. McNamara had made his opposition to interservice rivalry clear from the start.

the Army was now seeking thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons: Cited in “Memorandum from Secretary Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer),” May 23, 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, p. 297.

as urgently needed… as intercontinental ballistic missiles: See “History of the XW-51 Warhead,” SC-M-67-683, AEC Atomic Weapon Data, January 1968 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 10.

“appear to be unreasonably high”: The document that the Army submitted as a reply to McNamara’s questions has been heavily censored, and yet the justification for seeking so many nuclear weapons seems clear. The Army wanted to defeat the Soviets on the ground in Western Europe, using “quick kill, quick response weapons.” And the author of the report was aware that the request might seem unreasonable. The full quote reads: “At the first reading, the number of weapons suggested appear to be unreasonably high.” In any event, the Army’s arguments failed to be persuasive. See “Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Special Studies Group (JCS), Project 23, C 2379, October 1962 (TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 55.

“if the enemy does”: Taylor criticized the “emotional resistance in some quarters” to providing American troops in Europe with tens of thousands of small nuclear weapons. See “Memorandum from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, May 25, 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, pp. 299–300. The quote is on page 300.

Air Force Intelligence had warned: According to the Air Force, the Soviet Union would have as many as 950 long-range missiles by mid-1964 and 1,200 by mid-1965. Instead, the Soviets never had more than 209 long-range missiles until the late 1960s. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,” in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), p. 141.

only four missiles that could reach the United States: Cited in ibid.

the Soviet program had secretly endured a major setback: A leading Soviet rocket designer wrote the most authoritative account of what came to be known as the “Nedelin Catastrophe.” See Boris Chertok, Rockets and People, Volume II: Creating a Rocket Industry (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Series, 2006), pp. 597–641.

Tass… announced that Nedelin had been killed in a plane crash: See Osgood Caruthers, “Chief of Rockets Killed in Soviet,” New York Times, October 26, 1960.

“it would be premature to reach a judgment”: See “Transcript of the Kennedy News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters,” New York Times, February. 9, 1961.

Eisenhower had thought that twenty to forty would be enough: Cited in “The Ballistic Missile Decisions,” Robert L. Perry, The RAND Corporation, October 1967, p. 14.

Jerome Wiesner advised President Kennedy that roughly ten times that number: Wiesner thought that about two hundred missiles would be enough. See Ball, Politics and Force Levels, p. 85.

General Power wanted… ten thousand Minuteman missiles: Cited in Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant’s View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon Schuster, 1970), p. 152.

it was “a round number”: The adviser was Herbert F. York. Quoted in Herken, Counsels of War, p. 153.

“a matter of transcendent priority”: “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Subject: Command and Control,” Robert S. McNamara, August 21, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1.

“The chain of command from the President down”: “Letter, From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy,” February 20, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, p. 39.

“classify the attack, as large or small”: Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control,” p. 292.