The
There are a multitude of books written on the Spanish Armada, with many and various contradictory conclusions as to why the English triumphed over it. The source documents for more recent books are mostly contemporary, particularly on the Spanish side, where volumes exist on the meticulous preparations for the campaign. These, along with more recent findings, in particular the discovery and exploration of Spanish wrecks along the coastline of Ireland from the 1960s onwards, have led to many challenges to the assertions of earlier historians who laboured under misconceptions regarding the size of Spanish ships versus English, and the ordnance carried by both sides.
The Spanish had four times as many ships over 500 tons as the English, but the majority of these were armed merchantmen, while all the English ships of this size were galleon warships. The Spanish merchantmen in the main did not take part in the battle, but rather sailed in the centre of the Armada’s formation. Where ships of comparable size did clash, the Spanish galleons or merchantmen flagships were no match for their English counterparts.
Many of the ships in the Spanish Armada were heavily armed, with some carrying upwards of fifty guns. But most of these weapons were of smaller calibre and some of the largest guns listed on the manifest for the fleet were actually siege pieces that had been stowed below decks for the voyage to England. The latest research claims that the Spanish had 138 guns of 16 pound calibre or above while the English had 251 such pieces.
The English were far superior to the Spanish in artillery skills. Estimates of their rate of fire are between one and three rounds-per-gun-per-hour. On the Spanish side it is closer to one round-per-gun-per-
Ultimately, the Spanish were defeated by a number of factors. Their plan of campaign as imposed by Philip was fatally flawed, they were out-sailed and out-gunned by the English and the weather conditions were rarely in their favour. Neither side lacked bravery and conviction. It is possible that had the Armada reached home safely and in good order they might have restocked and made a second attempt to link up with Parma. The casualties suffered on the Irish coast however turned defeat into disaster. At least forty ships were lost and those that did return were badly battered by the unseasonably harsh weather.
The English fleet too suffered their greatest casualties after the battle. Disease quickly spread amongst the crews and in some ships over fifty per cent of the men were lost. Elizabeth and her Privy Council did little to help with Burghley hoping that, ‘by death, by discharging of sick men, and such like … there may be spared something in the general pay.’ Howard remarked that it ‘would grieve any man’s heart to see them that have served so valiantly die so miserably.’
The English triumphed over the Spanish Armada and although victory was achieved by a very narrow margin, it was enough to embolden both the English and the Dutch to continue their wars against the dominant empire in Europe. Further campaigns were launched by both sides in subsequent years. The English, hoping to build on their victory of 1588, sent a fleet into Spanish waters in 1589. Led by Drake the venture ended in disaster and irreparably damaged his reputation. The Spanish dispatched two more Armadas, in 1596 and 1597, only to have both driven back by storms. A peace was finally concluded in 1604, after the deaths of Elizabeth I and Philip II.
Note: The dates referred to throughout the book are based on the Gregorian calender.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to my agent, Bill Hamilton, for his unswerving support and advice, and all the team at AM Heath, in particular Jennifer Custer, Kate Rizzo Munson, Vickie Dillon and Charlie Brotherstone.
Thanks to HarperCollins