Armada

Faith also played a large part in the planning of the Armada enterprise and its power should not be underestimated. Philip was a devout Catholic and any shortcomings that were recognized were confidently excused in the knowledge that God would assist their every endeavour. This depth of faith was prevalent on both sides and is evident in much of the correspondence between commanders and their superiors.

Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán (‘el Bueno’), Duke of Medina Sidonia, was one of the most senior nobles in Spain and his administrative skills made him an ideal choice to replace Santa Cruz who, though a highly experienced military commander, had few. Medina Sidonia was faced with a mammoth task when he arrived in Lisbon to take charge in February 1588. His reluctance to accept the post is well documented but his subsequent actions bear witness to his determination once his position was confirmed and he swiftly brought order to anarchy in Lisbon.

Many historians have directed a large portion of the blame for the Armada’s ultimate failure at Medina Sidonia, citing his limited naval combat experience and his lack of initiative. The duke however knew his limits and he continually sought and followed the guidance of his highly competent military advisors. The Armada might have fared better if Medina Sidonia had showed greater resourcefulness but it must be realized that at all times his options were limited by Philip’s inflexible orders. His courage was beyond doubt and the San Martín was at the heart of nearly every action in the campaign.

What proved to be one of the greatest weaknesses in the Spanish plan was the inability of Medina Sidonia and Parma to communicate effectively. At every stage in his advance Medina Sidonia dispatched updates to Parma to inform him of his progress. He never once received a reply or even an acknowledgement that his letters had been delivered. Crucially Medina Sidonia seemed to believe that Parma would sally out to meet him and they would rendezvous at sea, while Parma was firmly of the mind that any such sortie would result in annihilation of his transport fleet by the Dutch flyboats and so the Armada would have to come to him. The King’s command was simply that they ‘join hands’. No precise instructions had been given for how this would be achieved and with no deep water port in Spanish possession, the main purpose of the Armada remained shrouded in confusion until it reached Calais.

At the time of the Armada Lord High Admiral Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, was at the pinnacle of his long career. He was fifty-two years old and came from a distinguished line of naval officers. But despite his naval background he, like Medina Sidonia, had never experienced war at sea and relied heavily on his subordinates. Chief amongst those was Sir Francis Drake. A daring privateer, Drake’s raid on Cadiz in 1587 delayed the sailing of the Armada. He successfully predicted that the Spanish plan would involve a link up between Parma and the Armada and therefore advocated stationing the bulk of the English fleet at Plymouth, as far to windward of the narrow seas around Dover as possible. He contended that, ‘the advantage of time and place in all martial actions is half a victory,’ and his plan successfully ensured that the English fleet had the weather gauge when the Armada entered the Channel.

At the core of the English fleet were ‘race built’ galleons, a new breed of ship that saw accelerated development during the Tudor reign. Fast and nimble they carried a high proportion of armament in relation to their overall tonnage, upwards of ten per cent which was more than double that of their Spanish counterparts. Their heaviest guns were mounted in the bows and their method of attack was as described in the book. The galleon would swoop in from windward and fire in turn their bow chasers, lee broadside, stern chasers and second broadside before tacking away to reload. The English had high expectations of the damage these guns would inflict on the Spanish ships and were forced to rapidly alter their tactics after the first encounters proved they were not as effective at longer ranges.

The ‘race built’ galleons were warships designed for a primary purpose, to defend the coast of England, and so had little need of the massive holds of the Spanish galleons which were required for transoceanic trading. This gave them the option of carrying heavier guns closer to the water-line, a factor which had a significant impact in the Battle of Gravelines. The main weakness of these new English galleons was their scarcity and the vast majority of the remaining ships in the English fleet were of little value in heavy fighting.