Туннель Эго

9. A. Lutz, «Changes in the Tonic High-Amplitude Gamma Oscillations During Meditation Correlates with Long-Term Practitioners' Verbal Reports,» poster at the 9th ASSC conference, Pasadena, CA (2005); Lutz et al., «Long-Term Meditators Self-Induce High-Amplitude Synchrony During Mental Practice,» Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 101(46):16369-73 (2004). A good recent review is A. Lutz et al., «Attention Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation,» Trends Cog. Sci. 12(4):163–169 (2008).

10. Although I ultimately disagree with his theory of the «objective self,» perhaps the most beautiful and readable exposition of this problem and its application to self-consciousness can be found in chapter 4 of Thomas Nagel's The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

11. R. L. Gregory, «Visual Illusions Classified,» Trends Cog. Sci. 1:190–194 (1997).

12. Ernst Poppel, Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988); E. Ruhnau, «Time-Gestalt and the Observer,» in Thomas Metzinger, ed., Conscious Experience (Thorverton, UK, and Paderborn, Germany: mentis & Imprint Academic, 1995).

13. R. M. Halsey & A. Chapanis, «Number of Absolutely Identifiable Hues,» Jour. OpticalSoc. Amer. 41(12):1057-58 (1951). For an excellent philosophical discussion, see D. Raffman, «On the Persistence of Phenomenology,» in Thomas Metzinger, ed., Conscious Experience (Thorverton, UK, and Paderborn, Germany: mentis & Imprint Academic, 1995).

14. Raffman, «On the Persistence of Phenomenology,» 295 (1995).

15. Clarence I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Scribner's, 1929). See also Daniel C. Dennett, «Quining Qualia,» in A. J. Marcel & E. Bisiach, Consciousness in Contemporary Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

16. Diana Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

17. P. Churchland, «Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,» Jour. Phil. 78(2):67–90 (1981).

18. Quoted after the extensively revised 1991 edition by M. David Enoch and Hadrian N. Ball, Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes (London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991), 167.

19. I am grateful to Dr. Richard Chapman of the University of Utah's Pain Research Center for pointing out to me the concept of an «immunculus»: the network of natural autoantibodies targeting extracellular, membrane, cytoplasmic, and nuclear self-antigens. The repertoires of natural auto antibodies are surprisingly constant in healthy persons and, independently of gender and age, are characterized by only minimal individual variations.

CHAPTER 3

1. M. Botvinick & J. Cohen, «Rubber Hand 'Feels' Touch That Eyes See,» Nature 391:756 (1998).

2. K. C. Armel & V. S. Ramachandran, «Projecting Sensations to External Objects: Evidence from Skin Conductance Response,» Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. 270:1499–1506 (2003).

3. M. R. Longo et al., «What Is Embodiment? A Psychometric Approach,» Cognition 107:978–998 (2008).

4. See Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion, and the Making of Consciousness (London: Vintage, 1999), 19. See also A. D. Craig, «How Do You Feel? Interoception: The Sense of the Physiological Condition of the Body,» Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3:655–666 (2002) and «Interoception: The Sense of the Physiological Condition of the Body,» Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 13:500–505 (2003).

5. For an excellent recent review-including a new, empirically informed synthesis-of the classical intuition of David Hume (that the self is just a bundle of impressions and everything can be explained «bottom-up») as opposed to the classical Kantian intuition (self-consciousness is a necessary prior condition for experiencing the body as a whole and everything must be explained «top-down»), see F. De Vignemont et al., «Body Mereology,» in Gunther Knoblich et al., eds., Human Body Perception from the Inside Out (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).