The Triple Agent

2. “we have a chance to go after Zawahiri”: CIA director Leon Panetta’s words, as recalled in author interviews with two intelligence officials and one administration official who attended the meeting.

3. the al-Qaeda version of a mad scientist: See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

4. “To kill Americans and their allies”: Ibid.

5. an alleged 2003 plot to attack New York City’s subway system: See Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

6. Zawahiri was known to have visited the same province: For a description of the failed assassination attempt on Zawahiri, see analysis by Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda’s Future Plans,” Long War Journal, Jan. 15, 2006, as posted by http://threats​watch.org/​analysis/​2006/01/​zawahiri-​and-alqaedas-​future-p/.

7. “Bush, do you know where I am?”: Andrew Buncombe, “Zawahiri Taunts Bush in New Videotape,” Independent, Jan. 31, 2006.

8. a series of options for a meeting with Balawi were weighed: The CIA’s internal debate over the meeting with Balawi was described in author interviews with three CIA officers who participated.

9. “government was crying out for information”: Interview with the author.

10. Balawi became increasingly insistent: Negotiations with Balawi over the details of his meeting with the CIA and bin Zeid recounted in author interviews with two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials.

11. “We need to go slow on this case”: LaBonte’s words and his bosses’ response, as described in interviews with two CIA officials briefed on the exchange.

12. “But it’s my case”: The Jordanian intelligence agency’s effort to replace bin Zeid as the case officer for Balawi was confirmed by CIA director Leon Panetta in a press briefing on Oct. 19, 2010. Additional details about the internal discussions and events preceding bin Zeid’s departure for Afghanistan were described in author interviews with two Jordanian and two U.S. intelligence officials, as well as with bin Zeid’s and LaBonte’s families.

Chapter 12: Rehearsal

1. She would join them via Skype: Details of Matthews’s experiences during Christmas week were provided in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and two family members.

2. the most important ops plan of her life: Matthews’s plan and the various reactions to it were described in author interviews with two senior U.S. intelligence officials, three CIA colleagues, and two former Special Forces officers with personal knowledge of the events.

3. no formal counterintelligence review for Balawi: The CIA’s internal review, as described by Panetta on Oct. 19, 2010, confirmed deficiencies in the agency’s counterintelligence review of the case. Additional insights provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials.

4. they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious: Author interview with Pickering, op. cit. at Langley, Virginia.

5. everything seemed wrong: LaBonte’s and bin Zeid’s concerns about the Balawi case were described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and family members with whom they discussed their feelings in the final days of December.

6. “Sometimes it’s your job to say something”: Dec. 21, 2009, e-mail from Jeremy Wise to former navy colleague, provided to author.

7. Stay far away from this: Roberson’s words, as recalled by Khost colleague and recounted in author interview with the Khost colleague.

8. “Pray for me”: Hanson’s words as recalled in author interview with family member.

Chapter 13: The Triple Agent

1. very different from the vests he usually made: For the initial account of the making of Balawi’s suicide vest, see Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Inside Al Qaeda: Nine Years After 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s Network Remains a Shadowy, Little-Understood Enemy,” Newsweek, Sept. 13, 2010. Additional details provided in interview with Pakistani Taliban official.

2. police discovered that they could often distinguish the dead bomber: For a fuller understanding of the forensics of suicide bombing investigations, see Almogy et al., “Suicide Bombing Attacks: Update and Modifications to the Protocol,” Annals of Surgery, vol. 239, no. 3 (March 2004).

3. outlandish theories about how the CIA’s missiles found their targets: Specifics provided in interviews with two Taliban associates and a Pakistani law enforcement official.

4. Balawi’s days started at 5:30 A.M.: Details about Balawi’s training camp experiences, including his leg injury, as well as al-Qaeda’s internal debate over his trustworthiness, were provided in interviews with two Pakistani Taliban officials.