Very little is known about the life of Sun-tzu [Sunzi]^except that he is a real Chinese historical figure, a younger near-con- temporary of Confucius [4]. His name was Sun Wu (the hon- orific suffix -tzu simply means 'Master), and the brief testi- mony of early historical records suggests that he had a successful career as a general and military planner in one or more of the kingdoms of the Warring States Period into which China dissolved in the waning centuries of the Chou [Zhou] Dynasty. Some time after his death, probably in the early to mid-fourth century b.c.e., his disciples wrote down what they remembered of his teachings. The Art ofWar is a more unified and doctrinally coherent book than the Analects, which suggests to some scholars that it was written down over a shorter period of time and by a group of people personally well-versed in Sun-tzu's teachings. In any case, the book attributed to Sun- tzu set the standard for ali subsequent Chinese writings on military matters.
It is in some ways strange that The Art of War has been so highly esteemed, and so much imitated, as it has been through- out the history of traditional China. From pre-Confucian times, and even more so under the influence of Confucius and his school, Chinese social philosophy has downplayed the political role of warfare, and has insisted that military matters had to be kept firmly under the control of a civilian bureaucracy; little praise or honor was accorded to personal military prowess. (A famous Chinese proverb says "Do not take good iron to make a nail, do not take a good man to make a soldier.,>) On reading The Art of War, one sees that the apparent paradox resolves itself; it becomes clear that Sun-tzu was more a philosopher than a strategist, one who taught that the best victory is attained
without a battle. Sun-tzu was a realist who recognized that war- fare sometimes could not be avoided, and then must be pur- sued with the utmost vigor to a successful conclusion; his spe- cial talent lay in teaching rulers how to deploy their forces to maximum advantage. But he never glorifies warfare; his voice is that of a mature man dealing with the world as it is, not of a glory-seeking adolescent hero. Sun-tzu would not have had much use for Achilles (Homer [2]).
For Sun-tzu, the overall goal of the military strategist is plain: to maximize the effectiveness of whatever forces a ruler might have at his command. If the force be inherently great, choose a suitable target and a sufficient reason for attack, and crush the enemy with a single blow. If the force be weak and inadequate, find ways to elude, deceive, ambush, and exhaust the enemy so as to even the odds. Like Machiavelli [34], Sun- tzu did not trouble himself about the legality or morality of his methods; espionage, sabotage, and deceit were ali fair play. It was, he insisted, best not to fight at ali; if it became necessary for a state to fight, its ruler had no moral obligation greater than preserving the state's existence through victory.
Sun-tzu's forthright approach to power—his willingness to engage in no-holds-barred combat, his consistent and close attention to detail (such as "devise contingency plans on terrain vulnerable to ambush"), and the clarity of his style—has led in recent years to a new vogue for The Art ofWar, as a handbook of business management. The book itself and many derivative works have made their way onto the bookshelves of boardroom strategists, merger-and-acquisitions lawyers, personnel man- agers, and other modern warriors whose careers, like those of ancient Chinese kings, are fraught with danger and uncertainty.
Samuel B. Griffitfrs translation of The Art ofWar was for many years the standard version; it is still reliable. I prefer, however, the recent excellent translations by Roger Ames and by Ralph Sawyer, both of which incorporate up-to-date schol- arship on the text.
J.S.M.
I I
ARISTOPHANES
448-388 B.C.E.
Lysistrata, The Clouds, The Birds