Читаем The Historians' History of the World 06 полностью

To avoid rousing the suspicions of Varus the princes proposed to assist him and promised to join him with their forces along his line of march, which was exactly determined by the situation of the rebellious province and agreed upon between him and the Cheruscan princes. The conspirators had thus a pretext for issuing their own summons to arms without giving umbrage to the Romans dispersed throughout the country at military stations, and it is even possible that they induced Varus to send forth the command to all quarters. They themselves stayed with him, not only to sustain him in his unconcern, but also to watch him and to be at hand if the plot should happen to be betrayed to him by the Roman party. For this was no imaginary danger.

The evening before the start, while Varus was entertaining the princes of the Cherusci at his table, Segestes came forward and openly charged Arminius and his adherents with conspiracy, demanding the arrest of Arminius and the ringleaders of the plot, and offering to be put in fetters himself as a proof of the truth of his accusation. Varus turned a deaf ear to these disclosures, probably because the notorious enmity between Segestes and Arminius made him doubt the good faith of the accuser, and the start took place next morning.

The conspirators now took leave of Varus on the pretext of putting themselves at the head of their forces and bringing them to join him; but in reality these forces were already stationed in readiness along the route which Varus would have to take. In addition to this, word must have been sent even to the Marsi and Chauci to hasten with their levies to a particular point. Orders were then given for a general massacre of the isolated Roman garrisons.

It has frequently been observed that the revolt cannot have been represented to Varus as very serious; otherwise the carelessness of his dispositions on the march is absolutely incomprehensible. The crowd of women and children who were in the camp and accompanied the army proves either that he intended to pitch his summer camp for a longer or shorter period in the rebellious province after he had subdued it, or that if he meant to send them back to the Rhine their return would not involve a very circuitous journey.

Meanwhile the long array, marching in imperfect order and hampered by enormous quantities of baggage, had got entangled in difficult paths that led uphill and downhill through the thick forest, and while they were engaged in toilsomely improving the road by felling trees, making bridges, etc., very wet weather set in with a storm so violent that branches were torn from the huge trees and hurled down upon the marching men beneath. The ground became slippery, and the difficulty of getting along amidst the roots and trunks of trees was doubled; and in this precarious plight the army found itself suddenly assailed on all sides by Germans. At this juncture, when he realised the treachery of the Germans, Varus can hardly have come to any other resolution than to escape from a tract of country so dangerous by taking the shortest road to the Rhine, where he would be able to deploy his forces and checkmate the enemy.

It has been asserted that he could most easily have accomplished this by returning to his summer camp, from which a properly constructed military road must certainly have led to his winter quarters on the Rhine. But who can tell whether Varus did not reflect that to go back by the way he had come would involve too great hardship and loss, while a diversion of his line of march to the river might be effected with no greater danger and might even offer his army a more easily attainable condition of safety? Nor need we lose sight of the possibility that he arrived at a wrong decision.

Thus the march was continued with heavy loss, the straggling order avenging itself by making organised resistance impossible. Nevertheless, the army pitched its camp as best it could in the evening; though it must have been hard to find a suitable spot in the wooded hill-country. Here they decided to burn or abandon their useless baggage and to carry nothing with them but what was absolutely necessary; and so proceeded on their march in better order next day.

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