Читаем The Historians' History of the World 06 полностью

The senator was excluded from the army on principle; the knight on the contrary was bound to render military service if he hoped to serve the state in peace or war. His promotion was, of course, in the emperor’s hands. In the time of the republic the people did not make all the appointments, but they had twenty-four posts to dispose of; in the reign of Augustus these tribuni militum a populo were still elected by the people, but this emperor, who had deprived the senate of all means of influencing the army, also took from the people their practically obsolete privilege of electing officers, and about the time of his death the title of tribunus militum a populo ceases to appear in inscriptions.

In republican times the supreme command in war had been one of the official duties of the elective magistrates; but under the empire it became the duty and privilege of the imperator, who was represented by his legates in the several divisions of the army. Under Augustus each legion had a legatus legionis, so called to distinguish him from the governors of the imperial provinces (legati provinciæ). The officers of the imperial army were divided according to their social rank in the senatorial and knightly classes.

Many peculiarities of the army system of Augustus lose much of their singularity in the eyes of the modern observer by a comparison with corresponding conditions at the present time. The English army is the only contemporary force which can be compared with the Roman army under the empire.

In both nations the first duty of the army is not to defend the country, which is secured from the danger of invasion by its isolated situation, but to keep the provinces under control. Accordingly the country of the ruling race, Italy in the one case, England and Scotland in the other, has only insignificant garrisons of professional soldiers, who hardly suffice to supplement the police at need; while the bulk of the army is scattered all over the globe, wherever the interests of the ruling race appear to be imperilled. The troops are nowhere stationed in larger numbers than is absolutely necessary, because as a matter of fact their numbers are totally inadequate, and every serious incident shows that the aims of the state bear no proportion to its military resources.

The parallel is peculiarly apt in the non-enforcement of universal military service and the consequent lack of a sufficient reserve. The latter would be too heavy a financial burden for the state, as it has to treat its mercenary troops with consideration and grant them large donations of money. The England of to-day pays the bounty money on enlistment; imperial Rome bestowed considerable sums of money on her soldiers on their discharge.

The Roman soldiers were employed on peaceful tasks which were but remotely connected with the military uses of an army, in the same way as English soldiers nowadays. It has already been mentioned that Augustus had roads, canals, cisterns, and public buildings constructed by his legions. The demands made upon the English army in this respect do not go quite so far, but in the island of Corfu any one who drives from the capital to Palæocastrizza may see a bronze tablet let into the face of the rock to perpetuate the memory of the English regiment which constructed this difficult bit of road.

Led by young aristocrats more or less ignorant of the service when they enter it, both the Roman and English armies have generally attained the objects set before them and made up for the lack of organisation by the energy and capacity of their members.

As the Romans induced subject communities and states to furnish them with auxiliary troops, so England has enlisted Indian regiments officered by Englishmen, which are recruited only from among the warlike races such as the brave mountaineers of the Himalayas, the effeminate inhabitants of Bengal being scarcely represented amongst the Sepoys. This is in exact accordance with the principles on which Augustus acted in the formation of his auxiliary troops. Of course the military resources of those princes who still retained a show of independence were likewise at the disposal of the ruling power if the imperial troops had to be spared or were not sufficient to quell local disturbances.c

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