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The circumstances of Thessaly afforded another opportunity. Aristippus, a Thessalian of eminence, probably banished by faction, had been admitted to the prince’s familiarity. Returning afterwards to his own country, and becoming head of his party, divisions were still such that civil war followed. Then Aristippus thought he might profit from that claim which the ancient doctrine of hospitality gave him upon the generosity of Cyrus. He requested levy-money for two thousand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thousand, and six months; only stipulating that without previous communication with him no accommodation should be concluded with the adverse party. Thus another body of troops, unnoticed, was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban of the first rank and highest connections, happy in his talents, cultivated under the celebrated Gorgias, of manners to win, and character to deserve esteem, dissatisfied with the state of things in his own city, passed, at the age of towards thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpose of seeking employment, honour, and fortune; and, in Xenophon’s phrase, of so associating with men in the highest situations that he might earn the means of doing, rather than lie under the necessity of receiving favours. Recommended by such advantages, Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendship of Cyrus, who commissioned him to raise a Grecian force, pretended for a purpose which the Persian court could not disapprove, the reduction of the rebellious Pisidians.

Thus engaged in the prince’s service, it became the care of Proxenus to obtain in his foreign residence the society of a friend, of disposition, acquirements, and pursuits congenial to his own. With this view he wrote to a young Athenian, with whom he had long had intimacy, Xenophon, son of Gryllus, a scholar of Socrates, warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince’s favour, to which he engaged to introduce him. In the actual state of things at Athens enough might occur to disgust honest ambition. Xenophon therefore, little satisfied with any prospect there, accepted his friend’s invitation; and to these circumstances we owe his beautiful narrative of the ensuing transactions, which remains, like the Iliad, the oldest and the model of its kind.

For a Grecian land-force Cyrus contented himself with what might be procured by negotiation with individuals and the allurement of pay. But he desired the co-operation of a Grecian fleet, which, in the existing circumstances of Greece, could be obtained only through favour of the Lacedæmonian government. By a confidential minister therefore, despatched to Lacedæmon, he claimed a friendly return for his assistance in the war with Athens. The ephors, publicly acknowledging the justness of his claim, sent orders to Samius, then commanding on the Asiatic station, to join the prince’s fleet, and follow the directions of his admiral, Tamos, an Egyptian.

Preparation being completed, and the advantageous season for action approaching, all the Ionian garrisons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias, the Arcadian, commander of the Grecian guard, which had attended Cyrus into Upper Asia. The other Grecian troops were directed to join; some at Sardis, some at places farther eastward. A very large army of Asiatics, whom the Greeks called collectively Barbarians, was at the same time assembled. The pretence of these great preparations was to exterminate the rebellious Pisidians; and, in the moment, it sufficed for the troops. It could, however, no longer blind Tissaphernes; who, not choosing to trust others to report what he knew or suspected, set off, with all the speed that the way of travelling of an Eastern satrap would admit, with an escort of five hundred horse, to communicate personally with the king. Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis, with the forces already collected, by Colossæ to Celænæ in Phrygia, a large and populous town, where he halted thirty days. There he was joined by the last division of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thousand heavy-armed, and two thousand targeteers. His Asiatics or barbarians were near a hundred thousand.b

Greek Marble Chair

XENOPHON’S ACCOUNT OF CUNAXA

[401 B.C.]

Of the following famous battle-picture, Plutarch wrote glowingly: “Many historians have described this battle; but Xenophon has done it with such life and energy that we do not read an account of it—we see it and feel all the danger.” The praise is not undeserved, and yet as an illuminating example of the mental attitude of the ancient historian with his love of long digressions, it should be noted that in the very midmost of the battle, Xenophon pauses to insert a whole chapter reviewing the life of Cyrus. This chapter is omitted here, the rest of the description being given in the antiquated translation made in 1749 by Edward Spelman.a

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