Generaloberst von Arnim tried in vain to instil a greater degree of watchfulness over private discussions at Trent Park. On 9 July 1943 in his capacity as Senior German Officer (Document 12) he urged caution in what was said–Trent Park was a former interrogation centre and one had to take into account that microphones might be hidden there. For this reason alone one should not hold conversations which might be of propaganda value to the enemy. On 15 August he renewed his appeal. He suspected that Lord Aberfeldy listened-in to prisoners’ conversations from his window, and that some of the personal valets were collaborating with the British (neither true), and that one must therefore exercise the greatest caution.[67] His appeal fell on deaf ears. The prisoners would not be muzzled and chatted gaily about politics and military affairs. Generalleutnant Neuffer considered ‘the stories about eavesdropping’ to be ‘utter stupidity’[68] while Oberstleutnant Köhncke was of the opinion that the prisoners had the right ‘to talk about political things–we are, after all, not children.’ One should be grateful to find oneself amongst one’s peers, amongst people with some experience of life, with different points of view, he went on, and this was not the same kind of thing at all as gossiping with young lieutenants.[69] Thoma concluded, ‘They have such a good intelligence service that they don’t need to listen to us chatterboxes.’[70]
Further convincing evidence that the German prisoners were unaware of being eavesdropped on is contained in General Crüwell’s diaries. In captivity he had consciously avoided making notes on political and military matters. In conversation with colleagues he abandoned caution and spoke out at length on the war situation in February 1944, providing MI19 with a precise strategic analysis. If he had suspected that microphones were hidden in the walls at Trent Park he would certainly have exercised discretion as with his diary notes.[71]
After reading hundreds of protocols, one is left with the impression that the generals were holding nothing back in conversation, not even von Arnim. Those who wanted to talk did so frankly at Trent Park. In the main, tactical details of operations, absent from the generals’ conversations, were discussed by Wehrmacht other ranks while with a few exceptions the generals discussed more general matters. This was attributable to the higher degree of education, age and the higher military rank they held. It is this fact which makes the CSDIC (UK) protocols so interesting for historians, an insight into the thinking of a chosen circle of senior German officers during World War II beyond detailed military information.
To what extent Trent Park fulfilled its purpose and the British obtained a concrete military advantage from the practice of listening-in to long-term prisoners is only evident in a few cases. The information gleaned from a conversation on U-boat tactics between General Crüwell and Oberleutnant Röhmer has already been mentioned. At the end of March 1943 the War Office received definite information about the development of the V-2 rocket from a conversation between Crüwell and Thoma,[72] but otherwise it was only officers captured on the Channel coast who spoke extensively about military tactics. From the latter the Allies may have learned that Cherbourg was not sown with long-term mines.[73]
The
Not all officers who were at Trent Park speak in the published transcripts. From April 1945 CSDIC (UK) recorded far fewer conversations, and for reasons of space here a selection has had to be made to provide a broad spectrum of very senior officers with a spread of character types and biographies. Sixty-three generals, 14 Obristen (colonels), four Oberstleutnante, three majors and two lieutenants appear in the protocols. Most of the 86 were Army officers, 11 were Luftwaffe, four Kriegsmarine and one Waffen SS.