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GRGG 198(C) [TNA, WO 208/4363]

Provisional report on information obtain from CS/382–General der Fallschirmtruppen RAMCKE (Commander, Brest)–Captured 19 Sept. 44 in Brest.

[…]

RAMCKE: When I took over the command at BREST, I first of all brought four high officials up for trial by court martial, and officers; then I immediately had six men shot for defeatist talk, and for going over to the enemy and desertion; in fact I had them shot after I had called up representatives from each unit–300 men in all. After that there was order![267]

<p>Document 109</p>

GRGG 199 [TNA, WO 208/4363]

Provisional report on information obtained from Generalmajor BOCK VON WÜLFINGEN (Oberfeldkommandatur, Liege)–Captured 8 Sept. 44 in Liege.

SEYFFARDT (re Russian PW): They had to kill them all.

?HEYKING: The Commissars etc.?

SEYFFARDT: No. ‘No prisoners are to be taken!’ stated the order.

?: That was so for a time.

?SEYFFARDT: They were all killed, all of them. They were killed in thousands. They captured about 600,000 prisoners in that one pocket near GSCHATSK,[268] and, of those 600,000, 400,000 were said to have died on the march from GSCHATSK to SMOLENSK alone.[269]

?TRESCKOW: Whose idea was that, and what was the reason for it?

?SEYFFARDT: The FÜHRER, that was one of the FÜHRER’s orders.

<p>Document 110</p>

GRGG 201(C) [TNA, WO 208/4364]

Provisional report on information obtain from CS/443 Generalleutnant HEIM (Commander, Boulogne)–Captured 23 Sept. 44 in Boulogne.

HEIM: HIMMLER does an incredible amount for his SS; a man has only to do like this and everything he wants is there.

ELSTER: Well, why doesn’t he take steps to prevent these swinish tricks that the SS and Security Service have done?

HEIM: He’s supposed not to have been in favour of that.

?HEYKING: The SS and Security Service in general are blamed for all the Jewish massacres and so on. On the other hand, HIMMLER is supposed to have said at a big CO’s conference–he was asked about the Jewish question and he merely replied: ‘Well, gentlemen, as to this “Jewish question” I can only say that the orders were given and I carry out orders.’ He wasn’t giving them a chance. In the end everyone merely says that they haven’t the final word in these matters.[270]

[…]

<p>Document 111</p>

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 210

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 11–12 Oct. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]

CHOLTITZ: The orders arrived to shoot the Commissars.[271] We all objected strongly to doing this and said it was a really dirty job and a mistake, because if we considered them as proper soldiers and told them that we were taking them prisoner and sending them to GERMANY to show them the social conditions, then their resistance would be less. I was in front of SEBASTOPOL and SCHMUNDT, who was HITLER’S adjutant, came to me. I didn’t know him, but he knew me, and he remained in my dugout for a few days and watched me at work. I said to him: ‘My dear SCHMUNDT, don’t make that mistake, leave it now, give up that order so that we may stop having that strong opposition.’ What do you English do? You say: ‘All Nazis will be killed, they will all be hanged!

[…]

BAO: The French said that to me too.

CHOLTITZ: That’s all very well, but it shouldn’t be said openly. You incite–the Nazi says to himself: ‘It doesn’t matter what happens, even if GERMANY is smashed, I may perhaps save my life that way, whereas otherwise I certainly shan’t save my life!’ A thing like that is madness.

BAO: We come back to the point again, Sir, that there are two factors of which we are afraid: first a Nazi underground movement after the war and secondly an underground movement of the Armed Forces, like the ‘Black Reichswehr’ and so on after the last war.

CHOLTITZ: Our best men have gone, because HITLER began the war. Those were the ones who were hanged. It is certainly untrue that the officers’ corps agitated for war–we were all talking about it the other day and I asked them all what they knew from their people. We knew exactly how weak we were, there were fifteen annual classes which we hadn’t trained, we as experts, wouldn’t agitate for war, because we knew perfectly well that fifteen annual classes were not ready and they could never be trained afterwards. Our best men left. The generals fought tooth and nail against the French campaign,[272] incidentally, as we were able to see later, they were wrong, because HITLER happened to be right that time. Because he was right, that man usurped the leadership on the Eastern Front and wouldn’t let anyone get near it any more. We are getting a terrible state of affairs in EUROPE; the Russians are taking HUNGARY and the whole of the BALKANS, it can’t go on like that.

<p>Document 112</p>

CSDIC (UK), GRGG 215

Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 23–4 Oct. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]

CHOLTITZ: Did you destroy BREST?

RAMCKE: Yes.

CHOLTITZ: The town and everything else?

RAMCKE: Yes.

CHOLTITZ: Why on earth did you destroy the town?

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