Stalin: A Biography

Lenin would not be thwarted. He had never envisaged revolutionary war as a crude war of conquest. It was rather his assumption that workers across Europe were expected to rise up in support of the Red Army. The leftist elements in the European socialist parties, he anticipated, would rally to the communist cause and the obstacles to the establishment of revolutionary governments would be removed. The Red Army had only thirty-five divisions. The Imperial Army had assembled nearly a hundred divisions against Germany and Austria– Hungary at the outbreak of the First World War. Lenin brushed this aside. Class conflict in Europe would more than make up for the inadequacies of the Red Army. The die was cast by the Politburo. Warsaw would be taken and the way cleared for an advance on Berlin where, as Lenin believed, the Reds would find political disarray they could exploit. The German communists should make an alliance with the German far right to sweep away the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 which had taken territory and colonies from Germany, imposed heavy reparations and restricted its military reconstruction. Then they should turn against their right-wing enemies, and a revolutionary state would be installed.¹⁴

Having lost the discussion at long distance from the Politburo, Stalin accepted the decision. Indeed he developed an eagerness to prove himself in the campaign. He had been spending much time in previous months on yet another dispute about his posting and its responsibilities. In November 1919 he had made a characteristic attempt to intimidate Lenin and the Politburo by threatening to resign.¹⁵ His explanation was more colourful than usual: ‘Without this, my work on the Southern Front will become pointless and unnecessary, which gives me the right or rather the duty to move away anywhere — to the Devil even — rather than stay on the Southern Front.’¹⁶ The Politburo, already habituated to his tantrums, rejected his ultimatum.¹⁷ In January 1920 the Southern Front was re-formed as the South-Western Front with the task of defending Ukraine against both the Poles and Wrangel’s Crimean forces. But Stalin was transferred in February to the Caucasian Front. He did not like this;¹⁸ he wanted to be active where the fortunes of the Revolution were crucially threatened: he resented being regarded as the man from the Caucasus whose expertise was limited to Caucasian affairs. On 26 May Stalin’s tenacity was rewarded when he was assigned to the South-Western Front, where battles with the Poles were anticipated.

On 12 July Lenin sent a message to him in Kharkov:¹⁹

I request Stalin 1) to accelerate arrangements for a furious intensification of the offensive; 2) to communicate to me his (Stalin’s) opinion. I personally think that [Curzon’s proposal] is pure skulduggery with the idea of annexing Crimea.

Previously sceptical about the Polish campaign, Stalin telegraphed his euphoric agreement:²⁰

The Polish armies are completely collapsing, the Poles have lost their communications and administration and Polish orders, instead of arriving at their address, are falling ever more frequently into our hands; in short, the Poles are experiencing a collapse from which they will not soon recover.

Stalin scoffed at Lord Curzon’s proposal of a truce followed by peace talks in London:²¹

I think that imperialism has never been so weak as now at a time of Poland’s defeat and we have never been as strong as now. Therefore the more firmly we conduct ourselves, the better it will be both for us and for international revolution. Send on the Politburo’s decision.

Lenin and Stalin, advocates of caution at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, had become the warmongers of the Bolshevik leadership.