By the time we were ready for full-scale testing in the early summer of 1985, the Navy was eager to subject our prototype to the most rigorous radar testing imaginable. Several of their radar experts claimed that there was no way we could duplicate the low radar cross section achieved by a thirty-foot model in a pool with a full-size prototype on the real ocean. We had heard those same skeptical predictions before from the Air Force over our stealth airplane, but in the wonderful world of stealth, once we had acquired the right shape, the size of an object really didn’t matter. The military had a tough time understanding that basic fact.
The barge, with
These kinds of tests went on for nearly a year and often were conducted under the scrutiny of Soviet trawlers snooping in the open seas off the Channel Islands, about sixty miles southwest of Santa Barbara. To keep local fishing boats and any curious yachtsmen away, the Coast Guard leaked the word that they were escalating stop-and-search procedures against potential drug smugglers in the ship lanes we were using. Boat traffic miraculously vanished.
The tests began an hour after sunset and lasted until an hour before sunrise. Then
By the time we solved this problem, however, the admirals who ran the surface fleet were displaying little enthusiasm for going any speed ahead. “Too radical a design,” they told me. “If the shape is so revolutionary and secret, how could we ever use it without hundreds of sailors seeing it? It’s just too far out.” There were sexier ways of spending naval appropriations than on a small secret ship that would win few political brownie points for any admiral who pushed for it. Although the Navy did apply our technology to lower the cross section of submarine periscopes and reduce the radar cross section of their new class of destroyers, we were drydocked before we had really got launched. So I held back: I had a design for a stealthy aircraft carrier that would show up on radar no bigger than a life raft, but I had already proven Kelly’s unwritten Rule Fifteen about dealing with the Navy. Why ignore it twice?
14
THE LONG GOODBYE
IN THE EARLY SUMMER of 1972, an executive of Northrop Aircraft Company, whom I’ll call Fred Lawrence, invited me to dinner and offered me a terrific job.
“Ben,” he said, “we are planning to build a lightweight single-engine fighter. We’ve never done a single-engine jet before, and we want you to set up a Skunk Works for us with you as our Kelly Johnson.”
“Why me?” I asked, truly amazed. I could think of three or four veterans of our Skunk Works who had a world of managerial and practical experience greater than my own. For openers, our vice president, Rus Daniell, had been a project manager before I was even hired at Lockheed, and on the basis of seniority would certainly appear to be more qualified than I was. I was then forty-seven years old, working as Kelly’s assistant chief engineer, in charge of aerodynamics and all the flight sciences. I had about forty-five people working for me and was earning sixty grand. I was doing dandy, without any real future aspirations.