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with planning. Well, the system was right after all. The plan remains the thing." The front commander shifted in his chair, leaning closer toward Chibisov. "Consider how differently we and our enemies approached the long preparation for war. Nearly half a century's preparation, although its directness is only evident in retrospect. We followed the correct policy, whether we all liked it or not. We fit the military plan to the overall political framework, all the while resenting even that much compromise. But our enemies in NATO tried to force a political plan into a military framework. The beauty in our system is that it restrains the military, often uncomfortably for us, but does not interfere in the internal details of military operations. We are the warriors who enjoy the essential freedoms. Our enemies allowed political considerations to dictate not just the decision to use force, but even the practical details of military planning. Their forward defense policy, for example, proved disastrous—but it placated the West Germans in peacetime. When it mattered, they could not even implement it effectively. They avoided squabbles and discomforts in peacetime at the price of crippling their abilities to wage war. Look at the wastage evident on that map. All of their splendid equipment. And their expensively trained soldiers. Squandered for a political convenience that failed them in a time of crisis. Our opponents forgot what armies are for. And we are very fortunate. I have always been jealous of their marvelous equipment, and even, I must admit, of their soldiers. Pavel Pavlovitch, whenever I reviewed the special wartime tables for correlation calculations, I always told myself that, were I in command of NATO, the Warsaw Pact forces would not stand a chance. And who knows? Even now the tide of battle could turn in a moment. I do not believe it will. But perhaps I underestimate the nuclear bogeyman at this point. I do not believe the West Germans will consent to nuclear usage on their soil. I believe we have already won—for now. The outstanding question is, how much have we won, and for how long? But we've won. Or perhaps it would be more honest to say that our enemies have defeated themselves."

Chibisov rose and moved close to the map, recalling through the layers of weariness that his report was incomplete. He circled a large area in the mountainous region south of the Ruhr. "Comrade Front Commander, Dudorov has drawn a blank here. From the Ruhr right down to the Taunus, almost to Frankfurt, we have insufficient current data, only the sketchiest notion of what's happening in there. The attrition of our technical means of reconnaissance is hampering our collection effort, and our human intelligence and special-operations effort has been disappointing in its results. Only the systems can provide the volume and 284

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detail we require on the contemporary battlefield. And we're losing those systems at an intolerable rate. The attack on our intelligence infrastructure may be the most painful aspect of the NATO defense at this stage in the war. In any case, Dudorov is convinced that our sister front to the south does not have an accurate accounting of the current dispositions of all of the NATO-CENTAG forces."

Malinsky leaned slightly toward the map, but he either remained magnificently imperturbable or was nearing the point of true exhaustion.

"The Americans?" he asked the map. "Does Dudorov believe the Americans will move north?"

"He believes our sister front has overcounted the U.S. Army formations that are currently committed. It's psychologically natural for them to do so, based upon their failure to sustain a substantial penetration in the south. Dudorov is convinced that the Americans have been attacking our intelligence structure unilaterally, trying to blind us. He feels they're up to something big."

"It's a different war down south," Malinsky said. He paused for a moment, shifting his eyes, scanning thoughts that remained hidden from Chibisov. "Of course, I received the privileged position. Our comrades down in the Second Western Front have a thankless task. How well would we have done attacking the best-equipped, heaviest enemy formations on terrain that almost defends itself? No one really expected great gains in the south, of course. The object is simply to fix them while we break through and conduct the operational-strategic envelopment down the west bank of the Rhine. But it must be a heartbreaking mission for our comrades to the south. And now Dudorov thinks they may have botched the job? Does he really believe the Americans can move north fast enough to intercept us? Does he really think they're coming?"

"He doesn't believe the Americans will ever allow the British to be destroyed. And the Americans aren't the fools we'd like them to be. They must see the threat to their lines of communication if we reach the west bank of the Rhine. They have to move at some point."