In April 2015 the British police brought six charges of “making and possessing” child pornography against Vladimir Bukovsky, an even less likely candidate for the charge than Vladimir Putin himself. Yet slander is adhesive.
Bukovsky was one of the great figures of the Soviet dissident movement, not as famous as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn—there is always a second tier—but greatly respected for what he endured, twelve years in psychiatric hospitals and prisons, and for what he achieved as an activist and writer, especially for his memoir,
In 1976 he was forcibly deported from the USSR in exchange for the leader of the Chilean Communist Party. He then devoted himself mostly to neurophysiology, working mainly in Cambridge University in England.
When Litvinenko defected to the UK in 2000, he made contact with Bukovsky, calling him some twenty to thirty times a day. And it was to Bukovsky that Litvinenko would reveal how assassinations were now casually arranged over a bowl of soup in the FSB cafeteria.
After Litvinenko was himself assassinated—Bukovsky was called to testify into the inquiry conducted by former judge Sir Robert Owen. Bukovsky’s conclusion was hardly a ringing condemnation: “I am pretty sure it was done on orders from the Kremlin.” Owen himself went further, naming names: “I have concluded that the FSB operation to kill Mr. Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr. Patrushev, then head of the FSB, and also by President Putin.”
A month after Bukovsky testified the British police brought the multiple child pornography charges against Bukovsky based on information received from Europol. For a man of Bukovsky’s proven integrity it was a particularly loathsome charge, one that would besmirch, if only by association, his last years of life.
Two things were clear to everyone but the British police: the child pornography had been planted in Bukovsky’s computer and the act was an obvious allusion to Litvinenko’s accusing Putin of pedophilia.
A year after the charges were brought against him, the British police forging ahead with their case, Bukovsky went on a protest hunger strike though he was in very poor health. He said of the possibility of dying: “I’m not afraid of it. How can you be afraid of something inevitable? It isn’t a senseless death. It’s a purposeful death. I’m an old man anyway.”
In May 2016, after three weeks of a hunger strike by Bukovsky and a great international outcry, a British court postponed the criminal case against him. Bukovsky intends to file a civil case against the prosecutors, who say they need more time to determine whether his computer could have been hacked, a task difficult but doable.
One thing is clear here, one isn’t. It’s clear that the FSB was no more a match for Bukovsky than the KGB was. Men with that diamond-hard integrity can be killed but not broken. What isn’t clear is how the example of the attack on Bukovsky might convince future Russia dissenters that the game is not worth the candle.
The FSB and its predecessors had always been adept at finding or manufacturing compromising material,
On November 9, 2016, Donald Trump, a man of boundless ambition and self-love uncorrected by character or conscience, was elected president of the United States by both the American people and the intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation. Not to be outdone by foreign competition, the FBI had also rolled up its sleeves and gotten down to work to thwart Hillary Clinton’s run for president. Was this an early example of the renewed Russian-American cooperation Trump hinted at in his campaign?