Philosophy as a way of life

The idea of dialogue with oneself had existed for a long time; one thinks of Homer's depiction of Odysseus admonishing himself: "Bear up, my heart." 90 The custom of writing down, for one's personal use, either one's own thoughts or the sayings one has read is also no doubt extremely old .

Nevertheless, we have every reason to believe that it was from Epictetus that Marcus derived the idea of this particular form of self-exhortation and conversation with oneself, bearing as it does upon the same rules of life and principles of action upon which Epictetus had advised his readers to meditate.

The object of Marcus' meditations and exercises was none other than Epictetus' three fundamental themes: the discipline of desire, the discipline of inclinations, and the discipline of judgment. This conceptual structure is peculiar to Epictetus, and is found nowhere else in the philosophical literature of antiquity.91 Moreover, in the course of a series of quotations from Epictetus, Marcus cites a fragment which clearly sets forth the three themes we have been examining:

What must be found is a method with regard to assent [to sugkatatit/1es-1hai ]. In the area [topos] of the inclinations [honnai ], we must keep vigilant our attentive faculty, so that these inclinations may operate with reserve:, in l hc 11crvicc of the community, and in a way corresponding to t he v11lur uf lhl'ir ohjcclN. Finally, when it comes to things that do not

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Figures

depend on us, we must abstain totally from desire [orekseos apekhesthai ]

and feel no aversion towards any of them.92

Additionally, Marcus repeatedly formulates the triple rule of life himself. We can easily recognize it in the following passages: What is enough for you?

- Your present value-judgement, so long as it is objective;

- The action you are accomplishing at the present moment, so long as it is done for the benefit of the human community;

- Your present inner disposition, as long as it rejoices in every event brought about by causes outside yoursclf.93

A rational nature is proceeding as it should if it fulfills the following conditions:

- If, in its representations [ phantasiai ], it does not give its assent

[sugkatatithemene] either to what is false, or to what is unclear;

- If it guides its inclinations [honnas] only towards those actions which serve the human community;

- If it has desire [orekseis] or aversion only for things that depend on us, while joyfully greeting everything allotted to it by universal nature.94

Wipe out your representations [ phantasian].

Check your inclinations [honnaij.

Extinguish your desire [oreksin].

Keep your directing principle [hegemonikon] under your control.95

On what, then, should we exert our efforts? Only this:

- correct intentions;

- actions [prakseis] carried out in the service of the community;

- speech [logos] which could never be used to deceive;

- an inner disposition [diathesis] which joyfully greets each event like something necessary and familiar, since it flows from so grand a principle, and so great a source.'16

The reader will perhaps have noticed that, although it is quite obvious that Marcus Aurelius took over his tripartite structure from Epictetus, there is nevertheless a difference in tone and emphasis in Marcus' presentation of it.

When, for instance, Marcus speaks of the discipline of desire, he does not, as Epictetus had done, insist on the necessity of desiring only those things which depend on us - that is, moral good so that our desires may not be frustrated.

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Rather, Marcus, in n much more explicit way thlln EpictctuK, conceives of this exercise as putting our desires in harmony with the will of fate 1111d of

Marcus Aurelius

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universal reason. Its goal is to bring about within us an attitude of indifference to indifferent things; that is, whatever does not depend on us. For Marcus, much more than for Epictetus, the discipline of desire takes on the form of applied "physics," or physics transformed into a spiritual exercise.