Philosophy as a way of life

22 Ton kalon 11111emai. Cf. Galen, Gale11 On the Passio11s and Err(!rs of the S

23 On this theme, cf. Rabbow, Seelenfiihmmg, pp. 249-50; Hijmans, AIKEEIII, pp. 68-70. Cf. especially Epictetus, Discourses, 4, 1 2, 1 -2 1 .

24 The idea o f tension (tonos) i s particularly in evidence i n Epictetus, Discourses, 4, 1 2, 15 and 19. The concept of tonos is central to Stoicism, as is that of relaxation (a11esis) in Epicureanism . Cf. F. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysiq11e d 'Austote, Paris, 1 846, repr. Hildesheim 1 963, p. 1 1 7.

25 Epictetus, Discourses, 4, 1 2 , 7; cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 3, 1 3; Galen, Gale11 On the Passions and Errors of tl1e Soul, 1, 9, 5 1 , p. 40, 10

Marquardt.

26 Epictetus, Discourses, 4, 1 2, 1 5-18.

27 ' Cf. below.

28 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 7, 54; cf. 3, 1 2; 8, 36; 9, 6.

29 Only the present depends on us, since our free action cannot be extended either to the post or to the future. Free action is that which either brings about Komething in the present, or else accepts the present event, which has been willed by line; cf. Mnrcu11 Aurelius, Medit11tif111s, 2, 1 4; 4, 26, 5; 1 2, 26; Seneca, On llt'llr/ils, 7, 2, 4: "Rcjoidntc in 1.hcNe 1,reKt•nt evt,n111."

1 12

Spiritual Exercises

30 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 3, 1 O; 2, 14; 8, 36.

31 Cf., for instance, Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4, 23. Marcus also stresses the cosmic value of the instant in 5, 8, 3: "This event occurred for you, was prescribed for you, and had some kind of relationship to you, having been woven since the beginning, from the most ancient causes."

32 Epictetus, Discourses, 2, 16, 2 3; 3,

-

8, 1-5.

33 Cf. Rabbow, See/enfiihnung, pp. 1 24-30, 334-6; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griuh1"s,h-romiuhe Tradition der Seelenleitung, Berlin 1 969, pp. 57-8. See also Galen, Galen On the Passions and E"ors of the Soul, 1 , 5, 24, p. 18, 19 Marquardt; Seneca, On Benefits, 1, 2, I ; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 1, 63.

34 Seneca, On Benefits, 1, 2, 1-2; Epictetus, Discourses, 3, 3, 14-16.

35 On the role of rhetoric in spiritual exercises, sec Rabbow, SeelerrfiihnuP1g, pp. 5 5-90; Hijmans, ALKEJ:IX, p. 89; I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 1 7, 184. For examples in Plutarch, see Ingcnkamp, Plutarchs Schrifien, pp. 99ff.

36 Marcus Aurelius, Medi1a1ior1s, 1, 58: "In every contingency, keep before .vour e.ves those who, when the same thing befell them, were saddened, astonished, resentful. Where are they now? Nowhere." Epictetus, Manual, ch. 2 1 : "Keep before .vour e.ves every day death and exile, and everything that seems terrible, but most of all death; and then you will never have any abject thought, nor excessive desire." On this exercise, see Rabbow, Seelenj'iihrU11g, p. 330.

37 Cf. the passage from Philo cited above. Hijmans, AJ:KEJ:IJ:, p. 69, calls attention to the frequency of the expression "Remember!" in Epictetus. It recurs quite often in Marcus Aurelius, for instance, Meditations, 2, 4; 8, 1 5 ; 29. Cf. Galen, Galer1 On the Passions and E"ors of the So11/, l , 5, 25, p. 1 9, 8- 1 0 Marquardt:

"With the help of memory, keep 'at hand' the ugliness of those who succumb to anger, and the beauty of those who master it."

38 It is only after much hesitation that I have translated mtlete by "meditation." In fact, melett and iL'I Latin equivalent meditatifl designate "preparatory exercises,"

in particular those of rhetoricians. If 1 ha\•e finally resigned myself to adopting the translation "meditation," it is because the exercise designated by mtltte corresponds, in the last analysis, rather well to what we nowadays term meditatio11: an effort to assimilate an idea, notion, or principle, and make them come alive in the soul. We must not, however, lose sight of the term's ambiguity: meditation is exercise, and exercise is meditation. For instance, the "premeditation" of death is a "pre-exercise" of death; the (Oltidiana meditatio cited in the following note could just as well be translated as "daily exercises. "

3 9 See Rabbow, See/enfiihrung, pp. 23- 1 50, 325-8; and Seneca, On Benefits, 1, 2, 1 :

"These are the things that my friend Demetrius says the beginner in philosophy must grasp with both hands, these arc the precepts that he must never let go.

Rather, he must cling fast to them and make them a part of himself, and by daily meditation reach the point where thc.'lc salutary maxims occur to him of their own accord." Cf. also Galen, Ga/e11 011 t/1e Passior1s anti E"nrs 1if tl1t Soul, l , 5, 25, p. 1 9, 13 Marquardt.

40 ["Pre-meditation of misfortunes"

Trans. I On the /m1t111tdit11ti11 "'"'"'""'• 11cc R11bhow, Srtlrr(/lilir1111R, l'I'· 1 '111 70; I . I l11Ll111 , St'1t1l'tl, p11. (J() I .

Spiritual Exercises

1 13

41 See above.

42 See above.

43 Cf. lngenkamp, Plutarchs Schufien, pp. 99- l OS; Rabbow, Seelenfohrung, pp. 1 48, 340-2.

44 Cf. Galen, Galen On the Passions and E"ors of the Soul, l, S, 24, p. 18, 1 2

Marquardt: "As soon as we get u p in the morning, w e must consider i n advance, with regard to the various acts we will perform throughout the day, whether it is better to live as a slave of our passions, or to utilize reason against all of them ."

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2, 1 , I : "At the break of dawn, say to yourself: 'I'm going to come across a nosy person, an ingrate, a thug, a cheat, a jealous man, and an anti-social man. AU these defects have affiicted them because of their ignoram.."C of what is truly good and evil.' " Cf ibid, S, I , I : "In the morning, when you have trouble getting up, have this thought at hand [procheiron]: 'I'm getting up to do a man's work.' "

4S On the examination of the conscience, see Rabbow, Seele11fiilirung, pp. 1 80-8, 344-7; I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 68-70; Hijmans, AIKEIII, p. 88.

46 Cf. Plutarch, Honi One may K1101P One is Making Progress i'1 Virtue, §1 2, 82F: "It was Zeno's belief that everyone could, thanks to his dreams, have knowledge of what progress he was making. One has made real progrc.<;s if he no longer dreams that he is giving in to some shameful passion, or giving his consent to something evil or unjust - or even committing it - and if, instead, the soul's faculties of representation and afTectivity, relaxed by reason, shine as if in an ocean of diaphanous serenity, untroubled by waves.''

47 See below.

48 This is the domain of spiritual guidance; sec I. Hadot, Senm1, pp. S-97.

Note especially Galen, Galen 011 the Passio11s and Errors of the Soul, I , 7, 36, p. 27, 22 Marquardt: we are to ask an older man to tell us frankly about our defects.

49 Cf. Rabbow, Seeletifiilirung, p. 3 1 1 , n. 64; I. Hadot, Smeca, p. S9. Marcus Aurelius' Meditations are, of course, the example par eJ.·cel/e11u of this. Note also Horace, Satires, l, 4, 1 38: "When I have some spare time, l amuse myself by writing these thoughts down on paper."

SO The phrase is Descartes', but it gives good expression to the St�ic ideal of inner coherence. [This is the third of Rene Descartes' well-known "four laws" which he exposes in Part 2 of his Discourse 011 the Method. - Trans.]

SI On this subject, sec P. Lain Entralgo, "Die platonische Rationalisienung .der Bcsprechung (Etnf18q) und die Erfindung dcr Psychotherapie durch das Wort,"

Hermes 68 (19S8), pp. 298-323; P. Lain Entralgo, The Therapy of the Word in

' Clt1ssica/ Atlliqui()', New Haven 1 970; and the review of this latter work by F.

Kudlien, G11omo'1 4S ( 1 973), pp. 410-12.

S2 ["Collections of aphorisms" - Trans.] Cf. Rabbow, Sulenfiihrung, pp. 2 1 S-22,

.1S2-4; G.A. Gerhard, Plioi11i.\' von Ko/op/ion, Leipzig 1909, pp. 228-84; I.

1 ladot, Se,,eca, pp. 1 6- 1 7. Sec also Seneca, lttter, 94, 27; 43; 98, S; 108, 9. On collections of poetical and philosophicnl aphorisms, see W. Spocrri, "Gnome," in

!>tr Nmtt /111111)•, \'ol. 2 , 1 %7, col11 H22 9; C:hndwick, Smttnces t1f Se.\·t11s;

1 14

Spiritual Exercises

T. Klauser, "Apophthcgma," Rea/le:i:icon for Antike und Christemun I ( 1950), pp. 545-50. Sec also P. Wendland, Ana:i:imenes 11on Lampsakos, Berlin 1905, pp. l OOff.

53 The term akroasis as used by Philo could designate, among other things, attending a course in philosophy; cf. Epictetus, Discourses, 3, 23, 27; 38. Normally, the course included the reading, with commentary, of a philosophical text (anagnosis}, often done by the disciple and criticized by the master (cf. Epictetus, Discourses, l, 26, l; Porphyry, Lij( of Plotinus, ch. 14). See also I. Bruns, De si:hola Epirlelc, Kiel 1897. This does not, of course, exclude the individual reading of philosophical texts; cf. Epictetus, Discourses, 4, 4, 14-1 8 (where Epictetus reproaches his disciples for reading texts without putting them into practice). After the reading with commentary, a philosophy class would normally include a discussion (diatribe) with the audience, as well as individual discussions (cf. I. Hadot, Se11eca, p. 65). For the listener, this entire ensemble could be a spiritual exercise. With regard to reading, we should add that exegesis, whether literal or allegorical, was one of the most important spiritual exercises at the end of antiquity, among both pagans and Christians.

54 On the educational program in Hellenistic schools, with its transition from aphorisms to epitomai (summaries of basic principles), and finally to full-scale treatises, sec I. Hadot I 969a, pp. 53-6; 1 969b.

55 On the exercise of definition, sec below.

56 On this exercise, sec Rabbow, See/mfiihrung, pp. 42-9.

57 Philo's expression "indifference to indifferent things" corresponds exactly to the spiritual exercises mentioned by Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 1 1 , 16: "Our soul finds within itself the power to live a perfectly happy life, if we can remain indifferent towards indifferent things." This formula seems to be a reminiscence of the definition of the goal of human life according to Aristo of Chios (SVF, 1, §360, = Clement of Alexandria, Stromatfl, 2, 2 1 , 129, 6, p. 183, 1 4- 1 6 Stiihlin): "And why should I mention Aristo? He said the goal was indifference, but he leaves 'the indifferent' as simply 'the indifferent.' " On this theme, see below. We must bear in mind that here "indifference" does not mean a lack of interest, but rather equal love for each of life's instants; that is, we are not to make any "difference" between them.

58 See Rabbow, Su/enfiihr11ng, pp. 223-49; Ingcnkamp, Plutarclls Sd1iifien, pp. 1 05-1 8. The technical term for this process is e1/1ismos.

59 Epicurus, Gnomo/ogium Vaticanum, §64. Cf. also Leiter to Metwecus, §1 22: "No one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul."

60 Epicurus, Ratae Senlenliae, §1 1 : "If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science [physioloxia]." On Epicurean theology, sec Schmid, "Epikur"; D. Lemke, Die Theologie Epikurs, Munich 1 973.

6 1 Epicurus, Rtittle Selllmtiae, §29; Epicurus, Lmer 111 Me11<1ttm, § 1 27.

62 Epicurus, Gn()ln. V111. §33. Cf. A.-J. Fcstugicrc:, /!'pirnre et m tl1t11.\', 1'11rh1 1 94(1, p. 44.

Spiritual Exercises

1 1 5

63 Epicurus Fr. 469, p. 300, 26ff Usener.

64 On these Epicurean exercises of meditation, see Schmid, "Epikur," p. 744; Rabbow, Seelmfohrung, pp. 1 29, 336-8; I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 52L3. Cf. Epicurus, Leiter lo Menoenu, §135, 5-8: "Meditate therefore on these things and things like them night and day by yourself, and with someone similar to yourself, and you shall be disturbed, either awake or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men." Ibid, §123, 1-2: "That which I used constandy to recommend to you, put it into practice and meditate upon It [me/eta], considering them to be the elements of the living well." Ibid, § 1 24, 7-8: "Become accustomed [sunethi.ze] to considering that death is nothing to us."

65 Cf. Philodemus, Adversus sophistas, col. 4, 1 0-14, p. 87 Sbordone, cited by Festugiere, Epicure, p. 46, n. 1, Schmid, "Epikur," col . 744; translation by A.A.

Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. l: Translations of the Principal Sources, 11Jith Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge 1987, repr. 1988, p.

1 56, section J; Greek text, vol. 2, Greek and Latin Texts 'IDith Notes and Bibliography, p. 1 6 1 . The technical term used here to indicate that this aphorism must always be "at hand" is parhepomet1on.

66 For instance, the Ratae Sententiae or Kuriai Doxai ["Principal Doctrines"), which were known to Cicero (On Ends, 2, 20), and the Gnorn. Vat.

67 On the curriculum in the Epicurean school, see above.

68 Epicurus, Leiter to Pythodes, §85 = Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, section 1 8 C ( I ), vol. I , pp. 91-2; Greek text, vol. 2, p. 94. Cf. Letter to Herodotus,

§37: "I recommend . . . constant occupation in the investigation of the science of nature, since I consider that this activity provides the greatest serenity in life."

69 Lucretius, On tlie Nature of Things, 3, 1 6f, 28ff. This passage is quite remarkable.

On the one hand, it illustrates the fact that Epicurean physics was a true source of pleasure for the sage: it allowed him to have a grandiose imaginative vision of the formation and dissolution of the universe in the infinity of space. On the other, it throws light on one of the most fundamental feelings of the human experience: l1orror in the face of the enigma of nature. One thinks of Goethe's formulation in Faust, Part 2, 6272ff: "The shudder is the best part of man.

However dearly the world makes him pay for it, he feels the Prodigious deep inside, seized with astonishment." ("Das Schaudcrn ist der Menschheit bestes Teil. Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefilhl verteure, Ergriffen ftihlt er tief das Ungehcurc.") On Epicurean spiritual exercises in general, see P .-H. Schrijvers, Horror ac Divina Vo/uptas. Et11des s11r la poetique et la poesie de L11crece, Amsterdam 1 970.

70 I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 62-3; Rabbow, Seelenfiihrung, p. 280. Cf. Cicero, On Ends,

,I, 1 7, SS; I, 19, 62; Tusculan Disputations, I S, 32-3.

7 1 Epicurus, Gnom. Vat., §7S: "The saying, 'Wait till the end of a long life' (to know if you've been happy) is ungrateful towards the good things of the past." Cf. ibid,

§69; § 1 9: "He who has forgotten yesterday's good fortune is already an old man."

72 Cf. I·:. Hoffmann, "Epikur," in M. Dessoir, ed., Die Geschidue der Philosophie, vol. I, Wi1.'!lbaden 1 925, p. 223: "f:xistcnce is to be considered, first and limm11111t, 1111 11 11urc: 111.'Cidc:nt , 110 that it nmy then be lived as a completely unique

1 16

Spiritual Exercises

miracle. We must first realize that existence, inevitably, is a one-shot affair, in order to be able to celebrate that in it which is irreplaceable and unique."

73 Epicurus, Gnom. Vat. , §14. Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Tiiings, 3, 957-60, and G. Rodis-Lewis, Epicure et son ecole, Paris, 1 975, pp. 269-83.

74 Horace, Odes, I, 1 1 , 7: "Oum loquimur, fugerit invida I aetas: carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero." Cf. ibid, 2, 1 6, 25: "A soul content with the present."

75 On Epicurean friendship, see Schmid, "Epikur," cols 740-55; Festugiere, Epicure, pp. 36-70; I. Hadot 1969a, pp. 63fT; Rodis-Lewis, Epicure, pp. 362-9.

76 Cf. S. Sudhaus, "Epikur als Beichtirater," Archiv for Rtligio11S11Jissenscliafi 14

( 191 1 ), pp. 647ff. The fundamental text is Philodemus, Peri parrhisias ["On Free Speech"], ed. A. Olivieri, Leipzig 1914; cf. I. Hadot, Seneca, p. 63; M. Gigante 1968, pp. 1 96-217.

77 Schmid, "Epikur," cols. 741-3.

78 Festugiere, Epicure, p. 69.

79 The prehistory of spiritual exercises is to be sought, first of all, in traditional rules of life and popular exhortation (cf. I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 1 0-22). Must we go back further still, and look for it first of all in Pythagoreanism, and then, beyond Pythagoras, in magico-religious/shamanistic traditions of respiratory techniques and mnemonic exercises? This theory, defended by E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the lrratio11al (= Sather Classical Lectures 25), 3rd edn, Berkeley/London 1 963; L. Gernet, Anthropo/ogie de la Grece antique, Paris 1 968, pp. 423-5; J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensee chez /es Crees, Paris 1 97 1 , pp. 94ff, 1 08ff; M. Detienne, De la pe11see religieuse ti la pmsee p/1ilosophique. La notion de Daimon da11s le pythagoisme aP1det1, Paris 1963; M. Detienne, Les maitres de vbiite da11s la Grece arc/1ai'que, Paris 1967, pp. 1 24ff; H. Joly, Le renversement plato11icim, Paris 1974, pp. 67-70; is entirely plausible. However, I shall not go into the matter here, first of all owing to my lack of competence in the field of the anthropology of prehistory and of archaic Greece, and secondly, because it seems to me that the problems inherent in the history of Pythagoreanism are extremely complex, so that it presupposes a rigorous criticism of our sources (many of which are late, idyllic projections, reflecting Stoic and Platonic concepts). Thirdly, the spiritual exercises under discussion here are mental processes which have nothing in common with cataleptic trances, but, on th� contrary, respond to a rigorous demand for rational control, a demand which, as far as we are concerned, emerges with the figure of Socrates.

80 The historical Socrates is a probably insoluble enigma. But the figure of Socrates, as it is sketched by Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, is a wellattested historical fact. When, in what follows, I speak of "Socrates," I shall be referring to this figure of Socrates. See below, ch. 5 , "The Figure of Socrates."

81 By using quotation marks, I wish to underline the fact that we arc not dealing with authentically Socratic dialoi,'Ucs, but with literary composit ions which imitate - more or less faithfully - the dinlogues of SocrnteH, or in which the figure of Socrates plays a role h is in this sense thnt Plotn111 JinlogueR 11rc

.

Socrntic.

Spiritual Exercises

1 1 7

82 Plato, Laches, 1 87e-1 88b.

83 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 1 83b8: "Socrates used to ask _questions and not to answer them - for he used to confess that he did not 1'now." Cf. Plato, Apology, 2 ld5: "I do not think that I know what I do not know."

84 Plato, Apology, 30el-5: "If you put me to death, you will not easily find anyone to take my place . . . God has specially appointed me to this city, as though it were a large thoroughbred horse which . . . needs the stimulation of some stinging fly."

85 On taking care of oneself, cf. Plato, Apology, 29d; 31 b; 36c.

86 Ibid, 29d5-e3. Cf. 30a6-b l : "For I spend my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of your souls."

87 Plato, Apo/11gy, 36b4-c6.

88 Plato, Symposium, 2 1 5e6-2 1 6a5.

89 In this respect, Stoic exhortation remains Socratic. More than one of Epictetus'

Di1&ourses seems to imitate the Socratic style; cf., for instance, Discourses, I, 1 1 , 1 -40. Epictetus praises the Socratic method ,t 2, 12, 5-1 6, but he empha.'lizes that, in his day, it is no longer easy to practice it: "Nowadays, especially in Rome, it is not at all a safe business" (2, 1 2, 1 7; 24). Epictetus pictures a philosopher trying to have a Socratic dialogue with a consular personage, and ending up receiving a fist in the face. If we can trust Diogenes Laertius, LiVts of the Philosophers, 2, 2 1 , a similar incident had happened to Socrates himself.

90 On the history of this theme, see Pierre Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-mime. De So(rate ti saint Bernard, 3 vols, Paris 1974--5.

91 Plato, Symposium, 1 74d.

92 Plato, ibid, 220c--d.

93 Aristophanes, Clouds, 700-6, · 76 1-3; cf. 740-5. As a matter of fact, the true meaning of these verses is not entirely clear. They could be interpreted as an allusion to an exercise of mental concentration; this is the view of G. Meautis, l 'time hellb1ique, Paris 1 932, p. 1 83; A.-J. Festugiere, Contemplation ti vie conttmplatit-e selon Platot1, 2nd edn, Paris 1950, pp. 67-73; W. Schmid, "Das Sokratcsbild der Wolken," Phitologus 91 ( 1 948), pp. 209-28; A.E. Taylor, Vaina Socratica, Oxford 1 9 1 1 , pp. 1 29 7 5. The terms phrontizein and ekphrontizein,

-

used in Aristophanes' description, became - perhaps under Aristophanes'

influence - technical terms for designating Socrates' habits. Cf. Plato, Symposium, 220c: Socrates stays standing, phrontizot1 ti; Xenophon, Symposium, 6, 6: Socrates is nicknamed the plirontislts. But it is not certain that, in Aristophanes, this phrontizein corresponds to an exercise of meditation directed towards oneself. In the first place, the comparison with the may-beetle gives us to understand that thought takes flight toward "elevated" things. In his Symposium, Xenophon tells us it relates to the "meteora," in other words to celestial phenomena (cf. Plato, Ap11logy, 1 8b). Secondly, in the Clouds, Strepsiades phrontizei about the means he will use to settle a business affair, not about himself. It is more a question of the mcrhmlolo1n· of research (cf. I . 742: 1lit1ide nod e.wm1ine). The most interesting de111il 11eern11 tu me lo be the plm111c: "Ir ynu come up 11g11inNt 110 insoluble point,

1 18

Spiritual Exercises

jump to another" (702-4), repeated at 743ff: "If an idea gets you into any difficulty, let go of it, withdraw for a bit, then submit it to your judgement again, shift it around and weigh it carefully." This means that, when one arrives at an aporia, one must take up the question again, from a new point of departure. This method is constantly applied in the Platonic dialogues, as has been shown by Rene Schaerer, La Question platonidenne. Etudes sur /es rapports de la penste et de /'expressions dans /es Dialogues (= Memoires de l'Universite de Neuchatel 1 0), 2nd edn with postscript, Neuchatel 1 969, pp. 84-7; citing Meno, 79e; Pltaedo, 1 05b; Theaetetus, 187a-b; Phi/ebus, 60a. As Schaerer points out (p. 86), we have to do with a process "which forces the mind indefatigably to tum around in circles, in search of the True." It is perhaps this aspect of Socratic methodology which explains Aristophanes' allusions to decours and circuits of thought. Be this as it may, this method is also discernible in Aristotle, as we can sec by the examples collected by H. Bonitz, lnde.t·

aristotelicus, Berlin 1 870, repr. Graz 1 955, col. 1 1 1 , 35ff: "Taking another point of departure, we shall say." We find Plotinus using the same method, for instance in Enm:ad, 5, 8, 4, 45; 5, 8, 1 3, 24; 6, 4, 1 6, 47. On Aristotle, cf. the remarks of I. Di.iring, "Aristotle and the heritage from Plato," Eranos 62 ( 1964), pp. 84-99.

94 Diogenes Lacrtius, lives of the Philosophers, 6, 6. Ancient man frequently spoke to himself out loud. Some examples: Pyrrho in Diogenes Laertius 9, 64 (= Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, IA, vol. 1, p. 13; vol. 2, p. 3): "When once discovered talking to himself, he was asked the reason, and said that he was training to be virtuous." Philo of Athens, in Diogenes Laertius, lives of the P/1ilosophers, 9, 69: "Philo

. . . had a habit of very often talking to himself . . . that i.o; why Timon says of him:

'Philo . . . he who, apart from mankind, used to speak and converse with himself, with no concern for glory or disputcs.' " Qcanthcs, in Diogenes Laertius, lii:es of che Philosop/1ers, 1, 171: [Cleanthcs] used often to scold himself out loud. Upon hearing him, Ariston once asked him: 'Who are you scolding?' Cleanthes laughed and replied,

'Some old man who has grey hair but no brains.' " Horace, Satires, I, 4, 137: "Thus, with lips shut tight, I debate with myself." ("Hacc ego mecum compressis agito labris.") Epictetus, Discourses, 3, 14, 2: "Man - if you really an: a man - then walk by yourself, talk to yourself, and don't hide yourself in the chorus." On meditating while walking, cf. Horace, letter, 1, 4, 4-5: "strolling peacefully amid the healthful woods, bearing in mind all the thoughts worthy of a sage and a good man." - On the problems pcsed by interior and exterior dialogue with oneself, sec F. Leo, "Der Monolog im Drama,'' Abha11Jlunge11 der Colling. Gese/lsthaji tier Wissenschaji. NF 10, 5 ( 1908); Wolfgang Schadewelt, Mono/og und Selbstgespiiich. U111ersuchungen z.ur Fonngeschid11e der griechischen Tragiidie, Berlin 1926; F. Dirlmeier, "Vom Monolog der Dichting zum

'innen:n' Logos bei Platon und Aristotcles," in Augellliihlte Schrijim zu Diduung 11nd Phi/osophie tkr Griechen, Heidelberg 1970, pp. 142-54; G. Misch, Geschidttt der Au1obiographie, vol. I, Berlin 1949, pp. 86, 94, 363, 380, 426, 450, 4118. Concerning the prehistory of this spiritual exercise, one may no1.c 1-lomcr, Otb•�y. 20, 1 7--2.l:

Spiritual Exercises

1 19

He struck himself on the chest and spoke to his heart and scolded it:

"Bear up, my heart.

have had worse to endure before this

on that day when the irresistible Cyclops ate up my strong companions . . .

"

So he spoke, addressing his own dear heart within him; and the heart in great obedience endured and stood it without complaint, but the man himself was twisting and turning.

This passage is quoted by Plato, Republic, 441b: "there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing." Cf. Phaedo, 94d-e.

95 Thus, according to Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8, 19: "Plotinus was present at the same time to himself and to others." [On this theme, sec Pierre Hadot, Plotin ou la simp/icite du regard, 3rd edn, Paris 1 989. An English translation of this work is in preparation. - Trans.)

96 Plato, Meno, 75c-d.

97 V. Goldschmidt, Les dialogues de Platon. Structure et methode dialectique (=Bibliothcque de philosophic contemporaire, Histoire de la Philosophic et Philosophic generate), 2nd cdn, Paris 1963, pp. 337-8.

98 See above. In La Question platonicienne, pp. 84-7, Schacrer has admirably demonstrated the significance of this Platonic method.

99 Plato, Seventh Leuer, 344b; 34lc-d. Cf. Goldschmidt, Les dialogues, p. 8; Schaerer, La Question platonicienne, p. 86. For the perspective we are adopting, these two works are of fundamental importance.

100 Plato, Republic, 450b.

JOI "The dialogue's goal is more to form than to inform," writes Goldschmidt, Les dialogues, p. 3, citing Plato, Statesman, 285-6. Cf. ibid, pp. 1 62-3; Schaercr, La Qpestion platonicienne, p. 2 1 6.

1 02 Plato, Statesman, 285c-d.

1 03 Ibid, 286d. In the words of Schaercr (La Question platonicienne, p. 87): "Definitions arc worthless in and of themselves. Their entire value consists in the road travelled to achieve them. Along the way, the interlocutor acquires more met11al penetration (Sophist, 227a-b), more cotifidence ( Theaetttus, 1 87b), and more skillfulness in all things (Statesman, 285dff). His soul is thereby purified, as he rejects the opinions which formerly barred the way co enlightenment (Sophist, 230b-c). But whatever words one uses to designate this dialectical progress, it always takes place in the soul of the interlocutor - and, by the same token, in the soul of the intelligent reader."

104 Cf. Schaerer, La Question platonicienne, pp. 38-44; Goldschmidt Les dialogues, pp.

79-80, 292, and 34 1 : "The Republic solves the problem of Justice and its advantages. At the same time, and by the same token, it urges us on towards Justice." On the cxhortatory character of the dialogues, see K. Gaiser, Protreptik und Pariinese bei Platon. Untersuch1mgen zur Fonn des platonischen Dialogs, Stuttgart 1959; K. Gaiser, P/atone come scrillore filosojico, Naples 1984.

105 Plato, Me1111, H i e:.

l llt1 Phuu, Rtpultlii.·, SOSc:.

120

S piritua/ Exercises

107 The dialectical exercise, as it rids our thought of the illusions of the senses, brings about the apprenticeship for death which we are about to discuss; cf. Plato, Phaedo, 83a.

1 08 Brice Parain, "Le langage et I' existence" ["Language and existence"], in L 'Existence, Paris 1945, p. 173. Parain's novels, especially La morl de Socrate ["The Death of Socrates"], Paris 1950, try to make comprehensible this relationship between language and death.

109 Sallustius, Sal/ustius: Concerning the Gods and tire Universe, 5, 3, p. 1 1 Nock.

1 1 0 Plato, Apology, 28b-30b.

1 1 1 Plato, Phaedo, 67e. Cf. ibid, 64a, 80e.

1 12 Plato, ibid, 67c. Note the use of the verb "to accustom" (ethisa1), which presupposes the practice of exercises.

1 13 Cf. above.

1 14 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 84a: "The philosophical soul calms the sea of the passions, following the course of reasoning and always being present within it, contemplating and drawing nourishment from the true, the divine, and that which is not subject to opinion." Cf. ibid, 6Se, 66c, 79c, 81b, 83b-d.

1 1 5 Plato, Republfr, 571 d .

1 16 Plato, Republic, 57 l d-572a.

1 1 7 Plato, Phaedo, 64a-b. This is probably an allusion to Aristophanes, Clouds, verses 1 03, 504.

1 1 8 La Rochefoucauld, Ma.-ri,nes, no. 26.

1 19 Horace, Letler, l, 4, 1 3-14: "Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum; gratia superveniet quae non sperabitur hora." Once again, we encounter the Epicurean theme of gratitude.

1 20 Michel de Montaigne, Essays, bk I, ch. 20, vol. 1, p. 87 Villey/Saulnier = vol.

1, p. 1 1 1 Ives. Cf. Seneca, Leiter, 26, 8: "Meanwhile Epicurus will oblige me with these words: 'Think on death,' or rather, if you prefer the phrase, on 'migration to heaven.' The meaning is clear - that it is a wonderful thing to learn thoroughly how to die . . . 'think on death.' In saying this, he bids us think on freedom . . .

He who has learned to die has un-leamed slavery. [.Qui mori didicit, servire dedidicit.]" As we can see, the Stoic Seneca borrowed the maxim "Meditare mortem" from Epicurus.

1 2 1 Epictetus, Manual, ch. 2 1 . Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2, 1 1 : "Let your every deed and word and thought be those of one who might depart from this life this very moment."

1 22 See above.

1 23 Cf. A. de Waelhens, la philosophie de Martin Heidegger (= Bibliotheque Philosophique de Louvain 2), 4th edn, Louvain 1955, pp. 1 35-5 1 ; and especially Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §53, pp. 260ff. As R. Brague pointed out in his review of the first edition of this work (Eludes phi/osophiques, 1982), Heidegger here "is careful to distinguish Being-for-Death from the metlitatio mortis." It is perfectly true that Heideggerian Being-for-Death only takes on its full meaning within the perspective particular to Heidegger; it is nonetheless true: that we have here a system which makes of the anticipation or forcstnlling of Lleath 11 prccomlillon of 11uthentic exi11tencc, We muHI 11111 furgcl th111 in Pliucmic philoNuphy, the '"'Int iN

Spiritual Exercises

121

not simply to think about death, but to carry out a training fo r dying which is, in reality, a training for life .

1 24 Cf. Plato, Republic, 525c, 532b8, and especially 5 18c: "the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the organ whereby each of us learns is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul . . . until it is able to endure the contemplation of that which is. Education is the art of turning this eye of the soul."

1 25 Plato, Republic, 604b-d.

1 26 Should we call this exercise already Stoic, or should we rather say that Stoic exercises are still Platonic?

1 27 Plato, Republic, 486a. This passage is quoted by Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations, 7, 35.

1 28 Cf. I. Hadot, Seneca, pp. 1 1 5-17, 1 28-30.

1 29 Aristotle, Paris of Animals, 2, 3, 5, 645a 9- 1 0.

1 30 Sec above.

1 3 1 Epictetus, Diuoi1rses, I, 6, 1 9-25: "God has brought man into the world to be a spectator of himself and his works, and not merely a spectator, but also an interpreter . . . Nature . . . did not end [i.e. in the case of mankind] until she reached contemplation and understanding and a manner of life harmonious with nature. Take heed, therefore, lest you die without ever having been spectators of these things. You arc wi lling to travel to Olympia to look at the work of Pheidias, and each of you regards it as a misfortune to die without seeing such sights; yet when there is no need to travel at all, when you have such works near you and under your noses, will you not yearn to look at these works and know them? Will you consequently refuse to learn either who you are, or for what you have been born, or what is the meaning of the spectacle to which you have been admitted?"

1 32 Philo Judaeus, On the Special Laws, 2, chs. 44--6; cf. the other passages from Philo on the contemplation of the world quoted by A.-J. Festugiere, la rtvtla1io11

d'Hem1es Trismegiste, vo1. 2, Paris 1949, p. 599.

1 33 Plutarch, 011 Peace of Mind, §20, 477c.

1 34 On this theme, sec Fcstugiere, La reve/a1im1, vol. 2, pp. 441 -57; P. Courcelle, la Consolation de Phi/osophie dans la traditio11 lilleraire, Paris 1967, pp. 355-72.

1 35 Marcus Aurelius, Medi1ations, 1 2, 24. Cf. ibid, 9, 30: "Contemplate from up above."

1 36 Seneca, Natural Questions, I, Preface, 7-9.

1 37 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 8, 54; 9, 32.

1 38 Plotinus, Ermead, 6, 5, 12, 1 9-29.

1 39 For example, Plotinus, E11nead, I, 2; Porphyry, Se111ences, ch. 32; Macrobius, f;omme11tary on the Dream of' Scipio, I, 8, 3-1 1 ; Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato 's Pliaedo, pp. 23, 25ff, 45, l 4ff. Cf. 0. Schissel von Fleschenberg, Marinos vim Neap11lis 1md die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade, Athens 1 928, with the review by W. Theiler in G1iomo11 5 ( 1929), pp. 307-1 7; I. Hadot, le problbne d"

neoplat011isme ttle.\'andn

/Jierodes et Simplicus,

'n,

Paris 1 978, pp. I 52ff. On the

important role played by this theme in the systematization of Christian mystid1m, Nee I I. vnn l .icNhuut, /,11 tl1r11rie pl11ti11ie1111e de la 11er111. Ess11i s11r la gmese

1 22

Spiritual Exercises

d'un article de la Somme Tlreologique de saint Thomas, Fribourg 1 926, as well as the texts cited in P. Henry, Plotin et /'Occident. Firmicus Maternus, Marius Victorinus, Saint Augustin et Macrobe (= Spicileguim sacrum Lovaniense, Etudes et Documents l S), Louvain 1 934, pp. 248-SO.

140 Marinus, Lift of Produs, chs 14, 1 8, 2 1 , 22, 24, 28.

141 Cf. P. Hadot, "La metaphysique de Porphyre," in Porplryre (= Entretiens Hardt sur l'Antiquite Classique 1 2), Vandoeuvres/Geneva 1 966, pp. 1 27-9.

1 42 Porphyry, On Abstinence, I, 30.

1 43 Ibid, I, 29 (phJisiosis ltai zoe).

144 Plotinus, Ennead, 1 , S, 7, 10, 28-32.

1 4S Ibid, 1, 6, 9, 8-26.

146 To put this observation into relation with what we have said above, we may say that the spirit of Platonism consists precisely in making knowledge into a spiritual exercise. In order to know, one must transform one.'lelf.

1 47 As, for example, at Ennead, S, 8, 1 1 , 1-39. As has been shown by P. Merlan, M011opsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian anti Neoplatonlc Tradition (= Archives internationaux d'Histoire des idees 2), The Hague 1 963, this experiential knowledge of the Intellect has much in common with certain aspects of the Aristotelian tradition.

1 48 Plotinus, Ennead, 6, 7, 36, 6-9.

1 49 Ibid, 6, 7, 33, 1-2.

l SO Ibid, 6, 7, 34, 2-4.

l S l lbid, S, 3, 1 7, 38.

1 S2 Ibid, 6, 9, 10, 14-17. At this point, we ought to take into account the entire post-Plotinian tradition. Perhaps it will suffice to recall that Damascius' Life of Isidore, one of the last works of the Neoplatonic school, is full of allusions to spiritual exercises.

1 S3 This comparison is quite frequent in Epictetus; cf. Discourses, I , 4, 1 3; 2, 17, 29; 3, 2 1 , 3. The metaphor of the Olympic games of the soul is also quite common; cf. Epictetus, Manual, ch. S l , 2; Plato, PhaeJrus, 2S6b; Porphyry, On Abstinence, I , 3 1 .

1 S4 According to J . Delorme, Gymnasion, Paris 1 960, pp. 31 6ff, 466: "Athletic exercises were always accompanied by intellectual exercises. "

1 SS Cf. above.

1 S6 Cf. K. Borinski, Die Antilte irr Poetik 1md Kunsttheorit, vol. 1 , Leipzig 1914, pp. 169fT.

1 S7 Plato, Rep11blic, 61 1 d--<:.

1 S8 Cf. K. Schneider, Die st:/1RJeigenden Gotter, Hildesheim 1 966, pp. 29-S3 .

1 S9 Cf. Lucretius, S, 8 (referring t o Epicurus): "He was a god" (Deus ille fuit); Epicurus, Leiter to Merroet:us, §§ 13S; 23, J, Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers vol. 2, p. I S2; vol. 1 , p. 144: "You will live like a god among men."

1'60 The philosopher is neither a sage, nor a non-sage; cf. H.- J. Kramer, Plotonisnms und helltnistische Philosophie, Berlin/New York 197 1 , pp. 1 74-S, 228-9.

1 6 1 Heidegger's analyses of the authentic and inauthentic modes of existence can help to understand this situation; cf. A. de Waelhens, la plrilosoplrie dt M1mi11

Heidegger, pp. 1 01), 1 (19.

Spiritual Exercises

1 23

1 62 [On conversion, cf. above. - Trans.]

1 63 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, 6, 103.

1 64 Damascius, Life of Isidorus, §147, p. 1 27, 1 2-1 3 Zinzten.

1 65 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2, vol. 2, pp. 426-8 Bury; Against the Physicists, 1 , vol. 3, pp. 26-8 Bury; Against the Physicists, 2, vol. 3, p. 292 Bury; Outlines of Pyrrhonisn1, vol. 1, pp. 324-6 Bury. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, 9, 61-2: "He lived in conformity with everyday life [bios]." Such was Pyrrho's life-style, which, at least on the surface, was not very different from the average man's: "He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife . . . now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry or pigs for instance, and with complete indifference he would clean the house. It is said that he was so indifferent that he washed a piglet himself." (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, 9, 66.) All that mattered was one's inner attitude; therefore the sage conformed to "life," i.e. to the opinions of non-philosophers. But he did so with indifference, that is, wjth an inner freedom which preserved his serenity and peace of mind. This is, incidentally, the same Pyrrho who, when frightened by a dog, replied to his mocking onlookers: "It is difficult to strip oneselr completely of being human." (Diogenes Lacrtius, Lives of the Philosophers, 9, 66, fr. J C Long and Sedley, He/lenistif Philosophers, vol. 1 , p. 14; vol. 2, p. 3.) 1 66 Cf., with regard to Plato, V. Goldschmidt, "Sur le probli:me du 'systi:me de Platon'," Rivista critifa di stonia del/a filosofia 5( 1959), pp. 169-78. The recent researches of K. Gaiser and H.-J. Kriimer on Plato's unwritten teachings have once again raised doubts about the existence of systematic thought in antiquity.

1 67 Plato, Phaedrus, 264c.

168 I. During, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation sei11es Denkens, Heidelberg 1 966, pp. 29, 33, 41 , 226.

1 69 Cf. I. During, "Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz. Einige Haupttinien in der Gcschichtc des Aristotelismus," in P. Mordux, ed., Aristoteles in der neuren Forschut1g (= Wege der Forschung 61), Darmstadt 1968, p. 259: "In reality, Aristotle thought in terms of problems: he was a creator of methods, a pedagogue, and an organizer of collaborative scientific work. He did, of course, have strong systematic tendencies, but what he was striving after was a systematic way of approaching problems . . . The idea of creating a self-contained system, however, never even entered his mind."

1 70 During, "Aristotle and the heritage from Plato," pp. 97-8.

171 See above.

1 72 During, Aristoteles, p. 4 1 , n. 253.

1 73 Ibid, pp. 5, 289, 433.

174 Porphyry, Lift of Plotir1us, 4, I I ; 5, 60.

1 75 Cf., for instance, with regard to Plotinus' doctrine of the soul, Henry Blumenthal,

"Soul, world-soul, and individual soul in Plotinus," in Le Neoplat011isme, 1 97 1 .

1 76 Cf. I. Hadot, "Le systcmc theologiquc de Simplicius dans son commentairc sur le Manuel d'Epictetc," in Le Neop/atonisme, 197 1 , pp. 266, 279; I. Hadot, Le pro/1/bne, llp. 47- 65, 147-67.

1 77 C :f. the lation from Chrysippus' T/1m1peulikos in SVF 3, § 474, pp. 1 24-5, 111kcn from OriMcn, AJ(fliml Cl'lms, I , M; K, 5 1 . Note how Origen introduces his

124

Spiritual Exercises

citation: "Chrysippus

in his endeavours to restrain the passions of the human

• . .

soul, not pretending to determine what doctrines are the true ones, says that those who have been brought under the dominion of the passions are to be treated according to the principles of the various schools." On this theme, cf. I. Hadot, Sene,a, pp. 3, 2 1 , 44, 54, 83; 1969b, p. 3 5 1 . We ought therefore not to be surprised to find the Stoic Seneca utilizing Epicurean aphorisms to exhort his disciple Lucilius; cf. I. Hadot, Seneca, p. 83. A concrete example of this parenetic eclecticism may be found in the manuscript Vati,anus Graeros 1950.

According to Festugiere, La rrotlation, vol. 2, p. 90, n. 2: "It is interesting to note that the second half of Vat. gr. 1950 . . . which forms an independent whole, contains the Memorabilia of Xenophon (f. 280fT), followed by the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (f. 341 fT), then the Manual of Epictetus (f. 392•), and finally, after a page of rhetorical pieces (f. 40 1 ), the collectfon of Epicurean aphorisms entitled Gnomologium Vaticanum (f. 401 •fT.). This whole ensemble, including the selections from Epicurus, is the work of a Stoic, who has gathered together for his personal use a number of fundamental texts on moral doctrine - a kind of

'book of devotion', as it were. Now, the first item on the list is the Socrates of the Memorabilia."

1 78 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 9, 39; 4, 3, 2.

1 79 See above.

1 80 Augustine, On t/1e Trinity, 1 5, 6, 10: "Quia in nobis fiunt vel in nobis sunt, cum ista meminimus, aspicimus, volimus." Memory, knowledge, and will are, for Augustine, the three trinitary images. On the exercitatio animi ("exercise of the soul") in Augustine, see H.-1. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la ,u/ture antique, Paris 1938, p. 299.

1 8 1 On the utilization of the word philosophia in Christianity, see A.N. Malingrey,

"Philosop/1ia. " Et1ide d'un groupe de mots dans la litterature grecque, des Presocratiques au /Ve sitcle ap. J.-C., Paris 196 1 . Clement of Alexandria is one of the best witnesses for the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises. He emphasizes the importance of the master-disciple relationship (Stromata, I, I , 9, 1), the value of psychagogy (ibid, I, 2, 20, 1 ), and the need for exercises and a hunt after the truth (ibid, I, 2, 2 1 , 1 : "the truth reveals itself full of sweetness when one has searched for it and obtained it at the cost of great efforts.") 1 82 For H. Happ, JI.vie, Berlin 1 97 1 , p. 66, n. 282, the concern for "systems" goes back to Francisco de Suarez (1 548- 1 6 1 7).

1 83 Cf. K. Jaspers, "Epikur," in Weltbewohner und Weimarianer (Festschifi E. Beutler), Zurich 1 960, p. 1 32; and Immanuel Kant, Die Me1aphysik der Sitten ( 1 797), Ethische Methodenlehre, Zwieter Abschnitt. Die etl1is,he Asketik, in Immanuel Kant 's Werke, ed. Ernst Cassircr, Berlin 1916, §53 . Here Kant shows how the practice of virtue - which he calls ascetics - should be carried out with Stoic energy combined with Epicurean joie de vivre.

1 84 Vauvenargues, Reflections et maximes, §400 [Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues ( 1 7 1 5-1 747), friend of Voltaire. - Trans. ], together with §39H:

"Every thought is new when the author expresses it in his own way," and above all §399: "There arc many things we do not know well enough, and thal ii is good to have rc1lcn1ed ."

Spiritual Exercises

1 25

1 85 "It is contained in the very briefest statements," says Plato, speaking of the essence of his own doctrine (Seventh Letter, 334e). "The esse�e of philosophy is the spirit of simplicity . . . always and everywhere, complication is superficial, construction is an accessory, and synthesis an appearance. Philosophizing is a simple act" (Henri Bergson, La pensee et le mouvant, Paris 1946, p. 1 39).

1 86 Epictetus, Dis(ourses, 3, 2 1 , 7-8.

1 87 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Conversations 111i1h &kmnann, trans. John Oxenford, 2 vols, 1850, 25 January, 1 830.

4

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

and "Christian Philosophy"

It was the great merit of Paul Rabbow to have shown, in his Seelmfiihrung, 1

in what sense the methods of meditation set forth and practiced in Ignatius of Loyola's Exercilia spirilua/ia2 were deeply rooted in the spiritual exercises of ancient philosophy. Rabbow begins his book by discussing the various techniques by means of which rhetoricians throughout antiquity sought to persuade their audiences. These included, for example, oratorical amplification and lifelike, stirring descriptions of events.3 Above all, Rabbow gives a remarkable analysis of the exercises practiced by the Stoics and Epicureans, emphasizing the point that they were spirilual exercises of the same kind as we find in Ignatius of Loyola. On both these points, Rabbow's book opened the way to new areas of research. It is possible, however, that even the author himself did not foresee all the consequences of his discovery.

In the first place, Rabbow seems to me to have linked the phenomenon of spiritual exercises too closely to what he terms the "inward orientation"

(lnnenwendung)• which, he claims, took place in the Greek mentality in the third century BC, and which manifested itself in the development of the Stoic and Epicurean schools. As a matter of fact, however, this phenomenon was much more widespread. We can already detect its outlines in the Socratic/Platonic dialogues, and it continues right up until the end of antiquity.

The reason for this is that it is linked to the very essence of ancient philosophy. It is philosophy itself that the ancients thought of as a spiritual exercise.

If Rabbow tends to limit the extent of spiritual exercises to the Hellenistic/Roman period, the reason is perhaps that he restricts himself to considering their ethical aspect alone. Moreover, he considers ethics only in philosophies like Stoicism and Epicurcanism, which uppcnr to 1u:cord 1irc-

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 27

dominance to ethical questions in their instruction. In fact, Rabbow goes so far as to define spiritual exercises as moral exercises: By "moral exercise," we mean a procedure or determinate act, intended to influence oneself, carried out with the express goal of achieving a determinate moral effect. It always looks beyond itself, in as much as it repeats itself, or at least is linked together with other acts to form a methodical ensemble.5

With the advent of Christianity, Rabbow continues, these moral exercises were transformed into spiritual exercises:

Spiritual exercises, then, which resemble moral exercises like a twin, both in essence and structure, were raised to their classical rigor and perfection in the Exercitia spiritua/ia of Ignatius of Loyola. Spiritual exercises thus belong properly to the religious sphere, since their goal is to fortify, maintain, and renew life "in the Spirit," the vita spiritualis. 6

Christian spiritual exercises did indeed take on a new meaning by virtue of the specific character of Christian spirituality, inspired as it is by the death of Christ and the Trinitarian life of the divine Persons. But to speak, apropos of the philosophical exercises of antiquity, of simple "moral exercises" is to misunderstand their importance and significance. As we showed above, these exercises have as their goal the transformation of our vision of the world, and the metamorphosis of our being. They therefore have not merely a moral, but also an existential value. We are not just dealing here with a code of good moral conduct, but with a way of being, in the strongest sense of the term. In the last analysis, then, the term "spiritual exercises" is the best one, because it leaves no doubt that we are dealing with exercises which engage the totality of the spirit. 7

Secondly, one gets the impression from reading Rab bow that Ignatius of Loyola rediscovered spiritual exercises thanks to the sixteenth-century renaissance of rhetorical studies.8 In fact, however, rhetoric for the ancients was only one of many ingredients of exercises which were first and foremost philosophical in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, ever since the first centuries of the church's existence, Christian spirituality has been the heir of anc;.ient philosophy and its spiritual practices. There was thus nothing to prevent Ignatius from finding the methodology for his Exercitia within the Christian tradition itself. In the following pages, we hope to show, with the help of a few quotations, in what way ancient spiritual exercises were preserved and transmitted by an entire current of ancient Christian thouicht: that current, namely, which defined Christianity itself as 11 philm111phy,

128

Spiritual Exercises

Before we begin our study, we must be more specific about the notion of spiritual exercises. "Exercise" corresponds to the Greek terms askesis or melete. Let us be clear at the outset about the limits of the present inquiry: we shall not be discussing "asceticism" in the modem sense of the word, as it is defined, for instance, by Heussi: "Complete abstinence or restriction in the use of food, drink, sleep, dress, and property, and especially continence in sexual matters." 9 Here, we must carefully distinguish between two different phenomena. On the one hand, there is the Christian and

-

subsequently modem - use of the word "asceticism", as we have just seen it defined. On the other, there is use of the word askesis in ancient philosophy.

For ancient philosophers, the word askesis designated exclusively the spiritual exercises we have discussed above: 10 inner activities of the thought and the will. Whether or not sexual or alimentary practices analogous to those of Christian asceticism existed among certain ancient philosophers - the Cynics, for example, or the Neoplatonists - is a wholly different question. Such practices have nothing to do with philosophical thought-exercises. This question has been competently dealt with by many authors,1 1 who have shown both the analogies and the differences between asceticism (in the modern sense of the word) in ancient philosophy and in Christianity. What we propose to examine here is rather the way in which as/mis, in the philosophical sense of the term, was received into Christianity.

In order to understand the phenomenon under consideration, it is essential to recall that there was a widespread Christian tradition which portrayed Christianity as a philosop�y. This assimilation began with those Christian writers of the second century who are usually referred to as the Apologists, and in particular with Justin. The Apologists considered Christianity a philosophy, and to mark its opposition to Greek philosophy, they spoke of Christianity as

"our philosophy" or as "Barbarian philosophy." 12 They did not, however, consider Christianity to be just one philosophy among others; they thought of it as the philosophy. They believed that that which had been scattered and dispersed throughout Greek philosophy had been synthesi7.ed and systematized in Christian philosophy. Each Greek philosopher, they wrote, had possessed only a portion of the Logos, 13 whereas the Christians were in possession of the logos itself, incarnated in Jesus Christ. If to do philosophy was to live in accordance with the law of reason, then the Christians were philosophers, since they lived in conformity with the law of the divine Logos. 1•

Clement of Alexandria dwells at length on this theme. He establishes a close link between philosophy and paideia, by which he means the education of mankind. Already within Greek philosophy, the Logos, or divine pedagogue, had been at work educating humanity, but Christianity itself, as the complete revelation of the logos, was the true philosophy1 5 which "teaches us to conduct ourselves so that we may resemble God, and to nccepl the divine plan

[oikonomial as the guiding principle of all our cduc111ion.11 16

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 29

The identification of Christianity with true philosophy inspired many aspects of the teaching of Origen, and it remained influentiaL throughout the Origenist tradition, especially among the Cappadocian Fathers: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa. It is also in evidence in John Chrysostom. 17 All these authors speak of "our philosophy"; of the

"complete philosophy"; or of "the philosophy according to Christ. "

We may well ask ourselves if such an identification was legitimate, and wonder whether it did not contribute to a large extent to the notorious

"Hellenization" of Christianity, about which so much has been written. I will not go into this complex problem here, but shall limit myself to pointing out that in portraying Christianity as a philosophy, this tradition was the heir -

almost certainly consciously so - of a tendency already at work in the Jewish tradition, particularly in Philo of Alexandria. 18 Philo portrayed Judaism as a patrios phi/osophia: the traditional philosophy of the Jewish people. The same terminology was used by Flavius Josephus. 19

When, a few centuries later, monasticism came to represent the culmination of Christian perfection, it, too, could be portrayed as a philosophia. From the fourth century on, this is exactly how it was in fact described, by church Fathers such as Gregory Nazianzen,20 Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom,21 and especially by Evagrius Ponticus.22 This viewpoint was still current in the fifth century, for instance in Theodoret of Cyrrhus.13

Here again, it was Philo of Alexandria who had shown the way. He had given the name "philosophers" to the Therapeutae, who, according to his description,24 lived in solitude, meditating on the law and devoting themselves to contemplation. Jean Leclercq25 has shown that, under the influence of Greek tradition, the monastic life continued to be designated by the term phi/osophia throughout the Middle Ages. Thus, a Cistercian monastic text tells us that Bernard of Clairvaux used to initiate his disciples "into the disciplines of celestial philosophy. " 26 Finally, John of Salisbury maintained that it was the monks who "philosophized" in the most correct and authentic way.27

The importance of this assimilation between Christianity and philosophy cannot be over-emphasized. Let us be clear on one point, however: there can be no question of denying the incomparable originality of Christianity. We shall return to this point later; in particular, we shall emphasize the specifically Christian character of this "philosophy," as well as the care Christians have taken to connect it with the biblical/ evangelical tradition.

Moreover, the tendency to assimilation was confined within strict historical limits, and always linked more or less closely to the tradition of the Apologists and of Origen. This tendency did, however, exist; its importance was considerable, and its result was the introduction of philosophical spiritual exercises into Christianity.

A long with its 11hsorption of spiritual exercises, Christi�nity acquired a KJll'Ci lic 11tyk· of' l i fe, spiritu11l 1lt t i t udc, nnd 1.on11lity, which h11d been absent

1 30

Spiritual Exercises

from primitive Christianity. This fact is highly significant: it shows that if Christianity was able to be assimilated to a philosophy, the reason was that philosophy itself was already, above all else, a way of being and a style of life.

As Jean Leclercq points out: "In the monastic Middle Ages, just as much as in Antiquity, philosophia did not designate a theory or a means of knowledge, but a lived, experienced wisdom, and a way of living according to reason." za We remarked above29 that the fundamental attitude of the Stoic philosopher was prosoche: attention to oneself and vigilance at every instant. For the Stoics, the person who is "awake" is always perfectly conscious not only of what he does, but of what he is. In other words, he is aware of his place in the universe and of his relationship to God. His self-consciousness is, first and foremost, a moral consciousness.

A person endowed with such consciousness seeks to purify and rectify his intentions at every instant. He is constantly on the lookout for signs within himself of any motive for action other than the will to do good. Such self-consciousness is not, however, merely a moral conscience; it is also cosmic consciousness. The "attentive" person lives constantly in the presence of God and is constantly remembering God, joyfully consenting to the will of universal reason, and he sees all things with the eyes of God himself.

Such is the philosophical attitude par excellence. It is also the attitude of the Christian philosopher. We encounter this attitude already in Clement of Alexandria, in a passage which foreshadows the spirit which was later to reign in philosophically-inspired monasticism: "It is necessary that divine law inspire fear, so that the philosopher may acquire and conserve peace of mind

[ amerimtiia ], by dint of prudence [ eulabeia] and attention to himself [prosoche], and that he may remain exempt from sins and falls in all things." JO For Clement, the divine law is simultaneously the universal reason of the philosophers, and the divine word of the Christians. It inspires fear, not in the sense of a passion - which, as such, would be condemned by the Stoics -

but rather in the sense of a certain circumspection in thought and action.

Such attention to oneself brings about amerimnia or peace of mind, one of the most sought-after goals in monasticism.

Attention to oneself is the subject of a very important sermon by Basil of Caesarea.31 Basil bases his sermon on the Greek version of a passage from Deuteronomy: "Give heed to yourself, lest there be a hidden word in your heart." 32 On this basis, Basil develops an entire theory of prosoche, strongly influenced by ·the Stoic and Platonic traditions. We shall return to this point later. For the moment, let us simply note that Basil's reason for commenting on this particular passage of Deuteronomy is that, for him, it evokes a technical term of ancient philosophy. For Basil, attention to oneself consists in awakening the rational principles of thought and action which God has placed in our souls.33 We arc to watch over 011rselves that is, over our 11piri1 and our

-

soul - nnd nol over th111 which i11 mm (our body) or 1 hn1 whkh iN rllmul 11/11mt

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 3 1

us (our possessions).3'1 Thus, prosoche consists i n paying attention to the beauty of our souls, by constantly renewing the examination 06 our conscience and our knowledge of ourselves.35 By so doing, we can correct the judgments we bring upon ourselves. If we think we are rich and noble, we are to recall that we are made of earth, and ask ourselves where are the famous men who have preceded us now. If, on the contrary, we are poor and in disgrace, we are to take cognizance of the riches and splendors which the cosmos offers us: our body, the earth, the sky, and the stars, and we shall then be reminded of our divine vocation.36 It is not hard to recognize the philosophical character of these themes.

Prosoche or attention17 to oneself, the philosopher's fundamental attitude, became the fundamental attitude of the monk. We can observe this phenomenon in Athanasius' Life of Antony, written in AD 357. When describing the saint's conversion to the monastic life, Athanasius simply says: "He began to pay attention to himself." 38 Antony himself, we read later, is supposed to have said to his disciples on his deathbed: "Live as though you were dying every day, paying heed to yourselves fprosechontes heautois] and remembering what you heard from my preaching." 39

In the sixth century, Dorotheus of Gaza remarked: "We are so negligent that we do not know why we have gone ou t of the world . . . That is why we are not making progress . . . The reason for it is that there is no prosocke in our hearts." "° As we have seen;• attention and vigilance presuppose continuous concentration on the present moment, which must be lived as if it were, simultaneously, the first and last moment of life. Athanasius tells us that Antony used to make no attempt to remember the time he had already spent at his exercises, but rather made a brand new effort every day, as if starting afresh from zero.42 In other words, he lived the present moment as if it were his first, but also his last. We also saw that Antony told his disciples to "Live as though you were dying every day." 43 Athanasius reports another of Antony's sayings: "If we live as if we were going to die each day, we will not commit sin." -H We arc to wake up thinking it possible that we may not make it until the evening, and go to sleep thinking that we shall not wake up.45

Epictetus had spoken along similar lines: "Let death be before your eyes every day, and you will never have any abject thought nor excessive desire." 46

In the same vein, Marcus Aurelius wrote: "Let your every deed and word and thought be those of one who might depart from this life this very moment." 47 Dorotheus of Gaza also established a close link between prosocke and the imminence of death: "Let us pay heed to ourselves, brothers, and be vigilant while we still have time . . . Look! Since the time we sat down at this conference we have used up two or three hours of our time and got that much nearer to death. Y ct though we see that we are losing time, we are not afraid l " 48 And again: "Let us pay heed to ourselves and be vigilant, brothers.

Who will l(ivc UK hack the present time if we w111nc it?" 4'1

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Attention to the present is simultaneously control of one's thoughts, acceptance of the divine will, and the purification of one's intentions with regard to others. We have an excellent summary of this constant attention to the present in a well-known Meditation of Marcus Aurelius: Everywhere and at all times, it is up to you to rejoice piously at what is occurring at the present moment, to conduct yourself with justice towards the people who are present here and now, and to apply rules of discernment [emphilotekhnein] to your present representations [phantasia1] , so that nothing slips in that is not objcctive.50

We encounter the same continuous vigilance over both thought and intentions in monastic spirituality, where it is transformed into the "watch of the heart," si also known as nepsis 52 or vigilance. We are not dealing here with a mere exercise of the moral conscience. Rather, prosoche relocates man within his genuine being: that is, his relationship to God. It is thus equivalent to the continuous exercise of the presence of God. In the words of Plotinus' disciple Porphyry: "Let God be present as overseer and guardian of every action, deed and word!" s3 Here we have one of the fundamental themes of philosophical prosoche: presence both to God and to oneself.

"Have your joy and your rest in one thing only: in progressing from one action done for the sake of others to another such act, always accompanied by the remembrance of God." 5� This Meditation of Marcus Aurelius has to do, once again, with the theme of exercises involving the presence of God. At the same time, it introduces to us an expression which was later to play an important role in monastic spirituality. The "remembrance of God" is a perpetual reference to God at each instant of life. Basil of Cacsarca links it explicitly with the "watch of the heart": "We must keep watch over our heart with all vigilance . . . to avoid ever losing the thought of God." ss Diadochus of Photicc often evokes this theme. For him, the remembrance of God is entirely equivalent to prosocl1e: "Only they know their failures who never let their intellects be distracted from the remembrance of God." 56 "Since then [i.e. since its fall], it is only with difficulty that the human intellect can remember God and His commandments."57 We are to

close off all the intellect's avenues of escape, by means of the remembrance of God.58

What distinguishes a man who is virtue's friend is that he constantly consumes everything that is earthly in his heart by means of the remembrance of God, so that, bit by bit, the evil in it is dispersed by the fire of the 1·cmembrnncc of the Uood, nn

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 33

returns in perfection to its natural brilliance; nay, even with increased splendor.59

Clearly, remembrance of God is, in some sense, the very essence of prosoche.

It is the most radical method for ensuring one's presence to God and to oneself.6Cl Vague intentions, however, are not sufficient for true attention to one's self. We noted that Diadochus of Photice speaks of the "remembrance of God and of His commandments." In ancient philosophy as well, prosoche required meditating on and memorizing rules of life (kanones), those principles which were to be applied in each particular circumstance, at each moment in life. It was essential to have the principles of life, the fundamental

"dogmas," constantly "at hand."

We encounter this same theme once again in the monastic tradition. Here, however, philosophical dogmas are replaced by the Commandments as an evangelical rule of life, and the words of Christ, enunciating the principles of Christian life. Yet the rule of life could be inspired not only by the evangelical commandments, but also by the words of the "ancients;" in other words, of the first monks. We have only to recall Antony, on his deathbed, recommending that his disciples remember his exhortations.61 Evagrius Ponticus declares:

" It is a very nece&-sary thing . . . to examine carefully the ways of the monks who have traveled, in an earlier age, straight along the road and to direct oneself along the same paths." 62

Both the evangelical commandments and the words of the ancients were presented in the form of short sentences, which - just as in the philosophical tradition - could be easily memorized and meditated upon. The numerous collections of Apophlhegmata and of Kephalaia we find in monastic literature are a response to this need for memorization and meditation. Apophthegmata63

were the famous sayings which the ancients - that is to say, the Desert Fathers - pronounced in specific circumstances. This literary genre was already in existence in the philosophical tradition, and we find numerous examples of it in the works of Diogenes Laertius. As for Ke_phalaia,64 these are collections of relatively short sentences, usually grouped into "centuries."

This, too, was a literary genre much in vogue in traditional philosophical literature; some examples are Marcus Aurelius' Meditations and Porphyry's Sentences. Both these literary genres are responses to the requirements of meditation.

Like philosophical meditation, Christian meditation flourished by using all available means of rhetoric and oratorical amplification, and by mobilizing all possible resources of the imagination. Thus, for example, Evagrius Ponticus used to invite his disciples to imagine their own death, the decomposition of their bodies, the terrors and sufferings of their souls in Hell, ilnd eternal fire; then, by way of contrast, they were to picture the happiness of 1hc ju111 .M

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Meditation must, in any case, be constant. Dorotheus of Gaza insists strongly on this point:

Meditate constantly on this advice in your hearts, Brothers. Study the words of the holy Elders.66

If we remember the sayings of the holy Elders, brothers, and meditate on them constantly, it will be difficult for us to sin.67

If you wish to possess these sayings at the opportune moment, meditate on them constantly.68

In the spiritual life, there is a kind of conspiracy between, on the one hand, normative sayings, which are memorized and meditated upon, and, on the other, the events which provide the occasion for putting them into practice. Dorotheus of Gaza promised his monks that, if they constantly meditated on the "works of the holy Elders," they would "be able to profit from everything that happens to you, and to make progress by the help of God." 69 Dorotheus no doubt meant that after such meditation, his monks would be able to recognize the will of God in all events, thanks to the words of the Fathers, which were likewise inspired by the will of God.

Vigilance and self-attention clearly presuppose the practice of examining one's conscience. We have already seen, in the case of Basil of Caesarea,711 the close link between prosoche and the examination of conscience. It seems that the practice of the examination of the conscience occurs for the first rime, within the Christian tradition, in Origen 's Commentary on the Song of Songs. 71

In the course of his interpretation of verse l : 81 "Unless thou know thyself, 0 fair one among women," 72 Ori gen explains that the soul must examine its feelings and actions. Does it have the good as a goal? Does it seek after the various virtues? Is it making progress? For instance, has it completely suppressed the passions of anger, sadness, fear, and love of glory? What is its manner of giving and receiving, or of judging the truth?

This series of questions, devoid as it is of any exclusively Christian feature, takes its place in the philosophical tradition of the examination of conscience, as it had been recommended by the Pythagoreans, the Epicureans, the Stoics

- especially Seneca and Epictetus - and many other philosophers, such as Plutarch and Galen.7l We find the practice recommended again by John Chrysostom,7� and especially by Dorotheus of Gaza: We ought not only to examine ourselves every day but also every season, every month, and every week, and ask ourselves: "What stage nm I at now with regards to the pm1sion by which I waN overcome luNt week?"

Ancienl Spiritual Exercises

1 3 5

Similarly every year: "Last year I was overcome b y such and such a passion; how about now?"

The Fathers have told us how useful it is for each of us to purify himself in tum, by examining, every evening, how we have spent the day, and every morning, how we have spent the night . . . . Truly, however, we who sin so much and are so forgetful, really need to examine ourselves every six hours also, so that we may know how we have spent these hours and in what way we have sinned.75

In this regard there is an interesting detail in Athanasius' Life of Antony.

According to his biographer, Antony used to recommend to his disciples that they take written notes of the actions and movements of their souls. It is possible that written examinations of conscience were already part of the philosophical tradition;76 they would have been useful, if not necessary, in order to ensure that the investigation was as precise as possible. For Antony, however, the important aspect was the therapeutic value of writing: "Let each one of us note and record our actions and the stirrings of our souls as though we were going to give an account of them to each other." 77 Surely, he continues, we would not dare to commit sins in public, in full view of others:

"Let this record replace the eyes of our fellow ascetics." According to Antony, the act of writing gives us the impression of being in public, in front of an audience. We can also discern the therapeutic value of writing in a passage in which Dorotheus of Gaza reports that he felt "help and relier• 78 by the mere fact of having written to his spiritual director.

Another interesting psychological point: Plato and Zeno had remarked that the quality of our dreams allows us to judge the spiritual state of our soul.79

We find this observation repeated by Evagrius Ponticus80 and Diadochus of Photice.81

Finally, prosoche implies self-mastery. That is, it implies the triumph of reason over the passions, since it is the passions that cause the distraction, dispersion, and dissipation of the soul. Monastic literature insists tirelessly on the misdeeds of the passions, which were often personified in demoniacal form.

Many recollections of ancient philosophy were preserved in monastic exercises of self-mastery. For instance, we find Dorotheus of Gaza, like Epictetus, advising his disciples to begin by training themselves in little th,ings, so as to create a habit,82 before moving on to greater things. Similarly, he advises them to diminish the number of their sins bit by bit, in order to defeat a passion.u We find Evagrius Ponticus proposing that one passion ought to be combated by means of another - fornication, for instance, by the concern for one's good reputation - as long as it remains impossible to combat the passion directly by the virtue which is opposed to it. This was the method already KUl(Ke11tcJ by Cicero in hiK 1i11rn/a11 Disp"tations.84

1 36

Spiritual Exercises

We said above that Christianity's acceptance of spiritual exercises had introduced into it a certain spiritual attitude and style of life which it had previously lacked. As an example, let us consider the concept of exercises as a whole. In the very process of performing repetitious actions and undergoing a training in order to modify and transform ourselves, there is a certain reflectivity and distance which is very different from evangelical spontaneity.

Attention to oneself - the essence of prosoche - gives rises to a whole series of techniques of introspection. It engenders an extraordinary finesse in the examination of conscience and spiritual discernment. Most significantly, the ideal sought after in these exercises, and the goals proposed for the spiritual life, became tinged with a strong Stoico-Platonic coloration; that is to say, since by the end of antiquity Neoplatonism had integrated Stoic ethics within itself, that they were deeply infused with Neoplatonism. This is the case, for instance, in Dorotheus of Gaza, who describes spiritual perfection in completely Stoic terms: it is the transformation of the will so that it becomes identified with the Divine Will:

He who has no will of his own always does what he wishes. For since he has no will of his own, everything that happens satisfies him. He finds himself doing as he wills all the time, for he does not want things to be as he wills them, but he wills that they be just as they arc.85

The most recent editors of Dorotheus compare this text with a passage from the Manual of Epictetus: "Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene." Rb

Spiritual perfection is also depicted as apalheia - the complete absence of passions - a Stoic concept taken up by Ncoplatonism. For Dorotheus of Gaza, apatheia is the end-result of the annihilation of one's own will: "From this cutting off of self-will a man procures for himself detachment [aprospatheia], and from detachment he comes, with the help of God, to perfect apatheia." R7

We may note in passing that the means Dorotheus recommends for cutting off self-will are wholly identical to the exercises of self-mastery of the philosophical tradition. In order to cure curiosity, for instance, Plutarch advised people not to read funeral epitaphs, not to snoop on their neighbors, and to turn their backs on street scenes.RR Similarly, Dorotheus advises us not to look in the direction where we want to look; not to ask the cook what he's preparing for dinner; and not to join in a conversation we find already underway.89 This is what Dorotheus means by "cutting off self-will."

It is with Evagrius, however, that we can see most clearly just how closely Christian apatheia can be linked to philosophical concepts. In Evagrius'

Praktikos, we find the following definition: "The K inicdom of Heaven is apalheia of the soul along with true knowlcd1o1c of c1d111 in1o1 1 hi n1i111. '""1 When

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 37

we turn to comment on a formula such as this, we find how great is the distance separating such speculations from the evangelical spir)t. As we know, the evangelical message consisted in the announcement of an eschatological event called "the Kingdom of Heaven" or "the Kingdom of God. " Evagrius begins by differentiating between the two expressions, and interpreting them in a highly personal way. Enlarging upon the Origenist tradition,91 he considers that the two expressions designate two inner states of the soul. More precisely, they designate two stages of spiritual progress: The Kingdom of Heaven is apatheia of the soul along with true knowledge of existing things.

The Kingdom of God is knowledge of the Holy Trinity co-extensive with the capacity of the intelligence and giving it a surpassing incorruptibility .92

Two levels of knowledge are distinguished here: the knowledge of beings and the knowledge of God. We then realize that this distinction corresponds exactly to a division of the parts of philosophy which was well known to Origen, and is attested in Platonism at least since the time of Plutarch.93 In chis division, three separate stages or levels of spiritual progress are distinguished, which correspond to the three parts of philosophy: ethics - or

"practics,'' as Evagrius calls it - physics, and theology. Ethics corresponds to initial purification, physics to definitive detachment from the sensible world and contemplation of the order of nature; finally, theology corresponds to contemplation of the principle of all things. According to the Evagrian schema, however, ethics corresponds to praktike, physics to "the Kingdom of Heaven," which includes the true knowledge of beings, and theology corresponds to "the Kingdom of God," which is the knowledge of the Trinity. In Neoplatonic systematization, these degrees also correspond to degrees of virtue. According to Porphyry,94 the soul begins by utilizing the political virtues to dominate the passions via the state of metriopatheia. It then rises to the level of the kathartic virtues. These virtues begin to detach the soul from the body, but do not yet do so completely; this is only the beginning of apatheia. Not until the level of the theoretical virtues does the soul attain to full apatheia and perfect separation from the body. It is at this level that the soul is able to contemplate the forms within the divine intellect, which are the moqels for the phenomenal world.95 This level, characterized by apatheia and the contemplation of existents, corresponds to Evagrius' "Kingdom of Heaven." According to Evagrius, the soul now contemplates the multiplicity of physeis ("natures"; hence the denomination "physical"): on the one hand, the intelligible forms, and on the other the logoi of sensible bcings.''6 The final stage, noetic in nature, is the contemplation of God llim11c:lf. Thu11, Ev11griu11 !IUm11 up his thought in these terms: "Christianity is

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Spiritual Exercises

the doctrine of Christ our Savior. It is composed of praktike, of physics, and of theology." 97

Apatheia plays an essential role, not only in theoretical constructions such as Evagrian metaphysics, but also in monastic spirituality. There, its value is closely linked to that of peace of mind and absence of worry: amerimnia98 or tranqui/litas.99 Dorotheus of Gaza100 does not hesitate to declare that peace of mind is so important that one must, if necessary, drop what one has undertaken if one's peace of mind is endangered. Peace of mind tranquillitas

-

animi

had, moreover, always been a central value within the philosophical

-

tradition.101

For Porphyry, as we have seen, apatlreia was a result of the soul's detachment from the body. Here we touch once again upon the philosophical exercise par excellence. As we saw above, Plato had declared: "those who go about philosophizing correctly are in training for death." 102 As late as the seventh century, we still find the echo of this saying in Maximus Confessor:

"In conformity with the philosophy of Christ, let us make of our life a training for death." ioJ

Yet Maximus himself is only the inheritor of a rich tradition, which repeatedly identified Christian philosophy with training for death. We encounter this theme already in Clement of Alexandria, 1114 who understood such training in a thoroughly Platonic sense, as the attempt spiritually to separate the soul from the body. For Clement, perfect knowledge, or gnosis, is a kind of death. It separates the soul from the body, and promotes the soul to a life entirely devoted to the good, allowing it to devote itself to the contemplation of genuine realities with a purified mind. Again, the same motif recurs in Gregory Nazianzen: "Make of this life, as Plato said, a training for death, while

- to speak in his terms - separating the soul from the body as far as possible." 105 "This," he tells us, "is the practice of philosophy." Evagrius, for his part, expresses himself in terms strikingly similar to Porphyry's: To separate the body from the soul is the privilege only of Him who has joined them together. But to separate the soul from the body lies as well in the power of the person who pursues virtue. For our Fathers gave to the training for death and to the flight from the body a special name: anachoresis [i.e. the monastic life ].106

It is easy to see that the Platonic concept of the flight from the body, which exercised such an attraction upon the young Augustine, was an element added 0'1

to Christianity, and not essential to it. Nevertheless, this concept determined the orientation of the whole of Christian spirituality in a quite specific direction.

So far, we have noted the permanent survival of certain philosophical spiritual exercises in Christianity and mono11tici11m, nnd we hnvc tried to make

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

1 39

comprehensible the particular tonality that their reception introduced into Christianity. We must not, however, exaggerate the i"'l>ortance of this phenomenon. In the first place, as we have said, it manifested itself only in a rather restricted circle: among Christian writers who had received a philosophical education. Even in their case, however, the final synthesis is essentially Christian.

To be sure, our authors strove to Christianize their borrowings as much as possible; but this is perhaps the least important aspect of the matter. They believed they recognized spiritual exercises, which they had learned through philosophy, in specific scriptural passages. Thus, we saw Basil of Caesarea making a connection between prosoche and a text from Deuteronomy .107 Then, in Athanasius' Life of Antony, and throughout monastic literature, prosoche was transformed into the "watch of the heart," under the influence of Proverbs, 4:23: "Above all else, guard your heart." 1118 Examination of one's conscience was often justified by the Second Letter to the Corinthians, 13:5:

"Examine yourselves . . . and test yourselves." 109 Finally, the meditation on death was recommended on the basis of First Corinthians, 1 5: 3 1 : "I die every day." uo

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that these references were enough, all by themselves, to Christianize spiritual exercises. The reason why Christian authors paid attention to these particular biblical passages was that they were already familiar, from other sources, with the spiritual exercises of prosoche, meditation on death, and examination of the conscience. By themselves, the texts from scripture could never have supplied a method for practicing these exercises. Often, in fact, a given scriptural passage has only a distant connection with a particular spiritual exercise.

More important is the overall spirit in which Christian and monastic spiritual exercises were practiced. They always presupposed the assistance of God's grace, and they made of humility the most important of virtues. In the words of Dorotheus of Gaza: "The closer one comes to God, the more one sees oneself as a sinner." 1 1 1 Such humility makes us consider ourselves inferior to others. It leads us to maintain the greatest reserve in both conduct and speech, and to adopt certain significant bodily positions, for instance prostration before other monks.

Two .other fundamental virtues were penitence and obedience. Penitence, inspired by the fear and love of God, could take the form of extremely severe self-mortification. The remembrance of death was intended not only to make people realize the urgency of conversion, but also to develop the fear of God.

In turn, it is linked to meditation on the Last Judgment, and thereby to the virtue of penitence. The same holds true of the examination of conscience.

Obedience - the renunciation of one's own will, in complete submission to the orders of o superior - completely transformed the philosophical practice of s1>irilual direclion. We can Nee 10 juHI what extremes such obedience could

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be taken in Dorotheus' Life of Dositheus. 112 The director of conscience had an absolute power of decision over his disciple's possessions, eating habits, and entire way of life.

In the final analysis, all these virtues were transfigured by the transcendent dimension of the love of God and of Christ. Thus, to train for death, or to separate the soul from the body, was at the same time to participate in the death of Christ. To renounce one's will was to adhere to divine love.

Generally speaking, we can say that monasticism in Egypt and Syriam was born and developed in a Christian milieu, spontaneously and without the intervention of a philosophical model. The first monks were not cultivated men, but Christians who wanted to attain to Christian perfection by the heroic practice of the evangelical prescriptions, and the imitation of the Life of Christ. It was, therefore, natural that they should seek their techniques of perfection in the Old and the New Testament. Under Alexandrian influence, however - the distant influence of Philo, and the more immediate influence of Origen and Clement of Alexandria, magnificently orchestrated by the Cappadocians - certain philosophical spiritual techniques were introduced into Christian spirituality. The result of this was that the Christian ideal was described, and, in part, practiced, by borrowing models and vocabulary from the Greek philosophical tradition. Thanks to its literary and philosophical qualities, this tendency became dominant, and it was through its agency that the heritage of ancient spiritual exercises was transmitted to Christian spirituality: first to that of the Middle Ages, and subsequently to that of modern times.

NOTES

1 See above.

2 See above.

3 Paul Rabbow, Seelenfiihrung. Metliodik der E.\·erzitien in der Antike, Munich 1 954, p. 23.

4 Ibid, p. 1 7.

S Ibid, p. 1 8.

6 Ibid.

7 See above.

8 Rabbow, Seelenfohrung p. 30 1 , n. 5; p. 306, nn. 14, 1 7.

9 K. Heussi, Der Ursprung des Monchtums, Tiibingen 1 936, p. 1 3 .

IO See above.

I I For example, G. Kretschmar, "Der Ursprung der friichristlichcn Askese,"

Zeitschrifi fiir Theologie U'1d Kirche 6 1 ( 1 964), pp. 27-67; P. Nagel /Jie Motivir

,

rung der Askese in der a/w1 Kird1e u'1d tier Urspnmg tlt.f Mli1ulm111., (= Tcxte und Untcrsuchungcn :r.ur Geschichtc: dc:r 11ltchriKt.lichcn l .itc:r111ur

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141

Munich/Vienna 1969; K.S. Frank, ed., Askese und Miinchtum in der a/ten Kirche (= Wege der Forschung 409), Darmstadt 1975; R. Hauser apd G. Lanczkowski,

"Askese," in Historisches Wiirterbuch der Philosophie, vol. I, cols 538-41, 1971

(with good bibliography); }. de Guibert, "Ascese," in Dictio1maire de Spiritualite, vol. I, cols 936-1010.

1 2 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho, 8, I; Tatian, Address to the Greeks, 31, 35, 55; Melito in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 4, 26, 7.

13 Justin, Second Apology, 2, 13, 3; Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 1, 1, 7: "if someone had arisen who could collect the truth scattered and dispersed among the individual philosophers and sects and reduce it to one body, that one . . . would not disagree with us"; 7, 8, 3: "We . . . are able to pick out the truth by surer signs; we who gather it, not from fluctuating suspicion, but who know it from divine tradition."

14 Justin, Apology, I, 46, 1-4.

1 5 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, I, 1 3, 57, 1-58, 5; I, 5, 28, 1-32, 4.

16 Ibid, I, 1 1 , 52, 3.

17 Most of the relevant texts have been assembled in A.N. Malingrey, "Phi/osophia. "

Etude d'un groupe de mots dans la litterature grecque, d.es Presocratiques au /Ve siecle ap. J.-C., Paris 196 1 .

1 8 Philo Judaeus, The legation t o Caius, 1 56; 345; Life of Moses, 2, 2 1 6; On the Contemplative life, 26.

19 Flavius Josephus, Antiquiti.es of the Jews, 18, 1 1 ; 23.

20 Gregory Nazianzen, Apologetica, 1 03, PG 35, 504A.

21 John Chrysostom, Against the Opponents of the Monastic life, 3, 13, PG 47, col.

372.

22 See below.

23 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, History of the Monks of Syria, 2, 3, I ; 4, I , 9; 4, 2, 1 9; 4, 1 0, 1 5; 6, 13, 1 ; 8, 2, 3 Canivet.

24 Philo Judaeus, On the Contemplative life, 2; 30.

25 }. Leclercq, "Pour l'histoire de !'expression 'philosophic chretienne'," Melanges de Science Religeuise 9 (1952), pp. 221-6.

26 E:t:ordium magnum Cisterciense, Pl 1 85, 437.

27 John of Salisbury, Polycraticus, 1, 21, Pl 199, 696.

28 Leclercq "Pour l'histoire," p. 22 1 .

29 See above.

30 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2, 20, 120, I .

3 1 Basil of Caesarea, In /l/ud Attende tibi ipsi, PG 3 1 , cols 197-2 1 7. P. Adnes, "Garde du ca:ur," Dictionnaire de Spiritualitc, vol. 6, col. 108, points to the existence of a multitude of sermons relating to this theme. He cites C. Baur, Initia Patrum Graecorum (= Studi e Testi 18 1 , 2), Vatican City 1 955, p. 374.

32 Deuteronomy, 1 5: 9. [ The Septuagint Greek version of the Bible renders this phrase as proseche seautoi me genetai rhema krypton en tei kardiai sou: "Pay attention to yourself, lest a hidden word come to be in your heart," which the King James Version renders as "Beware that there be not a thought in thy wicked heart. " The Greek title of Basil's sermon is consequently eis to Proseche seautoi:

"On t he wonl�, 'Oivt• hcml to yourself' " Trnns.)

142

Spiritual Exercises

33 Basil, In Illud Allende, 2, 201B, pp. 433--4 Wagner.

34 Ibid, 3, 204A, p. 43S Wagner. This distinction was current in Platonic circles; cf.

Plato, First Alcibiades, 130-ld; Apology, 36bk6.

3S Ibid, 3, 204B; S, 209B, pp. 43S, 440 Wagner.

36 Ibid, S-6, 209C-2 1 3A, pp. 440-2 Wagner.

37 On the following exercises, the reader may consult the following articles in the Dfrtionnaire de Spiritualite: "Attention," "Apatheia," "Contemplation," "Examen de Conscience," "Direction spirituelle," "Exercices spirituels," "Garde du coeur."

38 Prosechon heautoi. Athanasius, Life of Antony, 3, PG 26, 844B, p. 32 Gregg.

39 Ibid, 9 1 , 969B, p. 97 Gregg.

40 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, 1 0, §104, line 9 Regnault/de Preville = p. 1 63

Wheeler. The concept of prosoche plays a very important role throughout the monastic tradition; cf. for instance Diadochus of Photice, Kephalaia Gnostica,

§27, p. 98, 19 Des Places.

41 See above.

42 Athanasius, Life of Antony, 8S3A; 868A; 9698; pp. 37, 43, 97 Gregg/Clebsch.

43 Cf. above.

44 Ibid, 19, 872A, p. 4S Gregg/Clebsch.

4S Ibid.

46 Epictetus, Manual, 2 1 . See above.

47 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2, 1 1 .

48 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, §1 14, 1-lS Regnault/de Preville = p . 1 73

Wheeler.

49 Ibid, §1 04, 1-3 Regnault/de Preville = p. 163 Wheeler.

SO Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 7, S4.

Sl Athanasius, Life of Antony, 873C; Basil of Caesarea, Regulae fusius tractatae, PG

3 1 , 921 B = p. 243 Wagner. Cf. John Cassian, Col/ationes, vol. 1 , p. 84 Pichery

= p. 84 Luibheid: "we must practice the reading of the Scripture, together with all the other virtuous activities, and we do so to trap a"d to hold our hearts free of the harm of every dangerous passion." [Basil and Athanasius use the term phulake, among whose many meanings are "protection," "control," "guarding,"

and "observance." It can also mean a prison or a prisoner. Originally, however, phu/ake meant a night-watch or the person charged with this duty (the Latin custodia); and this is the meaning I have tried to convey by translating he tes leardias phulalee by "watch of the heart." All the other meanings, however, arc relevant and should be borne in mind. - Trans.]

S2 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didoslealiai, §104 Regnault/de Preville = p. 1 63 Wheeler.

S3 Porphyry, Porphyry the Philosopher, To Marcella, 1 2.

S4 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 6, 7.

SS Basil, In 11/ud allende, p. 243 Wagner.

S6 Diadochus of Photice, Kepha/aia Gnostica, 27, p. 98, 1 1 Des Places.

57 Ibid, S6, p. 1 17, l S .

S S Ibid, S9, p . 1 1 9, 1 -2.

S9 Ibid, 97, p. 1 60, 3 .

60 On the theme of presence, see above.

Ancient Spiritual Exercises

143

61 See above.

62 Evagrius of Pontis, Pralttikos, §9 1 , p. 9 1 Bamberger.

63 Cf. T. Klauser, "Apophthegmata," Rea/lexicon for Antilte und Christentum ( 1950), pp. 545-50.

64 Cf. E. von lvanka, "Kephalaia," Byzantinische Zeitschrifl 47 ( 1954), pp. 258-9 1 .

6 5 Apophthegmata Patrum, P G 6 5 , 1 73A-B.

66 Dorotheus of Gaza, Ditlasltaliai, §60, 27, p. 120 Wheeler.

67 Ibid, §69, 2, p. 1 3 1 Wheeler.

68 Ibid, § 1 89, 4-5.

69 Ibid, §60, 30, pp. 1 20-1 Wheeler.

70 See above.

71 Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs, pp. 143, 27ff. Baehrens = pp. 1 28ff Lawson.

72 [Again, while the King James Bible reads "If thou know not, 0 thou fairest among women", the Greek Septuagint version gives "Unless you know yourself"

(Ean me gnois seauten) - Trans.]

73 See the references in I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-romische Tradition tier Seelenleitung, Berlin 1969, pp. 66-7 1 .

74 John Chrysostom, Non esse ad gratiam concionandum, PG SO, 659-60.

75 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didasltaliai, §§1 1 1 , 13; 1 1 7, 7, pp. 170; 1 75 Wheeler.

76 Cf. I. Hadot, Seneca, p. 70.

77 Athanasius, Life of Antony, PG 26, 924B, p. 73 Gregg/Clebsch.

78 Dorotheus of Gaza, Ditlasltaliai, §25, 1 1 , p. 91 Wheeler.

79 Sec above.

80 Evagrius of Pontis, Praktikos, §§54-6, p. 3 1 Bamberger. Cf. F. Refoule, "Reves et vie spirituelle d'apres Evagre le Pontique," Supplement d.e la Vie Spirituelle 59

( 196 1 ), pp. 470-5 16.

81 Diadochus of Photice, Kephalaia Gnostica, 37, p. 106 Des Places.

82 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didskaliai, §20, p. 89 Wheeler. L. Rcgnault and J. de Preville, editors of the Sources Chretiem1es edition, cite as a parallel Epictetus, Discourses, I, 18, 1 8.

83 Ibid, §120, p. 1 78 Wheeler. Regnault and de Preville compare Epictetus, Discourses, 2, 18.

84 Evagrius of Pontis, Praktikos, §58, p. 32 Bamberger. In their Sources Chretiennes edition, A. and C. Guillaumont cite as a parallel Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4, 75.

85 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, §202, 12.

86 Epictetus, Manual, 8.

87 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, §20, 1 1-13, p. 88 Wheeler.

88 Plutarch, On Curiosity, 520Dff.

89 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, 20, pp. 88-9 Wheeler.

90 Evagrius of Pontis, Praktiltos, 2, p. 1 5 Bamberger.

91 See the texts cited by A. and C. Guillaumont in the notes to their commentary on the Praktikos (SC 1 7 1 ), p. 499, n. 2; p. 50 1 , n. 3.

92 1�:vngrius of Pontis, Prt1ktik11s, §§2--3, pp. 1 5-16 Bamberger.

1J3 Cf. P. llndot, "1 .11 division dcK parties de la philosophic dans l'Antiquite,"

MuMcum l·lelvc1in1111 .lf1 ( 1 11711), l'I'· 20 1 23.

144

Spiritual Exercises

94 Cf. I. Hadot, Lt probltme du niop/atonisme alexandrin, Hiirodis el Simplicus, Paris 1 978, pp. 1 52-8.

95 Porphyry, Sentences, p. 27, 9, Lamberz.

96 Cf. the note in A. and C. Guillaumont, 1 97 1 , p. 500.

97 Evagrius of Pontis, Praletikos, §I, p. 1 5 Bamberger.

98 On amtrimnia, see Diadochus of Photice, Kephalaia Gnostica, 25, p. 97, 7; 30, p.

100, 19; 65, p. 1 25, 1 2; 67, p. 127, 22 Des Places. For Dorotheus of Gaza, see, inter alia, Didaskaliai, §68, 2.

99 For occurrences of tranquillitas, cf. John Cassian, Conferences, I, 7, vol. I, p. 85

Pichery = p. 42 Luibheid; 1 9, 1 1 , vol. 3, p. 48 Pichery.

100 Dorotheus of Gaza, Didaskaliai, §§58-60, pp. 1 1 8-20 Wheeler.

1 0 1 In the treatises of Plutarch and Seneca, for instance.

1 02 See above.

1 03 Maximus Confessor, Commentary on the Our Father, PG 90, 900A = p. 1 14

Berthold.

1 04 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 5, 1 1 , 67, 1 , pp. 370-1 Stiihlin.

1 05 Gregory Nazianzen, Epistula 3 1 , vol. I , p. 39 Gallay.

106 Evagrius of Pontis Praktikos,

,

§52, p. 30 Bamberger. Compare Porphyry,

Sentences, 8, p. 3, 6 Lamberz: "What nature has bound together, she also unbinds, but that which the soul binds, the soul likewise unbinds. It was nature that bound the body within the soul, but it was the soul which bound itself within the body. Therefore, while it is nature that unbinds the body from the soul, it is the soul which unbinds itself from the body."

I 07 Cf. above.

1 08 Athanasius, life of Antony, 873C, p. 47 Gregg/Clebsch.

109 Ibid, 924A, p. 72 Gregg/Clcbsch.

1 1 0 Ibid, 872A, p. 45 Gregg/Clebsch.

1 1 1 Dorotheus of Ga7.a, Didaskaliai, § 1 5 1 , 47.

1 1 2 Dorotheus of Gaza, life 1if Dositheus, §§5-9, edited among Dorotheus' Spiritual Works in Regnault/de Preville 1963, pp. 129ff.

1 13 Cf. A. Voobus, A History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient (= CSCO vol. 184, Subsidia 14, vol. 197, Subsidia 17), Louvain 1 958-60.

Part III

Figures

5

The Figure of Socrates

Since the dawn of Greek thought, the sage has functioned as a living, concrete model. Aristotle testifies to this in a passage from his Protrepticus: "What more accurate standard or measure of good things do we have than the Sage?" 1

There were several reasons for the fact that my research on the sage as a model gradually became fixed upon Socrates. In the first place, I found in him a figure who had exercised a widespread influence of the greatest importance on the entire Western tradition. Secondly, and most importantly, the figure of Socrates - as sketched by Plato, at any rate - had, it seemed to me, one unique advantage. It is the portrait of a mediator between the transcendent ideal of wisdom and concrete human reality. It is a paradox of highly Socratic irony that Socrates was not a sage, but a "philo-sopher": that is, a lover of wisdom.

To speak about Socrates is, of course, to expose oneself to all sorts of historical difficulties. The accounts we have of him by Plato and by Xenophon have transformed, idealized, and deformed the historical Socrates.2

I shall not attempt here to uncover or reconstruct the historical Socrates.

Instead, what I shall try to set forth is the figure of Socrates, as it has influenced our Western tradition. Since this is a phenomenon of immense proportions, however, I shall restrict myself to two of its aspects: the figure of Socrates as depicted in Plato's Symposium, and as it was perceived by those two great Socratics, Kierkegaard3 and Nietzsche. 4

1 Silenus

Socrates thus functions as a mediator between ideal norms and human reality.

The concepts of "mediation" and "intermediate" call to mind the ideas of equilibrium and the Golden Mean. We should therefore expect to see in Socrates a harmonious figure, combining divine and human characteristics in llclicutc nu1mccN.

148

Figures

Nothing could be further from the truth. The figure of Socrates is ambiguous, troubling, and strangely disconcerting. The first surprise in store for us is his physical ugliness, which is well attested by the testimony of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes.5 "It is significant," wrote Nietzsche, "that Socrates was the first great Hellene to be ugly." 6 "Everything in him is exaggerated, bujfo, a caricature." 7 Nietzsche goes on to evoke his "crab-like eyes, puffed-up lips, and hanging belly," 8 and he takes pleasure in telling the story of how the physiognomist Zopyrus once told Socrates he was a monster, keeping hidden within himself the worst vices and appetites. Socrates, says Nietzsche, simply replied: "How well you know me! " 9 If Socrates really did resemble a Silenus, as he is depicted in Plato's Symposium,10 such suspicions were quite understandable. In popular imagination, Sileni and satyrs were hybrid demons, half-animal, half-men, who made up the escort of Dionysos.

These impudent, ribald buffoons also constituted the chorus of satyr-plays, a literary genre of which Euripides' Cyclops is one of the few remaining examples.

The Sileni were purely natural beings. They stood for the negation of culture and civilization, for grotesque buffoonery, and for the license of the instincts.1 1

To use Kierkegaard's expression, Socrates was a cobold. 12 To b e sure, Plato gives us to understand that Socrates' resemblance to Silenus was only an appearance, beneath which something else was hidden. Alcibiades, in his famous speech in praise of Socrates at the end of the Symposium, 1.i compares Socrates to the little statues of Sileni that could be found in sculptors' shops, which concealed little figurines of the gods inside themselves. Similarly, Socrates' exterior appearance - ugly, buffoon-like, impudent, almost monstrous - was only a mask and a facade.

Here we are led to another paradox: Socrates was not only ugly, but a dissimulator as well. Nietzsche writes: "Everything in him is concealed, ulterior, subterranean." 14 Socrates masks himself, and at the same time is used as a mask by others.

Socrates masks himself: here we encounter that famous Socratic irony, the meaning of which we shall have to clarify later on. Socrates pretends to be ignorant and impudent. "He spends his whole life," says Alcibiades, "playing the part of a simpleton and a child." i; "The nouns and verbs which form the outer envelope of his words arc like the hide of an impudent satyr. "11' His ignorant appearance and amorous attentions "are what he has wrapped around himself, like a carved Silenus." 17