Opening Moves

The Soviet plan departed from their standard tactics by utilising a general assault plan throughout Europe. Zhukov and his staff reasoned that the Allied soldiers would not be ready and little organised resistance would be found initially, so a broad front approach should yield more territory and offer the more opportunity for substantial penetrations at first.

The low opinion that the Soviet Military had for the Allies had translated into a rough expectation of about one week before any real organised counter-attacks came their way.

By that time, the picture should have developed more clearly and the large forces held in reserve would be employed to make the drives on their main targets through areas of weakness.

The Rhine beckoned to the Soviets as much as it had done to the Allies coming from the other direction a year before, and so Soviet planning for the first phase of the assault expected a large drive on the Rhine via the Ruhr, and also via Frankfurt and on into Luxembourg and Saarland. Two major targets were the port city of Hamburg and nearby Bremen, and to a lesser extent Cuxhaven. Of particular interest was the ability to operate submarines to interdict allied supply routes, much as the Germans had done in the preceding years, and both Hamburg and Bremen has bunkers suitable for the task.

Soviet planning also required the destruction, or at minimum negation, of the Allied fighter and ground attack capability throughout Europe and from the beginning artillery, saboteurs and aircraft were fulfilling this requirement with mixed results, in line with the requirements of Operation Kurgan.

A six man observation force was landed clandestinely by a Beriev MP1 seaplane on Saltholm Island in the Oresund, sovereign territory of Denmark, to observe shipping movement. The small group of naval specialists were concealed on the southern edge of the island, away from the farming community of Barakkebro to the north-west end. Soviet naval vessels stood ready to converge on any allied naval force attempting to enter the Baltic.

Elements of the Baltic Fleet landed large Soviet forces on the islands of Lolland and Falster, also Danish territory, supporting the landings with ships gunfire.

As soon as bridgeheads were established, auxiliary vessels began to unload heavy artillery pieces that were to be sited to cover shipping routes around the island.

Aircraft flew in and established a fighter base at Marthasminde on Lolland, and a combined bomber and fighter base at a larger field near Rødby. Ingenious use of the Sydmotorvejen road running north from its junction with the Ringsebøllevej adjacent to Rødby permitted operations by 571st Assault Aviation Regiment, recently equipped with the new IL-10 ground attack aircraft. Three Tupolev TU-2t torpedo bombers, specially enhanced for maritime reconnaissance completed the allocation on Lolland.

On Falster, a similar provision had been found on the Gedser Landveg road angling north from the village of Gedesby, and more aircraft arrived, this time IL-4 torpedo bombers of Soviet Naval Aviation. In fact, the Soviets had learned a great deal from the Luftwaffe’s use of roads as airfields and had hidden air regiments the length and breadth of Europe in such a manner. All the better to evade any air raids by the Western Allies.

A smaller force similarly equipped and tasked landed simultaneously on the island of Mon. Fighters flew into Kostervig to complete the defence.

To all intents and purposes, the Baltic was closed and the Northern shores of Germany secure from interference.

To the south of the Austrian attacks, all would remain quiet for now. It had not been thought prudent for security to advise the Yugoslavs of their plans. Sometime after the first Soviet units rolled forward into the attack, Russian liaison officers were being unceremoniously woken and virtually interrogated by their Yugoslavian allies, keen to understand what was happening and why they had not been informed. The delay also suited the Soviets as the Allies could not afford to ignore the large field forces of the Yugoslavian Army and their existence pinned numerous high quality allied divisions in place, divisions that could make a difference elsewhere.

GRU’S report, endorsed by Pekunin, guaranteed that once Tito was onside then the plan existed to carry Soviet and Yugoslavian forces into Northern Italy to the Mediterranean and beyond. A high-level Soviet delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Vyshinski was already on its way to Belgrade to seek cooperation and support in the coming months. The GRU report also indicated that the omission of Yugoslav forces from the planning and conception of the operation would be easily explained away by operational security needs and no harm would be done.