Насосы интуиции и другие инструменты мышления

Dennett D. C. 2009c: Intentional Systems Theory // McLaughlin B., Beckermann A., and Walter S. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 339–350.

Dennett D. C. 2010: Homunculi Rule: Reflections on Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection by Peter Godfrey-Smith, Oxford University Press, 2009 // Biology and Philosophy. Доступно в сети: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/homunculi.pdf.

Dennett D. C. 2011a: Cycles // World Question Center. Edge.org. (Перепечатано: Brockman 2012, pp. 81–88.)

Dennett D. C. 2011b: Shall We Tango? No, but Thanks for Asking // Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 18, Nos. 5 and 6, pp. 23–34.

Dennett D. C. 2012: Sakes and Dints // Times Literary Supplement, March 2, pp. 12–14.

Dennett D. C. 2013a: The Evolution of Reasons // Bashour B., Muller H. D. (eds.). Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. New York: Routledge, pp. 13–47.

Dennett D. C. 2013b: Expecting Ourselves to Expect: the Bayesian brain as a projector // Behavioral and Brain Sciences, June 36 (3), pp. 209–210.

Dennett D. C. 2013с: Kinds of Things – Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image // Ross D., Ladyman J., and Kincaid H. (eds.). Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 96–107.

Dennett D. C. 2013e: Turing’s ‘Strange Inversion of Reasoning’ // Cooper S. B., Van Leeuwen J. (eds.). Alan Turing – His Work and Impact. Elsevier, pp. 569–573.

Dennet D. C., Akins K. 2008: The Multiple Drafts Model // Scholarpedia, Vol. 3, No. 4, 4321: http://www.scholarpedia.org/wiki/index.php?title=Multiple_drafts_model.

Dennet D. C., Plantinga A. 2011: Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dennet D. C., Westbury C. F. 2000: Mining the Past to Construct the Future: Memory and Belief as Forms of Knowledge // Schacter D., Scarry E. (eds.). Memory, Brain, and Belief. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 11–32.

Denton M. 1985: Evolution: A Theory in Crisis. London: Burnett Books.

Dewdney A. K. 1984: The Planiverse: Computer Contact with a Two-Dimensional World. New York: Poseidon Press.

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Feynman R. 1985: “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!”: Adventures of a Curious Character. New York: W. W. Norton.

Fitch T. 2008: Nano-Intentionality: A Defense of Intrinsic Intentionality // Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 23, pp. 157–177.

Fitzgibbon C. D., Fanshawe J. H. 1988: Stotting in Thomson’s Gazelles: An Honest Signal of Condition // Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, Vol. 23, No. 2 (August), pp. 69–74.

Fodor J. 1975: The Language of Thought. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.

Fodor J. 2003: Why Would Mother Nature Bother? // London Review of Books, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 17–18.

Fodor J. 2008: LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fodor J., Lepore E. 1992: Holism: A Shopper’s Guide. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fodor J., Piatelli-Palmerini M. 2010: What Darwin Got Wrong. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

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Gell-Man M. 1995: The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex. New York: St. Martin’s.

Gibson J. J. 1979: The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Godfrey-Smith P. 2009: Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.