"Ms. Carvey refused his overtures in this direction, and so Mr. Littler got a court order barring Ms. Carvey from having an abortion, on the grounds that the fetus should be treated as a person under the law. Note that the judge issuing the injunction didn't rule as to whether Mr. Littler's contention was true. Rather he — and it was a he — felt Mr. Littler's argument was sufficiently persuasive that the issue should be decided by jury."
Lopez looked at our own jury box. "And how did the jury decide the case?"
"They ruled that given
"And so that was the end of things?"
Neruda shook her head. "It was not. Mr. Littler appealed; the appeals court overturned the lower court; and the case |was fast-tracked to the Supreme Court."
"Fast-tracked?" said Lopez. "Why?"
"Although none of the same justices were still sitting, the court recalled
In that case, the pseudonymous Jane Roe was suing for the right to have a legal abortion. Wade was Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where Roe lived; he was the one who was charged with upholding the then-ban on abortion in his jurisdiction.
Yes, she won the right to have an abortion, but far too late to do her any good.
Because of that, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
Lopez nodded. "And what did the Supreme Court find in
"In a six-to-three ruling, the court found that Stella Carvey's unborn child was indeed a person, with the full rights ascribed to persons under the Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution."
"And therefore…?"
"Therefore, Ms. Carvey was banned from getting an abortion."
"In relation to
"It's frequently cited as the case that overturned
"Making aborting embryos beyond a certain stage of development illegal again in the United States?"
"Correct."
"And what is the status of
"It still stands as the law of the land."
Lopez nodded. "Now, a moment ago, I said that
"Certainly.
The judge nodded his shoehorn face. "But do get on with it," he said.
"Of course, of course," said Neruda. "Drawing the line between personhood and nonpersonhood has represented one of the greatest challenges in bioethics. One position, of course, is that held by hard-line right-to-lifers: a new person, with the rights of personhood, is created at the moment of conception. The opposite extreme says that a new person doesn't exist until the moment of birth, some nine months later — and, indeed, since the 1970s, there's been a vocal faction that's argued that even birth is too early, contending that personhood doesn't really begin until there's significant cognitive ability, around two or three years of age; those people find painless infanticide and abortion equally morally acceptable."
I saw several of the jurors react in horror, but Neruda went on. "Conception and birth are, of course, precise moments in time. Although a human conception was never actually observed until 1969, we had known from animal studies for hundred years prior to that that conception occurs when the spermatozoa and the oocyte fuse."
"Oocyte?" said Lopez.
"The female gamete. What lay people call the egg."
Somebody near me snickered at what was presumably Neruda's inadvertent play on words.
"All right," said Lopez. "Conception occurs at the moment the sperm and egg fuse."
"Yes, and that's one specific second of time. We also, of course, routinely very precisely measure the time of birth. In fact…" Neruda trailed off.
"Yes, Professor?"
"Well, of course, there's Mr. Sullivan, sitting right over there."
I always sat up straight these days; there was no additional comfort in slouching my mechanical body.
"What's significant about Mr. Sullivan?" asked Lopez.
"Well, he's a Mindscan now, but the original him was, I believe, the first child bom after midnight on 1 January 2001, in Toronto, Canada."