Mao: The Unknown Story

MAO’S BENIGN MOOD did not last long. On 22 June 1973, Brezhnev and Nixon signed an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. When Mao read a Foreign Ministry analysis which concluded that this showed that “the world is more than ever dominated by the two powers, the US and the USSR,” he flew into a monumental rage. Nixon’s visit to Peking had raised Mao’s hopes that (in Kissinger’s words) “The bipolarity of the postwar period was over.” But Mao saw that it was not, and that he had not tipped the scales of world power after all. And in the meantime his dalliance with America had cost him his international image. “My reputation has gone bad in the last couple of years,” Mao told acolytes. “The only Marx in the world, the only beacon, is now in Europe. Over there [he meant Albania, which had come down hard on him over Nixon’s visit], even their farts are considered fragrant and are treated as imperial edicts … And I have come to be regarded as a right-wing opportunist.”

Mao took it out on Chou. He had bottled up much resentment against Chou over the whole business with America. Though Mao had masterminded the US president’s visit and the end to Peking’s diplomatic isolation, it was mostly Chou who seemed to get the credit. (There are some parallels with Nixon’s jealousy towards Kissinger.) On 4 July, Mao sent word to the Politburo that Chou was a “revisionist,” and Chou was condemned to one more round of self-abasement.

Barely was this crisis over when another, far worse one came crashing down on Chou’s head. Kissinger returned to China in November (now as secretary of state), bringing a terminal blow to Mao’s ambitions. Nine months before, Kissinger had promised that Washington would move towards full diplomatic relations “after the 1974 [mid-term] elections.” Now he said that the US “domestic situation” precluded severing relations with Taiwan “immediately”—which Peking had insisted on as a prerequisite for diplomatic relations. Mao was never to rule in Taiwan, or to have diplomatic recognition from America.

Worse still for Mao, his dreams of enjoying military might by courtesy of the USA came to nothing. All Kissinger could offer was an “early warning” system to detect Soviet missile launches. “I will have to study it,” Chou replied, but Kissinger heard no more. The proposal held no interest for Mao, as he did not really believe in a Russian attack. The Chinese stopped talking about a military alliance with America.

Mao blamed these setbacks on the Watergate scandal, which was then threatening Nixon’s presidency, and made it impossible for Nixon to take any big risks. Mao spent some time talking to Kissinger about Watergate, saying that he was “not happy about it,” and could not understand what all the “farting” was about. And he railed tirelessly against Watergate to other foreign statesmen. To France’s president Pompidou he said he could not understand what all “the fuss” was about. “What’s wrong with having a tape recorder?” he asked Thailand’s prime minister. “Do rulers not have the right to rule?” he would demand. In May 1974, when Nixon was on the ropes, Mao asked former British prime minister Heath: “Can you lend him a hand to help him through?”

Because of Watergate, Nixon was forced to resign on 9 August 1974. Less known is that Watergate also helped finish off Mao’s dreams of becoming a superpower.

By now, Mao’s Superpower Program was in seriously bad shape, despite two decades spent consuming a huge proportion of the nation’s investment. The entire higher-tech end of the arsenal was producing defective and unusable equipment, and it desperately needed foreign input. With Russia now a lost cause, Mao had hoped that America would bestow the kiss of life. But Kissinger’s November 1973 trip, conducted under the shadow of Watergate, closed this door. Mao was unable to come up with any new strategy. Ace schemer though he was, even he had reached the bottom of the barrel.

MAO WAS NOW EIGHTY, and very ill. He finally resigned himself to the reality that he could not become a superpower in his lifetime. He could not dominate the world, or any part of it other than China.