Mao: The Unknown Story

Mao had been planning war with India on the border issue for some time. China had refused to recognize the boundary that had been delineated by the British in colonial times, and insisted it be renegotiated, or at least formalized by the two now sovereign states. India regarded the border as settled, and not negotiable, and the two sides were deadlocked. As border clashes worsened, Peking quietly prepared for war during May — June 1962. Chou later told the Americans that “Nehru was getting very cocky … and we tried to keep down his cockiness.” But Mao was chary of starting a war, as he was worried about the security of the nuclear test site at Lop Nor in northwest China, which was beyond the range of American U-2 spy planes flying from Taiwan, but lay within range from India. Part of the fallout from the war was that India allowed U-2s to fly from a base at Charbatia, from where they were able to photograph China’s first A-bomb test in 1964.

Mao was also concerned that he might have to fight on two fronts. Chiang Kai-shek was making his most active preparations since 1949 to invade the Mainland, fired by the hope that the population would rise up and welcome him because of the famine. Mao took the prospect of a Nationalist invasion seriously, moving large forces to the southeast coast opposite Taiwan, while he himself hunkered down in his secret shelter in the Western Hills outside Peking.

The Chinese had been holding regular ambassador-level talks with America in Warsaw since 1955. Mao now used this channel to sound out whether Washington would support an invasion by Chiang. And he got a very reassuring and direct answer. The Americans said they would not back Chiang to go to war against the Mainland, and that Chiang had promised not to attack without Washington’s consent.

But Mao still hesitated. The paramount factor was Russia, on which China was heavily dependent for oil. In China’s previous border clashes with India, Khrushchev had ostentatiously declined to back Peking. He had then agreed to sell India planes that could fly at high altitudes, and in summer 1962 signed an agreement not only to sell India MiGs, but for India to manufacture MiG-21s.

By early October, the Himalayan winter was approaching, and the window of opportunity narrowing. Mao sent out a feeler to the Russian ambassador about how Moscow would react if China attacked India. Khrushchev seized this chance to make a startling démarche. On the 14th he laid on a four-hour farewell banquet for the outgoing Chinese ambassador, at which the Soviet leader pledged that Moscow would stand by Peking if China got into a border war with India, and would delay the sale of MiG-21s to India. He revealed that he had been secretly installing nuclear missiles in Cuba and said he hoped the Chinese would give him their support.

This was a hefty horse-trade, one well concealed from the world. On the morning of 20 October, just as the Cuba crisis was about to break, Mao gave the go-ahead for crack troops to storm Indian positions along two widely separated sectors of the border. Five days later, with the Cuba crisis at fever pitch, Khrushchev came through with his support for Mao in the form of a statement in Pravda that mortified Nehru.

Chinese forces rapidly advanced more than 150 km into northeast India. Then, having demonstrated military superiority, Mao withdrew his forces, leaving each country holding some disputed territory, a situation that prevails to this day. Mao had achieved his objective: long-term stability on this border, leaving him free to focus on his broader ambitions. The war also dealt a lethal blow to Nehru, Mao’s rival for leadership in the developing world, who died eighteen months later from a stroke.

MEANWHILE, THE Cuban missile crisis was basically settled on 28 October, after Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for a promise by US president John F. Kennedy not to invade Cuba (and an unpublished promise to pull US missiles out of Turkey). Mao immediately jettisoned his deal not to make trouble for Khrushchev during the crisis, and tried to horn in on Havana’s resentment towards Khrushchev for failing to consult it about his settlement with the US. Gigantic “pro-Cuba” demonstrations were staged in China, accompanied by bellicose statements containing barely veiled accusations against Moscow for “selling out.” Mao bombarded the Cubans with messages, telling them that Moscow was an “untrustworthy ally,” and urging them to hold out against Khrushchev’s agreement to remove Russian missiles and planes. Mao tried to capitalize on the differences between Castro and Guevara, who was against the settlement. “Only one man got it right,” Mao said: “Che Guevara.”