art. And yet there is an enormous difference between your art and the art of which I
speak. In your art everything is subjective—the artist's perception of this or that
sensation; the forms in which he tries to express his sensations and the perception of
these forms by other people. In one and the same phenomenon one artist may feel one
thing and another artist quite a different thing. One and the same sunset may evoke a
feeling of joy in one artist and sadness in another. Two artists may strive to express
exactly the same perceptions by entirely different methods, in different forms; or
entirely different perceptions in the same forms—according to how they were taught,
or contrary to it. And the spectators, listeners, or readers will perceive, not what the
artist wished to convey or what he felt, but what the forms in which he expresses his
sensations will make them feel by association. Everything is subjective and
everything is accidental, that is to say, based on accidental associations—the impression of the artist and his
"In real art there is nothing accidental. It is mathematics. Everything in it can be calculated, everything can be known beforehand. The artist
and another impression on another,
presuming, of course, people on one level. It will always, and with mathematical
certainty, produce one and the same impression.
"At the same time the same work of art will produce different impressions on
people of different levels. And people of lower levels will never receive from it what
people of higher levels receive. This is real,
understand it in one way and another in another way. Everyone who is sufficiently
prepared and who is able to read this book will understand what the author means, and
precisely as the author means it. An objective work of art is just such a book, except
that it affects the emotional and not only the intellectual side of man."
"Do such works of objective art exist at the present day?" I asked. "Of course they exist," answered G. "The great Sphinx in Egypt is such a work of art, as well as some historically known works of architecture, certain statues of gods, and many other
things. There are figures of gods and of various mythological beings that can be read
like books, only not with the mind but with the emotions, provided they are
sufficiently developed. In the course of our travels in Central Asia we found, in the
desert at the foot of the Hindu Kush, a strange figure which we thought at first was
some ancient god or devil. At first it produced upon us simply the impression of being
a curiosity. But after a while we began to
to decipher this system. It was in the body of the figure, in its legs, in its arms, in its head, in its eyes, in its ears; everywhere. In the whole statue there was nothing
accidental, nothing without meaning. And gradually we understood the aim of the
people who built this statue. We began to feel their thoughts, their feelings. Some of
us thought that we saw their faces, heard their voices. At all events, we grasped the
meaning of what they wanted to convey to us across thousands of years, and not only
the meaning, but all the feelings and the emotions connected with it as well. That
indeed was art!"
I was very interested in what G. said about art. His
I could neither define nor formulate, and which nobody else had formulated.
Nevertheless I knew that these divisions and gradations existed. So that all discussions
about art without the recognition of these divisions and gradations seemed to me
empty and useless, simply arguments about words. In what G. had said, in his
indications of the different levels which we fail to see and
understand, I felt an approach to the very gradations that I had felt but could not
define.
In general, many things which G. said astonished me. There were ideas which I
could not accept and which appeared to me fantastic and without foundation. Other
things, on the contrary, coincided strangely with what I had thought myself and with
what I had arrived at long ago. I was most of all interested in the
all philosophical and scientific ideas are, but made one whole, of which, as yet, I saw
only some of the pieces.