In the Met’s war room, de Montebello and the others “made lists of what we could not live without,” he said. “We were willing to accept a show that was quantitatively reduced, but not one that was typologically reduced. No single major category of objects could be missing. It was necessary that the show sustain its goal of presenting a transversal history of Chinese art, that we not be forced to eliminate the Tang, Song, or Yuan dynasties from our presentation, that the curatorial vision be left intact. But being too pious in this matter would not have been public spirited. It was important that we not in our disappointment cancel a remarkable show. One day I thought our chances were at sixty percent; the next day it was thirty percent.”
The Met’s press office, which had been organizing expensive preview trips to Taiwan and printing color brochures, descended into hysteria. Interviews were forbidden and information was given so much spin as to become implausible. Attempts to control journalists could hardly have been more stringent during the Cultural Revolution than they were in January and February at the Met.
At another protest, on January 17 back in Taipei, the rumors flew: the Metropolitan Museum would lock the Chinese treasures in its basement and send back cleverly made copies; President Clinton would give the art back to the mainland; the US Congress’s guarantee of protection for foreign cultural treasures was no more reliable than the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan that it had terminated in 1978. “Neither at the Met nor elsewhere in the West do you know how to treat work on paper or silk,” one protester told me. When a Chinese friend of mine countered that the Met’s studio for the conservation of Asian art operates at a much higher standard than the Palace’s, people screamed insults at him. “This work is much too sophisticated for you,” another protester said. “People in your country couldn’t understand or appreciate it. Sending it is just a waste.”
The Ministry of Education formed a committee to investigate the whole fiasco. At a big rally on Thursday, January 18, demonstrators wrapped themselves in a petition with twenty thousand signatures that had been gathered in a single day at Kaohsiung University. Particular rage was directed against committee members associated with Fong—though it would have been difficult to form a qualified committee free of Fong-trained scholars. Fong was still being advised to stay in New York. “You can do nothing but wait,” he was told by a friend on the committee. “I hope there will still be a show to save by next week.”
I was standing in the crowd outside the investigative committee’s first meeting when a television camera suddenly pointed at me. “I’m told you’ve actually met Wen Fong,” a journalist said. “Is he really as we understand him to be: greedy, arrogant, selfish, and mean?”
By January 20, when I met with Chu Hui-liang, the new New Party legislator, she was expressing regret over the debacle: “I worried about sending
Fong used a different analogy: “You don’t stop eating because you might choke.”