Far and Away: Reporting from the Brink of Change

I spend the afternoon with Sergei B. Stankevich, Yeltsin’s counselor on political affairs. Russian politics is unpredictable, but character is distinctive; of these three men, this is the only one who could run a country. He is at the moment unpopular and has severed his ties to various movements that might have helped him to greater success, but unpopular in Russia can turn to popular in hours, and Stankevich has had moments of great popularity. He has recently distanced himself from Yeltsin, though he has kept his Kremlin office and official position. In the past, when Yeltsin has acted strangely and unpredictably, Stankevich has been the one to explain.

Stankevich has neither Golovin’s pragmatic idealism nor his pristine record, and he is not free of Communist-type language. He has often been accused of dirty politics and was at the center of a small scandal last year when a great deal of government money went to an almost nonexistent music festival. He is said to have used his influence to get apartments for family members and to arrange other special favors. “You’re seeing Stankevich?” asked a friend from the old underground. “Make sure you take a bath afterwards.” But Stankevich has a quality of immense competence; sitting in his large Kremlin office, one is lulled into a sense that politics is straightforward. He pursues his political vision with the clear knowledge that his kind of democracy will benefit not only Russia, but also himself.

“The reforms in this country have come in waves,” he says. “The first was Gorbachev’s wave, which began in 1985, peaked with perestroika, and began its downward turn with the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation. The goals of this first wave were to introduce controlled elections and controlled free speech while preserving the system and retaining Communist Party control. These goals were accomplished. But the leaders of the first wave failed to introduce a new political or intellectual paradigm, and so they had to fall.

“The second wave was Yeltsin’s wave, which included such men as Andrei Sakharov, and the goal was to remove Communist ideology from its predominance and to establish basic freedoms: free speech, a free press, and a parliamentary system. These goals were accomplished. This wave peaked during the coup in 1991. In 1992, the second wave broke when state control was in large part lifted from the economy. The second wave failed to invent a new Russia, to balance this country’s racial, ethnic, and religious mix, to achieve the crucial joint goals of being market-oriented and socially responsible. The second wave has been heading downward for a year and a half.

“Now it’s time for the third wave, the base for which is already in place. It will begin in earnest with the elections and with the adoption of constitutional reform. The first goal of the third wave will be to establish a constitution and system of rule that allow for cooperation rather than competition among the branches of government. We will create a representative government, so that the republics now acting semiautonomously will feel that their representatives are involved in establishing national laws and that they are therefore bound by those laws. We will remain socially responsible, but we will take reasonable steps toward economic reform. I think we will accomplish these goals with moderate, conciliatory behavior, to create a single, strong, united Russia. We have passed the time when you can rule this country by standing on top of a tank.”

This seems a surprising line from someone who is still a presidential adviser—Yeltsin is the one who stood on top of a tank—and I press Stankevich on it. He implies that Yeltsin is undependable, a people’s hero but not a professional. “Yeltsin could conceivably be at the helm for the third wave if he accepts its conditions,” Stankevich says. “But the third wave must belong in large part to my generation.” The new Russian politics is younger politics. Unlike many younger politicians, however, Stankevich has built his career slowly. He was a great favorite of Gorbachev’s and later headed the strategic staff for Yeltsin’s political campaigns. When the coup was declared, he flew home from a holiday, went to the Russian White House, and stayed with Yeltsin for all three days.