Far and Away: Reporting from the Brink of Change

The Rohingya situation is separate from, albeit related to, armed conflicts waged chronically by several ethnic insurgencies that seek to establish a federal system in which they would enjoy greater autonomy. The Muslim problem proceeds from sectarian, demographic, and religious tensions; the armed conflict, from minority nationalism. “You can have one or two civil wars in a country. Here, there are seventeen going on,” Mitchell said. All of the contentious ethnic groups want the right to elect their own legislatures, and to teach in their own languages. In 2014, the government pushed for a nationwide cease-fire as a precondition for preliminary all-party peace talks. The agreement that was reached stipulated that future negotiations would include ethnic political and social leaders, not just military chiefs; and that those subsequent talks would address nondiscrimination, constitutional changes to support more ethnic/regional control, a more accountable security sector, and the clearance of land mines. “They are willing to leave the central government in charge of defense, currency, and international trade,” explained Win Min, a presidential adviser, “but they want to control education, social sectors, fisheries, transportation within their own state. And they want to get tax money from the natural resources extracted in their territories.”

Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts are also ideological. At the height of the Vietnam War, the Cultural Revolution, and the Khmer Rouge, the threat of escalating guerrilla warfare was terrifying to many Burmese. The military was eager to expel the remnants of Chiang’s Kuomintang army from mountains near the Chinese border, fearing an invasion. At the same time, the Burmese military was fighting the Communists who opposed the regime. On several occasions, leaders of various ethnic groups sided with the Communists just because doing so gave them combined fighting strength. Thant Myint-U, who is also involved in peace negotiations, pointed out that Myanmar’s military government had justified itself by exaggerating “a half-century-old counterinsurgency campaign on autopilot.” Ma Thanegi said, “Since independence, there have been so many insurgencies, fighting not only the central government but also one another, that it’s a wonder they can keep things straight and not shoot their own people.”

The past few years have seen little sustained fighting, though skirmishes erupt when the government enters a contested territory to regain control of a road, build a dam, or establish dominance in a lucrative mining operation. British colonial rule never fully penetrated these remote, rugged areas, and infrastructure is as scarce as political stability. Some militias aim to defend local people against profiteers; others demand taxes from villagers. Other self-styled forces pursue their own business agenda; the three-thousand-strong Mong La National Democratic Alliance, for example, is led by a former Chinese Red Guard accused of running gambling and drug rings and trading in endangered wildlife. In Kachin, 120,000 people remain in government prisons because of their ethnic activism or sympathies; recent video footage shows the Myanmar army bombing Kachin trenches. The jadeite mines of Kachin produce several billion dollars a year, but little of that money trickles down to the Kachin people. In the Karen region, the average villager makes less than $1,000 a year and can see that Karen people a mile away on the Thai side are making $10,000.

When I traveled to Mon State, Kyi Zaw Lwin, a local politician and teacher, told me that he could not advance because he was only half Mon and therefore trusted by neither the Mon nor the Burmese. His mixed ethnicity far outweighed his politics, his experience, or his education. The Mon once had a kingdom comparable in scale to Thailand, but they were conquered by the Burmese in 1057—and they still want their original kingdom back. Individual states already have parliaments, so components of federalism are in place. But how much power should those parliaments have? And should they represent everyone in the state, or just the dominant ethnic group? The consensus is that the central government should share power with regional lawmakers, but to what extent remains in contention.