Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia

Zero-sum policies on the part of Russia and the Western powers also exacerbated pre-existing political and ethnic cleavages in several of the In-Between states. In Ukraine, as noted earlier, the confrontation has mapped onto, and intensified, internal divisions over identity. Before the crisis, Ukrainians were split down the middle when asked if they would prefer membership of the EU or the Customs Union. The geographic breakdown within Ukraine was stark, with 73% in the western reaches of the country favouring the EU but 62% in the south and 46% in the east favouring the Customs Union in a 2013 poll.[45] After the Crimea annexation and the war in Donbas, the balance shifted somewhat, but regional schisms regarding NATO and EU membership remain.[46]

In Moldova, there are multiple axes of cleavage. Transnistria residents, survey research has consistently revealed, would prefer to become part of Russia than to reunify with Moldova.[47] Even in government-controlled territory on the right bank of the Dniester River, Moldovans are divided; as of October 2015, 45% favour joining the EEU over 38% who prefer the European Union, and the EEU has been gaining ground.[48] The November 2016 election of a president who favours closer ties with the EEU shows the strength of pro-Russian sentiment, although his narrow margin of victory demonstrates the persistent divisions in Moldova’s society on these matters. The Gagauz are also far more Russophile than the population as a whole.[49] As in Ukraine, being caught up in the Russia–West battle royal weakens social cohesion and sharpens ethnic and political divides, holding back market reforms and damaging fragile democratic institutions.

In Georgia, there have been similar gradients in opinion between the separatist territories and the rest of the country. Georgians in government-controlled areas are by a long shot the most pro-NATO and pro-EU in post-Soviet Eurasia.[50] South Ossetia residents are overwhelmingly in favour of becoming part of Russia, and Abkhazians are strongly pro-independence and anti-NATO.[51] Even before the 2008 war, these rifts bedevilled activities to reconcile grievances stemming from the conflicts of the early 1990s. Today, Russia’s determination to prevent Tbilisi from restoring control over the breakaway regions prevents any such activities from even getting off the ground. Until the late Soviet period, Georgians and Abkhaz lived in Abkhazia in relative harmony. Following the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from Abkhazia in 1992–93, a full generation of Georgians and Abkhaz have grown up without contact with each other; it is not likely that their children and grandchildren will have any such opportunity.

The geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-ideational tussle that permeates the In-Betweens has also warped party politics and supplanted democratic discourse with demagoguery. In Moldova and Ukraine, parties and leaders have declared themselves pro-Western to capitalise on popular desire for good government, which many citizens associate with the West. When in power, however, they all too often have proven to be as corrupt and incompetent as their so-called pro-Russian opponents.

Additionally, the contest for influence between Russia and the West has hobbled US and EU efforts to further reform in post-Soviet Eurasia. This is partly a function of practicalities: when geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-ideational issues are at the top of the agenda, other problems fall by the wayside. But at times when the contest is particularly intense, Western policymakers have deliberately downplayed human rights and democracy-related problems for fear of pushing countries into Russia’s embrace. EU backpedalling on conditionality with Yanukovych is one example discussed earlier. The tepid Western reaction to the crackdown on protesters in Tbilisi in November 2007 is another. As Human Rights Watch noted in its report on the incident,

Georgia has been seen as a small but crucial bulwark to counter Russian dominance in the region and as an important ally for the United States. It has also been held up as an example of a successful transition to democracy in the former Soviet Union region. As a result, the US and EU have refrained from criticizing Saakashvili in public and from engaging in robust discussion of the country’s human rights problems.[52]