Command and Control

the retrorockets of a Thor missile suddenly firing: The launch pad was evacuated, and when technicians returned to the site they found that the “latch safety pins” were still holding the reentry vehicle atop the missile. “The cause of the incident,” the report concluded, “was failure to follow prescribed safety rules for the Thor missile.” See ibid., Incident #42, p. 87.

a Mark 28 bomb emitting strange sounds: Ibid., Incident #9, p. 72.

the John Walker spy ring… provided about a million documents: See Pete Earley, Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring (New York: Bantam, 1988), p. 358.

so secret that the president… wasn’t allowed to know it: Known as the “Venona decryptions,” they helped to discover the names or code names of about two hundred Americans spying for the Soviet Union. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, made the decision not to tell President Truman. The motive was less sinister than bureaucratic. “Here we have government secrecy in its essence,” Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan later wrote. “Departments and agencies hoard information, and the government becomes a kind of market.” Those who know the secrets have great influence over that market. For the decision to keep Truman in the dark, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 59–73. The quote appears on page 73.

But the Soviet Union learned the secret: See ibid., p. 16; and James Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 47–56.

“Secrecy is a form of government regulation”: See Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997). Quoted in Moynihan, Secrecy, p. 12.

Cold War documents that were declassified in the 1990s: See Scott Shane, “U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review,” New York Times, February 21, 2006.

Chelyabinsk-65, the site of a nuclear weapon facility: For the tragic legacy of Soviet weapon production, see Vladislav Larin, “Mayak’s Walking Wounded,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1999), pp. 20–27, and John M. Whitely, “The Compelling Realities of Mayak,” in Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, John C. Pierce, and John M. Whiteley, eds., Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 59–96.

“arguably the most polluted spot on the planet”: Quoted in Whitely, Dalton et al., Critical Masses, p. 67.

well suited to the demands of nuclear command and control: Bruce G. Blair has written the best guide to the Soviet system. His work on the subject can be found in The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 59–167, and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). Blair also wrote the introduction for one of the few works in the field written by a Russian expert: Valery E. Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003). Two other sources, although dated, contain much fascinating information. See Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Nuclear Operations,” in Ashton Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987); and Stephen J. Cimbala, Soviet C3 (Washington, D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1987).

“more stringent than those of any other nuclear power”: Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 107.

the “Perimeter” system: See Blair, Global Zero Alert, pp. 51, 56; C3, pp. 137–45, 157–59, 245–48; and Hoffman, Dead Hand, pp. 152–54, 421–23.

Sidney Drell regards Bob Peurifoy as one of the leading: Interview with Sidney Drell.

the nuclear weapon community… became outspoken in defense of his cause: For a good analysis of the sudden interest in nuclear weapon safety, see Frank von Hippel, “Test Ban Debate, Round Three: Warhead Safety,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1991.

During a Senate debate on the treaty in August 1992: The senators were discussing an amendment to an energy and water development bill. See “Amendment No. 2833, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,” Senate, August 3, 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress (1991–1992), pp. S11171-S11222.

“Why is testing of nuclear weapons so important?”: Ibid., p. S11172. The senator was J. Bennett Johnston, Jr., a Democrat from Louisiana.

“we already know that science and technology cries out”: Ibid., p. S11184. The senator was Pete Domineci, a Republican from New Mexico.

“A vote to halt nuclear testing today”: Ibid., pp. S11186-S11187. The senator was William Cohen, a Republican from Maine.