Command and Control

Project 56 was the code name: In an oral history interview, Harry Jordan, a Los Alamos scientist, later described one of the rationales for the tests: “People worried that in shipping these weapons that they could go off accidentally… one accidental detonator could go, and would go nuclear in Chicago railroad yards or something.” See “Harry Jordan, Los Alamos National Laboratory,” National Radiobiology Archives Project, September 22, 1981, p. 1.

“one-point safe”: I am grateful to Bob Peurifoy and Harold Agnew for explaining the determinants of one-point safety to me.

The fourth design failed the test: Harry Jordan called it “a small nuclear incident.” Although the yield was less than one kiloton, it revealed that the weapon design wasn’t one-point safe. See “Harry Jordan,” p. 2.

“The problem of decontaminating the site”: “Plutonium Hazards Created by Accidental or Experimental Low-Order Detonation of Nuclear Weapons,” W. H. Langham, P. S. Harris, and T. L. Shipman, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-1981, December 1955 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 34.

“probably not safe against one-point detonation”: Quoted in Hansen, Swords of Armageddon, Volume VI, p. 32.

They argued that if such authority was “predelegated”: “The effective use of atomic warheads in air defense,” the Killian report had argued, “requires a doctrine of instant use as soon as a hostile attack has been confirmed.” This quote and a thorough examination of the new policy can be found in Peter J. Roman, “Ike’s Hair-Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60,” Security Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 121–64.

it was “critical” for the Air Force: Quoted in ibid., p. 133.

any Soviet aircraft that appeared “hostile”: Quoted in ibid., p. 138.

“strict command control [sic] of forces”: Quoted in ibid.

the French government wasn’t told about the weapons: In January 1952, President Truman authorized the deployment of atomic bombs to Morocco, without their nuclear cores — and without French authorization. See Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” p. 32.

“a positive effect on national morale”: “Letter, Herbert B. Loper, assistant to the secretary of defense (Atomic Energy), to Lewis L. Strauss, chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,” December 18, 1956 (SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1.

“The possibility of any nuclear explosion”: The full text of Wilson’s press release, issued on February 20, 1957, can be found in Hansen, Swords of Armageddon, Volume VI, pp. 37–38. This quote appears on page 37.

“a hundredth of a dose received”: Ibid., p. 38.

“It glowed for an instant”: “National Affairs: The A-Rocket,” Time, July 29, 1957.

Quarles left the meetings worried: See “The Origins and Evolution of S2C at Sandia National Laboratories 1949–1996,” William L. Stevens, consultant to Surety Assessment Center, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND99-1308, September 2001 (OFFICAL USE ONLY).

He rarely took vacations: These details come from “Quarles Held a Unique Niche,” Washington Post and Times Herald, May 9, 1959; “Donald A. Quarles, Secretary of the Air Force,” Department of the Air Force, Office of Information Services, May 1956, NSA; and George M. Watson, The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993), pp. 149–63.

Within weeks of the briefings for Quarles: See Stevens, “Origins and Evolutions of S2C at Sandia,” p. 30.

Quarles asked the Atomic Energy Commission to conduct: See “A Survey of Nuclear Weapon Safety Problems and the Possibilities for Increasing Safety in Bomb and Warhead Design,” prepared by Sandia Corporation with the advice and assistance of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the University of California Ernest O. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, RS 3466/26889, February 1959 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 10.

a list of eighty-seven accidents: Cited in ibid., p. 15.

Sandia found an additional seven: Cited in ibid.

More than one third… “war reserve” atomic or hydrogen bombs: See ibid., p. 16.

The rest involved training weapons: See ibid.

a B-36 bomber took off from Eielson Air Force Base: For a description of the accident see Michael H. Maggelet and James C. Oskins, Broken Arrow: The Declassified History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents (Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2007), pp. 33–44, and Norman S. Leach, Broken Arrow: America’s First Lost Nuclear Weapon (Calgary, Ontario, Canada: Red Deer Press, 2008), pp. 75–111.

On at least four different occasions, the bridgewire detonators: See “Accidents and Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons,” p. 1, Accident #1.

At least half a dozen times, the carts used to carry Mark 6 bombs: See ibid., p. 8, Incident #1.