these could be used in specific cases
to help usability. Many blockchain
companies provide alternative
wallet interfaces that have this kind
of functionality, such as
Blockchain.info’s numerous wallet
APIs.
Business Model Challenges
Another noted challenge, both functional
and technical, is related to business
models. At first traditional business
models might not seem applicable to
Bitcoin since the whole point of
decentralized peer-to-peer models is
that there are no facilitating
intermediaries to take a cut/transaction
fee (as in one classical business model).
However, there are still many
worthwhile revenue-generating products
and services to provide in the new
blockchain economy. Education and
mainstream user-friendly tools are
obvious low-hanging fruit (for example,
being targeted by Coinbase, Circle
Internet Financial, and Xapo), as is
improving the efficiency of the entire
worldwide existing banking and finance
infrastructure like Ripple—another
almost “no brainer” project, when
blockchain principles are understood.
Looking ahead, reconfiguring all of
business and commerce with smart
contracts in the Bitcoin 2.0 era could
likely be complicated and difficult to
implement, with many opportunities for
service providers to offer
implementation services, customer
education, standard setting, and other
value-added facilitations. Some of the
many types of business models that have
developed with enterprise software and
cloud computing might be applicable,
too, for the Bitcoin economy—for
example, the Red Hat model (fee-based
services to implement open source
software), and SaaS, providing Software
as a Service, including with
customization. One possible job of the
future could be smart contract auditor, to
confirm that AI smart contracts running
on the blockchain are indeed doing as
instructed, and determining and
measuring how the smart contracts have
self-rewritten to maximize the issuing
agent’s utility.
Scandals and Public
Perception
One of the biggest barriers to further
Bitcoin adoption is its public perception
as a venue for (and possible abettor of)
the dark net’s money-laundering, drug-
related, and other illicit activity—for
example, illegal goods online
marketplaces such as Silk Road. Bitcoin
and the blockchain are themselves
neutral, as any technology, and are “dual
use”; that is, they can be used for good
or evil. Although there are possibilities
for malicious use of the blockchain, the
potential benefits greatly outweigh the
potential downsides. Over time, public
perception can change as more
individuals themselves have ewallets
and begin to use Bitcoin. Still, it must be
acknowledged that Bitcoin as a
pseudonymous enabler can be used to
facilitate illegal and malicious
activities, and this invites in-kind “Red
Queen” responses (context-specific
evolutionary arms races) appropriate to
the blockchain. Computer virus detection
software arose in response to computer
viruses; and so far some features of the
same constitutive technologies of
Bitcoin (like Tor, a free and open
software network) have been deployed
back into detecting malicious players.
Another significant barrier to Bitcoin
adoption is the ongoing theft, scandals,
and scams (like so-called new altcoin
“pump and dump” scams that try to bid
up new altcoins to quickly profit) in the
industry. The collapse of the largest
Bitcoin exchange at the time, Tokyo-
based MtGox, in March 2014 came to
wide public attention. An explanation is
still needed for the confusing irony that
somehow in the blockchain, the world’s
most public transparent ledger, coins can
disappear and still remain lost months
later. The company said it had been
hacked, and that the fraud was a result of
a problem known as a “transaction
malleability bug.” The bug allowed
malicious users to double-spend,
transferring Bitcoins into their accounts
while making MtGox think the transfer
had failed and thus repeat the
transactions, in effect transferring the
value twice. 186 Analysts remain unsure if
MtGox was an externally perpetrated
hack or an internal embezzlement. The
issue is that these kinds of thefts persist.
For example, recent headlines inform us
that the Moolah CEO disappeared with
$1.4 million in Bitcoin (October
2014), 187 $2 million of Vericoin was
stolen (July 2014), 188 and $620,000 was
stolen in a Dogecoin mining attack (June
2014). 189
Blockchain industry models need to
solidify and mature such that there are
better safeguards in place to stabilize the
industry and allow both insiders and
outsiders to distinguish between good
and bad players. Oversight need not
come from outside; congruently
decentralized vetting, confirmation, and
monitoring systems within the ecosystem
could be established. An analogy from
citizen science is realizing that oversight
functions are still important, and
reinforce the system by providing checks
and balances. In DIYgenomics
participant-organized research studies,
for example, the oversight function is
still fulfilled, but in some cases with a
wholly new role relevant to the
ecosystem—independent citizen ethicists
—as opposed to traditional top-down